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As the title of The Economist article from 2017 put it, the world’s most valuable resource might 
no longer be oil, but rather data.1 The so-called online platforms managed to largely change the 
modern economy by being able to collect, analyse and use large amounts of data, becoming the 
most valuable and powerful companies in the world in the process.2 The position of these large 
players, however, raised a number of concerns in some areas, competition law in particular.3 
This notion of the so-called “new economy”4 entails two elements: online platforms and big 
data. Regarding the former element, there is no universal understanding of what exactly constitutes 
an online platform.5 In fact, in a 2016 communication, the Commission admitted that platforms 
come in “various shapes and sizes”6 and in its 2018 proposal for the so-called Platform-to-Business 
Regulation it similarly refrained from presenting a general understanding of a platform, working 
instead with the more limited term of “online intermediation services”.7  
In spite of the lack of a general definition, several creative ways to describe the reality of 
platforms have emerged recently. In particular, Stucke and Grunes introduced the term data-opoly.8 
Stucke explains the meaning of data-opoly with an emphasis on the “control [of] a key platform 
which, like a coral reef, attracts to its ecosystem users, sellers, advertisers, software developers, 
                                                 
1 THE ECONOMIST. The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data. The Economist [online]. The 
Economist Newspaper Limited, 2017 [cit. 2019-06-29]. Available at: 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.   
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market: Opportunities and Challenges for Europe. Brussels, 25.5.2016, COM(2016) 288 final, p. 2-3. Also available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288&from=EN [accessed 2019-06-25].  
3 See generally: STUCKE, Maurice E. Here Are All the Reasons It’s a Bad Idea to Let a Few Tech Companies 
Monopolize Our Data. Harvard Business Review [online]. Harvard Business Publishing, 2018 [cit. 2018-07-02]. 
Available at: https://hbr.org/2018/03/here-are-all-the-reasons-its-a-bad-idea-to-let-a-few-tech-companies-monopolize-
our-data.  
4 See JONES, Alison and Brenda SUFRIN. EU competition law: text, cases, and materials. Sixth edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 48-49, where the authors characterize the new economy both by relevant fields and 
by particular features (e.g. electronic communications, software, search engines etc. for the former and reliance on IP 
rights, need for the complementarity of products, services and platforms as well as in some cases the importance of 
network effects for the latter). 
5 Ibid. 
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 2, p. 2. 
7 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services. Brussels, 26.4.2018 
COM(2018) 238 final. Also available at: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=51803 [accessed 
2019-06-25]. In particular, while the explanatory memorandum often works with the notion of online platforms (see e.g. 
p. 1 or p. 3 of the proposal), the proposal subsequently introduces the term “online intermediation service” as well as the 
separate term “online search engine” in Arts 1 and 2 (p. 18-19 of the proposal). 
8 STUCKE, Maurice E. and Allen P. GRUNES. Big data and competition policy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 277.  
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apps, and accessory makers.”9  Each major player in the new economy thus controls an important 
platform (an online marketplace in case of Amazon, a social network in case of Facebook or mobile 
phone operating systems in case of Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android).10 
When it comes to the latter element of the new economy – big data – the situation is not 
significantly clearer. While the role of the ability to “organise new forms of participation or 
conducting business based on collecting, processing, and editing large amounts of data […]” in the 
rise of online platforms is without question,11 big data, nowadays a ubiquitous term, lacks a widely 
accepted definition as well.  
One approach in describing big data uses the “Four Vs” characterization: big data is thus 
delineated by the attributes of volume, velocity of collection, use and spreading, variety of 
information it can provide (e.g. about an individual) and lastly the value of such data In contrast to 
“other” data, i.e. data that falls outside of the term, but which can nonetheless be assessed according 
to these attributes, big data contains such volume, variety etc. of information that it allows for  
qualitatively different conclusions than with “standard” data. Consequently, while it has been 
possible for traditional brick-and-mortar businesses to collect data (e.g. on their customers or sales) 
for decades, big data is connected to the possibility to gather data at a much faster pace, much lower 
cost and with many more uses than before.12  
Other characterizations of data are also possible, for instance on the basis of how structured 
data is, what kind of information it provides or how is it gathered. For instance, it is also possible to 
differentiate between data according to the method through which it is obtained on an individual 
level – from data voluntarily and expressly provided by individuals (e.g. through a questionnaire), 
through data which can be observed (such as location data collected by mobile phones), to data that 
has to be derived or inferred through e.g. the use of algorithms and other more sophisticated 
methods of data collection and in particular data analysis.13  
                                                 
9 STUCKE, op. cit. 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 2, p. 2. 
12 See e.g. STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 16; see also GRAEF, Inge. EU competition law, data protection and online 
platforms: data as essential facility. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International B.V., 2016. 
International competition law series, v.68, p. 126-128, using a slightly altered structure, adding veracity of data to the 
mix. 
13 BUNDESKARTELLAMT and AUTHORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE. Competition Law and Data. 2016, p. 5-8. 
Also available at: http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf, [accessed 2019-06-
05], Further cited as “BKA/ADC”. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Competition Policy for the digital era 




Nonetheless, the key takeaway from the above is that big data, through the scale and scope of 
its collection and use, presents completely new possibilities for businesses. Big data can enable the 
improvement of existing products in a way that would not otherwise be possible; for instance, 
Google can improve the algorithms behind its search engine with the use of every search query 
made by any of the billions of its users. It can also enable the discovery of information that would 
be much more expensive and time-consuming to obtain, if at all; for example, location data of 
drivers and commuters obtained from mobile phones and other “smart” technology equipment can 
show traffic congestion at a quality (including being up-to-date) previously unachievable. The use 
of big data thus not only enables the analysis of (quantitatively) more data, but crucially makes it 
possible to arrive at (qualitatively) novel conclusions.14 
A recurring question in the practice of working with big data is if, and to what extent, can data 
be really characterised as the “new oil”. The problem, especially with large volumes of data, is that 
data alone does not present a competitive advantage; it is only when data is actually used to solve a 
problem that data and its analysis become useful.15 One early opinion went as far as claiming that 
the real value rests in the algorithms used to process data, giving thus less importance to data.16 
Nonetheless, the debate has recently shifted “in favour” of data and the view that analytical tools, 
including the use of so-called machine-learning methods, have limited relevance when it comes to 
building a strong and lasting advantage over competitors; one opinion of a leading industry expert is 
particularly telling: “[a]mong leading AI teams, many can likely replicate others’ software in, at 
most, 1–2 years.”17 Furthermore, recent reports point to the conclusion that leading companies are 
increasingly looking at acquisitions of datasets that are not always public,18 pointing to the possible 
conclusion that “[d]ata is the defensible barrier, not algorithms.”19 
Largely due to the phenomena known as network effects, which will be explained in Chapter 2, 
online platforms act as “hubs” which attract an ever-increasing number of users and with it, the 
                                                 
14 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 7, 10-11. 
15 GOLDFEIN, Jocelyn and Ivy NGUYEN. Data is not the new oil. Techcrunch.com [online]. Techcrunch.com, 2018 
[cit. 2018-07-05]. Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/27/data-is-not-the-new-oil/. 
16 In this particular opinion, the data-oil analogy was also probably put to perfection, as its author claims: “[b]ig data is 
the oil of the 21st century. But for all of its value, data is inherently dumb. It doesn’t actually do anything unless you 
know how to use it. Oil is useless thick goop until it’s refined into fuel.” See SONDERGAARD, Peter. Big Data Fades 
to the Algorithm Economy. Forbes.com [online]. Forbes Media LLC, 2015 [cit. 2018-07-05]. Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2015/08/14/big-data-fades-to-the-algorithm-economy/. 
17 NG, Andrew. What Artificial Intelligence Can and Can’t Do Right Now. Harvard Business Review [online]. Harvard 
Business Publishing, 2016 [cit. 2018-07-05]. Available at: https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-artificial-intelligence-can-and-
cant-do-right-now. Ng was at that time the Chief Scientist for Baidu, the Chinese search engine company. 
18 LOHR, Steve. Data Could Be the Next Tech Hot Button for Regulators. The New York Times [online]. The New York 
Times, 2017 [cit. 2018-07-05]. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/technology/data-regulators-google-
facebook-monopoly.html; One particular piece of information in this respect stands out - according to IBM, 70% of data 
is in private databases, rather than on publicly accessible websites. 
19 Stucke and Grunes also raise similar thoughts, albeit not so expressly, see STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 201. 
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flow of data available to platforms for analysis and further use also increases. In practice, this also 
led to the concentration of different activities, including the data obtained from such actions, with 
only a small number of platforms; in certain cases, with only one platform being the almost 
undisputed leader in providing a certain kind of service (e.g. Google in search engines or Amazon in 
online marketplaces). This leads to the possible concentration of big data with only a small number 
of companies and the difficulty for outside competitors to access, use such data and compete against 
these incumbents. 
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the position of companies that control the largest 
online platforms created several concerns. With regard to competition, in 2016 the French and 
German competition authorities jointly identified several types of these when it comes to the 
accumulation of data. Data thus may act as a source of market power or increase transparency in a 
market in a way that creates incentives for collusion;20 furthermore, to the extent data presents a 
competitive advantage, there is a risk of anticompetitive conduct such as exclusionary practices on 
part of a dominant platform.21 These concerns were subsequently confirmed by other authors.22  
In summary, the importance of data in the new economy most likely cannot be overstated; while 
it enabled the rise of a number of key online platforms, it also created a number of concerns, 
including those connected to competition law. The next subchapter thus explains how this situation 
is reflected in this thesis. 
 
1.2. Research Question 
The thesis aims to analyse the applicability of the so-called “refusal to supply” case-law of the 
Court of Justice on big data as an input which is vital for competing on a number of markets but 
which, due to a number of factors outlined further in the thesis, may not always be available to 
undertakings that wish to participate in such markets. The “refusal to supply” case-law presents one 
possible legal method, an instrument specific to EU competition law, through which it could be 
possible to access big data held by an online platform. 
The key question in such an analysis is the way EU competition law regulates access to 
accumulated big data within the control of an online platform, which can be in the position of a 
                                                 
20 EZRACHI, Ariel and Maurice E. STUCKE.  Systematic and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion [online]. 
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 366, 2018 [cit. 2018-12-10]. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3282235. 
21 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 11-20. It should be noted that the report cites more types of anticompetitive conduct under 
the last category - including mergers, price discrimination and exploitative conduct regarding privacy of users.  
22 See e.g. STUCKE, op. cit. 3, or HOLKOVÁ LUBYOVÁ, Linda. Data as a Source of Market Power. Antitrust. 2017 
9(3), p. 86-88. 
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dominant undertaking, by another undertaking. In terms of refusals to supply, which can be 
prohibited as abuse of dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU, such an assessment requires the 
discussion of each step necessary to arrive at a finding of prohibited behaviour, from the definition 
of relevant markets to the application of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to determine 
an illegal refusal to supply.  
Firstly, the thesis will explain the necessary background for further analysis in the chapters 
dealing with the accumulation of data in online platforms and the development and current 
understanding of refusal to supply in EU law. The thesis is subsequently structured according to the 
main steps that need to be made to arrive at a finding of a violation of Art. 102 TFEU through a 
refusal to supply big data; within each relevant chapter (i.e. chapters dealing with the notions of 
relevant markets, establishment of dominant position or the application of the conditions defining a 
refusal to supply), the following will be presented.  
Firstly, the current state of the law will be outlined in order to point out the standards, according 
to which competition analysis is usually conducted. Secondly, the applicability of key concepts 
(from the notions of relevant markets or dominant position to the indispensability of input) to data 
as the input potentially sought by undertakings will be discussed with emphasis on the 
modifications that need to be made in order to properly account for the specificities of big data. 
Thirdly, even though any particular situation where access to big data is sought will have to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, it will be suggested what impact could the particular steps in 
competition analysis have on the requests to access different kinds of data or in various markets. In 
the end, a brief outline of the conditions under which access to data could be provided in practice 
will be provided. 
The analysis outlined above is based on a number of main sources. Firstly, it is academic 
writing dedicated to the issues of multi-sided markets, online platforms and the use of data and the 
reflection of these phenomena in competition analysis. Furthermore, materials prepared by 
competition authorities on these questions are also used. The thesis also discusses judgments of the 
Court of Justice of the EU in the area of EU competition law and the decision-making practice of 
the European Commission, with particular focus on decisions concerning online platforms, online 
businesses in general or decisions where the undertakings in question collected and analysed data, 
including big data. 
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2. Accumulation of Data in Online Platforms 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background for further analysis and explain the key 
factors that lead to the rise of online platforms into their current positions. For this reason, Chapter 
2 outlines two key causes that are most often associated with the strength of online platforms and 
their ability to accumulate data; their practical influence is subsequently discussed in later chapters. 
Consequently, this chapter shall deal firstly (subchapter 2.1.) with the notion of the so-called 
network effects and secondly (subchapter 2.2.) with the concept of multi-sidedness of markets. 
Finally, developing the outline provided in Chapter 1, the concerns connected to the accumulation 
of data in online platforms are discussed (subchapter 2.3.).23 
 
2.1. Network Effects 
The first factor discussed in this chapter is the idea of network effects. However, over the years, 
a number of different categories of network effects have been described and the notion became the 
subject of rich discussion. In order to cover such an issue with clarity, this subchapter will focus on 
two broad categories of these effects: “traditional” network effects and so-called “data-driven” 
network effects. The first part of this subchapter (2.1.1.) will deal with the former category, the 
relevance of which has been universally accepted. This part will also introduce a further distinction 
between direct and indirect network effects in their traditional meaning. The second part of this 
subchapter (2.1.2.) will explain the influence of big data on the effectiveness of network effects. It 
will thus discuss, as suggested above, the category of data-driven network effects, which, in contrast 
to the former type of network effects, is a relatively novel concept. Furthermore, the issue of 
network effects is further discussed in subchapter 2.2. in connection to the notion of multi-
sidedness. 
 
                                                 
23 At the outset the author wishes to note that both in academic writing and legal practice, online platforms are subject to 
an almost overwhelming amount of descriptions and analyses; often, the same characteristics are merely described by 
different terms or the concepts used to define online platforms overlap in substance. For instance, one feature of online 
platforms that is not explicitly discussed in detail below is the influence of the so-called supply-side economies of scale. 
In most cases where online platforms dominate a certain market, there are substantial initial investments that need to be 
expended in order to not only build up a critical position on a given market, but also to enter such a market in the first 
place (e.g. investment in research and development required to create a functional search engine algorithm); however, 
once these steps are taken, the cost of further developing the platforms’ products and services (e.g. if we remain with the 
example of search engines, the cost of making one additional search query and producing one additional search result) 
is quite limited and online platforms can benefit from such economies of scale. See GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 32-33. 
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2.1.1. “Traditional” Network Effects 
As noted above, “traditional” network effects are the focus of this part of the subchapter; in 
terms of further analysis, they provide the necessary basis for the discussion of any modifications, 
such as the “data-driven” type of effects. Furthermore, it was the “traditional” category that 
developed first in time and accordingly is the most settled, even though more precise descriptions of 
network effects with respect to online platforms are provided further in the thesis; nonetheless, even 
in their “classic” form, these effects have immense influence on the operation of some online 
platforms, as explained below. 
The idea of network effects was originally confined to discussions in economic circles, where 
the notion caught attention and traction mostly in the 1980s.24 Over time, the concept found its way 
into legal reasoning; a range of areas where network effects could be used in legal argumentation 
was identified by e.g. the American authors Lemley and McGowan: corporate law, intellectual 
property law, standard-setting, Internet governance, telecommunications regulation and, most 
importantly, antitrust law.25 These authors proposed that the existence of network effects required a 
profound reflection in some areas of law, in particular on the question whether and to what extent 
should one think differently about antitrust law when it seeks to regulate the behaviour on markets 
where network effects are present.26 As they suggested, the existence of network effects could be 
used both as an argument for invoking antitrust law in a given case or, conversely, for refraining 
from invoking the law altogether.27  
Nowadays, in EU law and policy, network effects are increasingly often mentioned in 
connection to the rise of online platforms. According to the European Commission, one of the 
important and specific characteristics of online platforms is precisely that “they benefit from 
‘network effects’, where, broadly speaking, the value of the service increases with the number of 
users[.]”28  
As suggested above, the discussion of network effects lead over time to further classification of 
different types of such factors. The key distinction in this respect is between direct and indirect 
network effects. 
                                                 
24 KATZ, Michael L. and Carl SHAPIRO. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The American 
Economic Review. 1985, 75 (3), p. 424-440; FARRELL, Joseph and Garth SALONER. Standardization, Compatibility, 
and Innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics. 1985, 16 (1), p. 70-83; FARRELL, Joseph and Paul KLEMPERER. 
Chapter 31: Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects. In: ARMSTRONG, 
Mark and Robert PORTER, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 3. Elsevier, 2007, p. 1967-2072. 
25 LEMLEY, Mark A. and David MCGOWAN. Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects. California Law 
Review. 1998, 86(3), p. 481-612.  
26 LEMLEY, MCGOWAN, op. cit. 25, p. 485. 
27 Ibid., p. 512-513. 
28 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 2, p. 2. 
8 
 
A classic example of a product that benefits from direct network effects is a telephone network: 
the more people use the same telephone network, the greater the benefit for the individual as he or 
she may reach more people within the same network. 29 According to Katz and Shapiro, who put 
forward one of the most respected analyses of network effects, direct network effects can be 
summarised by the rule that: “the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases 
with the number of other agents consuming the good.”30  
Although a different kind of network effects is most often emphasised when it comes to online 
platforms, there are clear examples of direct network effects in such a context: as is the case of a 
telephone network, online communication networks – or more fittingly communication applications 
(or even embedded communication functions in certain social networking websites like Facebook) – 
are one such example. By extension, social networking websites in themselves are examples of 
direct network effects coming into play; the more people (and the more of one’s friends, relatives 
and acquaintances) join a certain social networking service, the more value can any individual user 
derive from his or her own participation in that network. 
The verbal (but not factual) opposite of direct network effects comes in the form of indirect 
network effects.31 While direct network effects are built upon the use of a single product (in a given 
case), indirect network effects arise from the connection between the use of a “primary” product 
and the availability of another, “secondary” or “complementary”, product.32 The classic brick-and-
mortar example of indirect network effects is the purchase of a razor and the availability and 
affordability of razorblades for that type of razor, or even more broadly, relationship between any 
original product and the supply of spare or repair parts. Another illustration is generally the 
relationship between e.g. personal computer hardware and software: the more people use a certain 
type of hardware, the more software will be developed to be used for this type of hardware. A 
similar representation of indirect network effects can be also seen in the case of computer or mobile 
operating systems: more applications and programs will be available for the widest-adopted 
systems.33 
In practice, indirect network effects have also value for online platforms; on the other hand, 
their key manifestation in such environments is closely connected to the issue of multi-sidedness, 
which is covered in subchapter 2.2. along with further discussion of this type of effects. 
                                                 
29 See JONES, SUFRIN, op. cit. 4 p. 48-49, or similarly WHISH, Richard and David BAILEY. Competition law. Ninth 
edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 11-12; see also GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 21-22. 
30 KATZ, SHAPIRO, op. cit. 24, p. 424. 
31 JONES, SUFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 48-49, WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 11-12, GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 21-22. 
32 The notion of primary and complementary products is introduced by the author for clarity and is not usually singled 
out in the literature in this way. 
33 See FARRELL, SALONER, op. cit. 24, p.70-71. 
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The outline above in this part of subchapter 2.1. provided the necessary basis for further 
understanding of network effects. As the next part shows, however, when considering the impact of 
big data in the new economy, it is also necessary to reflect on its impact on the existing, 
“traditional” network effects. 
 
2.1.2. “Data-Driven” Network Effects 
The second broad category of network effects concerns the so-called “data-driven” network 
effects. As discussed below, even though their “inclusion” in the accepted categorisation of network 
effects is not certain, they present an important view on the role of big data with respect to online 
platforms. 
Given the importance of data in the new economy, and, as the German and French competition 
authorities held: “the technological changes of the digital economy have revolutionized the 
possibilities to collect, process and commercially use data in almost every business sector[,]”34 
there have been attempts to describe the notion of network effects in connection to big data within a 
specific category. While the ways in which collection and analysis of data can help companies are 
well known and generally well-described – these can range from improving the product provided, 
better targeting of potential customers to opening new business opportunities35 – Stucke and Grunes  
view these improvements through the lens of a special type of network effects, giving thus rise to 
the idea of “data network effects” or “data-driven network effects”.36 This way, a new layer of 
examples can be added to those already described above, with the distinctive detail that various 
properties of big data help distinguish data-driven network effects from the “traditional” (i.e. not 
data-driven) network effects discussed in the previous part of this subchapter.37  
It is important, however, to note that, in terms of existing academic writing on network effects, 
Stucke and Grunes stand out with an approach describing specific data-related types of network 
effects.38 Other authors express their views on the use of scale and scope of data purely or mainly in 
terms of the technical nature of the use of data (i.e. by referring to so-called machine-learning)39 or 
through the concept of special “learning effects” on production where learning about e.g. previously 
recorded search queries may enable lowering the cost of producing subsequent and higher-quality 
                                                 
34 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 9. 
35 See e.g. BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 9-11. 
36 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 170, 186, 189. 
37 Stucke and Grunes use the distinction between “traditional” and “non-traditional” in STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, 
p. 164. 
38 Compare RUBINFELD, Daniel L. and Michal S. GAL. Access Barriers to Big Data. Arizona Law Review. 2017, 
59(2), p. 355-356. 
39 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 11. 
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search results.40 It could thus validly be claimed that data-driven network effects are actually not a 
type of network effects stricto sensu, as they have been described in previous literature. The author 
proposes that without the need to determine to what degree is the thought of data-driven network 
effects true to its name, it is useful to understand them at the very least as factors that can greatly 
enhance the effectiveness of already existing “traditional” direct or indirect network effects and, in 
the process, the product or service provided by an online platform. 
Stucke and Grunes thus put forward several types of data-driven network effects, or, as 
described above, factors enhancing existing network effects, two of which it is pertinent to describe 
here. First, they describe a type of effect following from the scale of data, and secondly, one 
stemming from the scope of data.41  
Regarding the first type – an effect resulting from the scale of data – the thinking goes as 
follows: unlike in a telephone network, in which individual users benefit from the overall increase 
in participants (where a telephone network user has more people to possibly contact), the benefit 
from a surge in the usage of a certain product or service is slightly less visible. The more customers 
adopt a certain service, the more data in total is given to the service operator, who can in turn utilize 
the larger amount of data available to improve the service.42 Stucke and Grunes mention several 
recognised examples of this type of data-driven network effect: one of them is e.g. the Waze 
navigation application, which collects data from drivers who commute with the “app” switched on 
and therefore in turn provide large amounts of traffic data to its servers; the data is subsequently 
analysed and provided to other drivers in the form of information on e.g. traffic congestion;43 
another, more common, example is search engines: whether people use Google or DuckDuckGo, 
the more users search through a certain engine, the more queries does the provider have and the 
more individual cases can be processed by the engine’s algorithms to better pair search queries and 
results in the future.44  
                                                 
40 ARGENTON, Cédric and Jens PRÜFER. Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities. Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics. 2012, 8(1), p. 79-81. 
41 Compare STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 170, 186. 
42 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 170; See also the example of Microsoft’s argumentation in the lead up to the 
merger decision in Microsoft/Yahoo decision (discussed also in subsequent chapters) in GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 37-38. 
43 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 171; Waze was subsequently acquired by Google. In fact, it is often suggested that 
a number of important mergers in the past years have been driven by the aim of increasing the scope of data available to 
a platform, see RUBINFELD, GAL, op. cit. 38, p. 352. 
44 PETROPOULOUS, Georgios, Search engines, big data and network effects. In: Breugel.org Blog [online]. Breugel, 
2016 [cit. 2019-06-02]. Available at: http://bruegel.org/2016/11/search-engines-big-data-and-network-effects/; 
STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 173; similarly, NUCCIO, Massimiliano and Marco GUERZONI. Big data: Hell or 
heaven? Digital platforms and market power in the data-driven economy. Competition and Change. 2019, 23(3), p.318-
320 and LERNER, Andres V. The Role of 'Big Data' in Online Platform Competition [online]. 2014 [cit. 2019-06-09], p. 
10-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2482780, strongly mentioning various “recommending” functions 
on a number of online platforms – e.g. from information on items that other users often bought together with the one 
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The second type of effect proposed by Stucke and Grunes arises from the scope of data; going 
back to the “four Vs” of big data mentioned in Chapter 1, this concept reflects best the variety of 
data at an online platform’s disposal. In this case, some examples from above can be reused. 
Google’s algorithms do not benefit only from the sheer scale of search queries processed by its 
servers every moment, but also from the ability to access information about a user’s activity across 
the entire portfolio of applications and services offered by the company, i.e. the texts of Gmail.com 
users’ emails, the types of Youtube.com videos people watch and so on. These can in turn be used to 
provide more personalised search results to users.45 The same goes e.g. for any “digital assistant” 
application that can use a larger scope of data than just that obtained from communication. 
Consequently, such an “assistant” can also provide more personalised information (for instance, 
when a user is looking for a restaurant, the larger variety of available data can, through the addition 
of e.g. location data or an individual’s income bracket, improve the suggestion made by such an 
application).46 Similarly, the access to a wider scope of data can help an online platform to better 
respond to current events (e.g. when a well-known person passes away, a search engine can stop 
sending users searching for his or her name to general pages about that person, but instead changes 
the search results to put recent reports to the top of the result page).47  
The importance of network effects (including data-driven effects) is, especially in relation to 
online platforms, sometimes dismissed, most often with reference to other factors that influence the 
success of certain businesses over others.48 The author nonetheless argues that while these effects 
may not in themselves be determinative of an online platform’s success (and such a proposition is 
not made by the author), they need to be recognised, on the basis of the explanation provided in this 
subchapter, as one of the most important factors leading to the strong position of certain online 
platforms. In particular, this subchapter demonstrated that either traditionally defined or data-driven 
effects are clearly beneficial to online platforms such as Facebook (as a representative of social 
networking services) and Google (as an illustration of a search engine). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
viewed by a customer on Amazon.com to personalization of news services and recommendation of articles with e.g. 
similar topics. 
45 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 188-189. 
46 Ibid., p. 187. 
47 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 39; although Graef does not use the language of data-driven network effects, this example 
corresponds well to the second effect presented by Stucke and Grunes. See also RUBINFELD, GAL, op. cit. 38, p. 351 
and the authors’ discussion of temporal barriers to access to data. 
48 TUCKER, Catherine, Why Network Effects Matter Less Than They Used To. Harvard Business Review [online]. 
Harvard Business Publishing, 2018 [cit. 2019-06-09]. Available at: https://hbr.org/2018/06/why-network-effects-matter-




The second reason why online platforms have managed to attain such powerful positions is that 
they managed to use the so-called multi-sided nature of certain markets or, in other words, the 
possibility to establish a multi-sided business.49 The first part of this subchapter will deal with the 
notion of multi-sidedness in general (2.2.1.), while the second part provides a discussion on the 
connection between the concepts of multi-sidedness and network effects (2.2.2.). 
 
2.2.1. Multi-Sidedness in General 
According to Tirole and Rochet’s paper in which they most likely introduced the notion of a 
two-sided market, “many if not most markets with network externalities are characterized by the 
presence of two distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from interacting through a common 
platform.”50 In essence, multi-sided markets can be described as markets that involve two (or 
theoretically more, thus warranting the prefix “multi-”) sets of customers, who effectively need 
each other. At the very least, customers from one group value the service provided by a business – a 
platform – placed in the middle of these two groups more if the other group of customers also uses 
the services, albeit not necessarily of the same kind, of such a business.51  
Multi-sided markets carry an important economic characteristic: because of the existence of 
more sides of the market (i.e. more groups of customers who mutually benefit from each other’s 
presence therein), a so-called positive externality is created; however, individuals are usually not 
able to “internalize” or take account of these externalities in their decision-making.52 For instance, 
both retailers who rent space in a department store and the customers who visit such a store and 
shop there benefit from each other’s presence; one group has access to large numbers of consumers 
while consumers have access to a store with a number of retailers. Nonetheless, the customers do 
not take into account the fact that by visiting, they increase the attractiveness of the store for 
retailers.53  
                                                 
49 For clarity, the author is going to preferably use the expression of a multi-sided “market”, but it should also be noted 
that Graef makes a distinction between the use of the term “multi-sided markets” and the fact that certain online 
platforms act as “multi-sided businesses”; see GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 19.  
50 ROCHET, Jean-Charles and Jean TIROLE. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of the European 
Economic Association. 2003, 1(4), p. 990. 
51 EVANS, David S. and Richard SHMALENSEE. The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms. 
Competition Policy International. 2007, 3(1), p. 152. 
52 EVANS, SCHMALENSEE, op. cit. 51, p. 154. 
53 Similarly, in another (heavily simplified) brick and mortar example, a nightclub might be charging different entrance 
fees to men and women in order to increase the number of persons of certain sex and thus make the club attractive to the 
members of the other; again, the visitors do not take into account the effect their entry has on the other side of the 
market. See EVANS, David S. The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Yale Journal on Regulation. 2003, 
20(3), p. 332-333, 376-377. An example to the contrary – i.e. of a market where the customer is able to internalise a 
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In practice, the operation of a platform that occupies the place between two groups of customers 
– two sides of a market – requires that the platform operator thinks not only about the price level 
that it is going to adopt, but additionally and mostly about the price structure. Determination of the 
price structure, i.e. how much to charge one group and how much to charge another, has one crucial 
objective: to get “both sides” of the market on board and take advantage of the multi-sided nature of 
certain markets.54 The platform thus acts as a matchmaker of sorts and importantly, becomes the one 
player in a multi-sided market who is able to take account of the characteristics of such markets and 
the effects that may arise when it manages to take advantage of it. This is reflected in many 
successful online platforms which seemingly offer their services to customers for free and finance 
their operation through the monetisation of the other side of a multi-sided market.55 
As is the case with the idea of network effects, multi-sidedness is not a concept that would be 
universally understood in the same way; for instance, there can be at least three types of definitions 
of multi-sided markets based on different elements.56 Furthermore, as Graef puts it, in practice and 
especially in the case of competition analysis, it is much more important to look at the multi-sided 
nature of a market or a business on a case-by-case basis rather than to look for a universal, all-
encompassing understanding of the impact operating in a multi-sided market has on a platform.57 
Nonetheless, the purpose of this subchapter is not to provide an exhausting terminology on multi-
sidedness, but to provide a presentation of the (economic) reality of the operation of online 
platforms. 
Multi-sided markets exist in two main settings. In addition to the examples above, the older, 
classical and mostly brick-and-mortar illustrations involve publishers (connecting readers and 
authors), travel services (connecting travellers and travel-related businesses), print media and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
positive externality – is the buyer of a razor who is claimed to be able to internalize, to take account of, the impact of 
the purchase and especially take into account the price of a razorblade in the initial purchase. See ROCHET, TIROLE, 
op. cit. 50, p. 994. 
54 ROCHET, Jean Charles and Jean TIROLE. Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report. The RAND Journal of 
Economics. 2006, 37(3), p. 665; This also implicitly determines which side of the market is the platform going to make 
most of its money on – Tirole and Rochet point to video game platforms who treated players as “loss leaders” and made 
money from charging software developers, while makers of operating systems chose the opposite path and made money 
on selling to clients-customers, while software developers were their “loss leaders”; see ROCHET, TIROLE, op. cit. 50, 
p. 990-992. 
55 Such an approach has raised a number of reflections, including both the examination of its benefits and flaws to 
consumers and competition in general, but also attempts to provide the first assessments of personal data as 
consideration in contract law. See EDELMAN, Benjamin and Damien GERADIN. An Introduction to the Competition 
Law and Economics of “Free” [online]. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2018, 2018 [cit. 2019-06-15], p. 4-7. 
Available at: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CPI-Edelman-Geradin.pdf, 
and LANGHANKE, Carmen, and Martin SCHMIDT-KESSEL. Consumer data as consideration. Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law. 2015, 4(6), p. 221-223. 
56 AUER, Dirk and Nicholas PETIT. Two-Sided Markets and the Challenge of Turning Economic Theory into Antitrust 
Policy. The Antitrust Bulletin. 2015, 60(4), p. 434. 
57 Furthermore, she claims that the practical appreciation of multi-sidedness is influenced by the degree to which the 
multi-sided nature of a business is determinative in a given competition issue. See GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 78. 
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“yellow-page” directories (connecting advertisers and readers), as well as payment-related services 
(e.g. Diners Club).58  
Online platforms of various kind (from search engines or social networking sites to online 
marketplaces etc.) then provide the other group of examples. Besides social networking websites 
and search engines, which attract consumers to their key products while also attracting advertisers 
to the possibility to reach these users, the latter category can also be described on the example of 
online marketplaces, such as Amazon.com (connecting buyers and sellers) or other platforms like 
Uber or Airbnb.59  
Crucially, the position of these companies is different from the former group in that precisely 
the “move” online enables them to benefit from the possibility to connect, almost instantly and at a 
cost far lower than with brick-and-mortar businesses, much larger amounts of people or even people 
it would not be possible to connect outside such an environment. Consequently, this is precisely 
why the Internet enabled the creation of social networks that attracted billions of people or the 
development of online businesses that disrupted the status quo in many existing fields (e.g. as is the 
case with Amazon.com and its influence on retail sales). In the process, while, as mentioned above, 
there are no absolute barriers to collecting data for brick-and-mortar businesses, it is arguably more 
probable that it is in the online environment that collection and analysis of data occur on a scale that 
enables the creation and subsequent use of big data. What the discussion above shows is that multi-
sidedness is a concept long recognised in theory and, even more importantly, widely taken 
advantage of in practice across various business environments. At the same time, however, it is 
necessary to understand the “inner workings” of such platforms, because the effects that come into 
play therein are immensely important for some steps of competition analysis with respect to online 
platforms. 
 
2.2.2. Multi-Sidedness and Network Effects 
As suggested above, the second part of subchapter 2.2. will deal with the connection between 
multi-sidedness and network effects. As was the case in subchapter 2.1., both “traditional” and 
“data-driven” network effects will be discussed below. 
                                                 
58 EVANS, SCHMALENSEE, op. cit. 51, p. 155-157; see also examples in HOLZWEBER, Stefan. Market Definition 
for Multi-Sided Platforms: A Legal Reappraisal. World Competition. 2017, 40(4), p. 563-564. 
59 The more customers use the Uber app in a given city or a region, the more drivers will be attracted to the platform; 
similarly, the more travellers turn to Airbnb to search for accommodation, the more owners will be tempted to put their 
property for rent on the platform. See STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 189. 
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Multi-sided markets can be characterised by the presence of network effects; it is, however, 
necessary to properly distinguish between the types of network effects already discussed and those 
specific precisely to multi-sided markets.60 As was mentioned above, the notion of multi-sidedness 
of businesses or markets is extensively discussed in literature; one recent characterization of the 
phenomenon explains multi-sidedness by two factors: firstly, that on such a multi-sided market 
distinct groups of individuals interact with each other (as explained above) and secondly, that so-
called cross-platform network effects exist between these groups.61  
Looking at any such market, it is possible to identify a version of an indirect network effect, 
e.g. that the increasing number of Facebook users makes it more interesting for advertisers to buy 
advertising space on the platform. The indirect nature of network effects in the case of multi-
sidedness, however, does not refer to the increased demand for a secondary or complementary 
product, but rather describes the fact that as the number of users on one side of a platform increases, 
so does the interest (and consequently the number) of users on the other.62 The Google search 
engine (together with Facebook attracting the overwhelming majority of digital advertising 
spending63) can be taken as another simplified example: one side of its platform attracts users of the 
search engine, while the other consists of advertisers who, through such a platform, attempt to reach 
the increasing number of users.64  
With the successful connection of the various “sides” of these markets, online platforms may 
create a very strong position to collect data that “flows” through them due to the fact that the 
relationship between the two (or more) groups of users is realised precisely on such a platform. As 
already suggested above, this is a way in which an online platform can move towards the idea of a 
                                                 
60 See GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 18. Other authors, as already suggested at the beginning of this chapter, use slightly 
different structures of network effects typologies - to illustrate, Stucke and Grunes use four different “categories” of 
network effects, while recognising the direct/indirect distinction - in this respect, see generally STUCKE, GRUNES, op. 
cit. 8, p. 162, 170, 186, 189, 200. The two examples covered below in this subchapter essentially correspond to what 
Stucke and Grunes call “traditional network effects” and “traditional spill-over network effects in multi-sided online 
platforms”. See STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 162-162, 189. 
61 These are sometimes also referred to as cross-side network effects. See SHELANSKI, Howard, Samantha KNOX and 
Arif DHILLA. 8. Network effects and efficiencies in multi-sided markets. In: Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided 
Platforms [online]. OECD, 2018, p. 189-198 [cit. 2019-03-07], p. 189. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms-2018.pdf. See also GRAEF, 
op. cit. 12, p. 22, who works with a three-point understanding of multi-sidedness, possibly due to reliance on different 
or narrower body of work on multi-sidedness. 
62 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 22. This for instance includes the notions of single- and multi-homing on either side of the 
market - see for a particularly detailed analysis of factors to be taken into account in such assessments COLLYER, Kate, 
Hugh MULLAN and Natalie TIMAN. 3. Measuring market power in multi-sided markets. In: Rethinking Antitrust Tools 
for Multi-Sided Platforms [online]. OECD, 2018, p. 71-86 [cit. 2019-03-07], p. 76-78.  Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms-2018.pdf. 
63 GARRAHAN, Matthew. Google and Facebook dominance forecast to rise: Tech duopoly to account for 84% of 
online advertising spend this year, forecasts report. Financial Times [online]. Financial Times, 2017 [cit. 2019-03-07]. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/cf362186-d840-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482. 
64 See e.g. GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 53. 
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data-opoly, the “coral reef” that attracts various sources of data and facilitates its transfer and 
collection. 
In addition, Stucke and Grunes came forward with a data-driven “category” of effects in this 
area as well, in the form of “data-driven” spill-over effects (as opposed to “traditional” spill-over 
effects).65 This way, online platforms not only build the opportunity to collect data, but also enhance 
it with the use of already available data. As in subchapter 2.1., the influence of big data in such 
cases should be best understood as an additional layer of effects on top of the traditional ones. With 
the use and analysis of big data, an online platform can e.g. tailor online advertisements, search 
results, shopping suggestions etc. for each individual user and, in doing so, generate greater returns 
to the scale and scope of data. It thus creates more benefits for one side of a market, which in turn 
helps to involve the other.66 While online platforms rely on traditional network effects as well, it is 
through the use of data they can enhance their services much further, in e.g. providing information 
on what users endorse (through “liking” posts on Facebook or using similar features in different 
services) or even spotting emerging trends in their interests and subsequently selling such 
information to advertisers.  
Nonetheless, while multi-sided markets share these important characteristics, this does not 
mean that every online platform exhibits these connections and the corresponding effects in a 
uniform way. For instance, according to OECD analyses, it is possible to distinguish between so-
called service-based and subsidy-based platforms.67  
The former category is exemplified by the Airbnb platform, where a “supply side” of the market 
in the form of accommodation owners can be identified as well as a “demand side” in the form of 
people seeking accommodation. One side provides a service to the other through the platform, 
which usually asks for a fee taken from the price of the service.68  
The latter category is represented by Facebook. Facebook users do not pay a price for using the 
service because they have free access to the platform. The other side of the platform, the advertisers, 
                                                 
65 Compare STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 189 and p. 190-191. 
66 One example of these data-driven network effects is the case of Coupons.com, which, through analysing data, has a 
clear advantage over traditional paper-based coupon providers. As paper coupons can be only distributed in large 
amounts and most importantly with more or less the same content (i.e. applying to the same goods), the rate of coupon 
use – redemption – is going to be limited. Conversely, if coupons are distributed through an online platform, it is 
possible to analyse the data provided by customers (and also analyse them with much less effort than if one wanted to 
analyse the usage of paper coupons) and with an increasing amount of data at the platform’s disposal, it is possible to 
better predict what goods are consumers interested in - tailoring the coupon offers to this information and making it 
more likely that customers will use them. This in return will help attract more retailers to the platform and so on. See 
STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 191-193. 




do, however, have to pay to advertise on the platform and in this way, subsidise the cost of usage of 
Facebook users.69  
The strength of cross-platform network effects varies in these two types of platforms: service-
based platforms exhibit relatively symmetrical network effects: the more people seek 
accommodation, the more homeowners benefit and vice versa. In contrast, there is little 
interdependence of this kind in subsidy-based platforms: users only benefit from having enough 
advertisers to subsidise the cost of running the platform; excessive amount of advertisements can 
even provide negative experience to the users.70  
In conclusion, the notion of multi-sidedness can thus also be expressed with the use of network 
effects, which can be further enhanced with the use of big data. As this subchapter explained, 
regardless of the type of platform, the effective use of the multi-sided nature of certain markets is 
another crucial reason behind the rise of online platforms into their current prominence. 
Furthermore, even with comparison to “offline” platforms, online platforms that take advantage of 
the amount data they are in a prime position to collect can stretch their position even further. 
 
2.3. Competition Concerns Arising from the Accumulation of Data 
In the two previous subchapters, it was shown that network effects and the ability to connect the 
sides of a multi-sided market (in both cases possibly enhanced by the use of big data and its 
analysis) can play an important role in the success of online platforms. However, these properties of 
online platforms also raise numerous concerns, because they arguably enable these platforms to 
occupy a very strong position in their respective markets and they also mean that enormous amount 
of data may “flow” through these platforms. 
In general, the concern closest to competition law is that online platforms can acquire a position 
of significant market power.71 It is generally accepted that the presence of network effects in a 
                                                 
69 SHELANSKI, KNOX, DHILLA, op. cit. 61, p. 190-191. As the authors explain therein, in the case of subsidy-based 
platforms, one more element is present in contrast to service-based platform: often, the subsidising side is not providing 
any sort of service or product that individual users would want and because of which they would join the platform (e.g. 
advertisement); because of this characteristic, another “side” of the market has to be present, most often in the form of 
content creators or providers. These content creators may (in the case of Facebook users, who effectively create the 
content other users come to Facebook for) or may not (as would be the case of journalists in e.g. online media) 
correspond to the two sides on a service-based platform.  
70 Ibid., p. 192. 
71 It should, however, be pointed out at the outset that this is not a claim accepted without controversy. If we look at the 
discussion of network effects and multi-sided markets above, it is certain these are at least capable of strengthening the 
position of an online platform and helping it obtain access to more data than its competitors who are not taking 
advantage of these phenomena are able to. Nonetheless, the significance of these effects is sometimes contested. 




given market does not mean that it would be impossible to compete in such a market, even if a 
platform has already built up its position thanks to these effects. Nonetheless, there is a concern that 
because of them, there is a danger that such a market will “tip” to one or a very small number of 
platforms (theoretically, those that managed to use the factors discussed in previous subchapters to 
their benefit the soonest or in the most efficient way).72  
The “data-advantage” of one undertaking above others can manifest itself best in a scenario 
where a small company or a new entrant attempts to compete with an established online platform, 
where the gap in access to data can act as barrier to competition: the platform will be able to access 
more data, provide better services and consequently attract more users, who will once again provide 
more data. Smaller competitors will not be even remotely able to replicate this kind and scale of 
operation. This can be coupled with increased revenues for the former group, enabling these 
companies to increase investments into research and development and once again, improve their 
service in a way smaller competitors cannot.73 Thanks to this process, a platform may be able to 
reach a “critical mass” which will enable it to remain in its strong position metaphorically as a 
“gatekeeper” to the type of service it provides.74  
Furthermore, another set of concerns revolves around the possibility of the lock-in of 
customers, be they individual users, who, depending on the type of platform, may not be charged 
any price to use the platform (e.g. Facebook users), or e.g. advertisers. This situation can arise when 
the cost of switching to a different service or a different platform would be so high that the user (or 
advertiser or any other relevant participant in a similar role) would not be reasonably able to do so, 
even though he or she would prefer to change the service used. As a result, not only is the entry of 
competitors possibly more difficult (but such a conclusion is subject to the impact of multi-homing, 
discussed below) and a lock-in has negative influence on competition in itself, but such a situation 
also facilitates anticompetitive conduct, as a lock-in creates the basis for future potential 
exclusionary behaviour of a dominant undertaking.75  
One example of a potential lock-in situation can be communication applications: even if a 
customer wants to start using a different communications app than he or she is currently using (for 
reasons that may vary, e.g. better privacy protection, more convenient interface etc.), it might be 
very costly to do so; the different applications might not be interoperable and leaving one would 
thus effectively mean abandoning the group of people using the original “app”, whose participation 
                                                 
72 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 163. 
73 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 12-13. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 98-99. 




made it attractive for the said user to consume such service in the first place.76 Similar arguments 
can be made regarding the benefits obtained through the ability of a platform to analyse one’s data 
and personalise the service (e.g. search engine results, personalised purchase suggestions) or the 
difficulty in successfully transferring one’s social media profile (even if it would not carry the 
“social” cost as is the case with the communications applications example above).77 For advertisers, 
difficulty may stem from the degree to which it is or is not possible to easily transfer advertising 
campaigns to different platforms; for sellers in an online marketplace, difficulties may arise when 
attempting to switch to a different platform, but not abandoning their reputation obtained through 
customer reviews at the same time.78 
On the other hand, it is often argued that users of online platforms multi-home, that is, that they 
use multiple platforms (e.g. through using multiple applications) to get the same kind of service, to 
fulfil the same needs.79 Because of multi-homing, the concerns about possible entrenchment of one 
platform in a given market are said to be exaggerated.80 However, the reality is more nuanced: 
questions can be asked to what degree do users actually multi-home and to what extent do they use 
multiple platforms to get similar, but at most complementary services (e.g. using Facebook for 
social networking and LinkedIn for professional networking would not qualify as multi-homing81). 
Furthermore, another question is whether any level of multi-homing is sufficient to dispel the 
concerns about market position of a dominant platform or, given the importance of data-driven 
effects, only multi-homing with sufficient intensity across all platforms can do so,82 or even whether 
it is possible for a platform to effectively exercise its market power in spite of users’ multi-
homing.83 
Effectively, the abovementioned set of concerns revolves around the position of market power 
of an online platform and the barriers to entry for its competitors. So far, this is a matter that has 
mostly concerned competition authorities during the approval of mergers.84 Furthermore, while 
obtaining certain levels of market power due to the above-mentioned factors and holding this 
position because of user lock-in may raise concerns, these two situations in themselves are not 
problematic from the point of view of the rules on anti-competitive conduct.  
                                                 
76 And in fact, this was the discussion in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger case (discussed further in chapters below); see 
STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 164-165. 
77 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 42-46. 
78 Ibid., p. 40-43. 
79 EVANS, David S. Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries. Review of Network Economics. 2003, 
2(3), p. 198-199; see also LERNER, op. cit. 44, p. 22-23. 
80 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 28. 
81 See Chapters 4 and 5 and the reflection on the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision discussed therein. 
82 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 29. 
83 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 169. 
84 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 16-17. 
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On the other hand, there are multiple concerns regarding the use of such position, i.e. 
anticompetitive behaviour involving data. These stretch from e.g. using data analysis or even 
specialised algorithms to increase transparency on a market and thus facilitating collusion,85 relying 
on an ever-increasing ability to analyse individual customers’ behaviour in order to introduce price 
discrimination86 or leveraging of dominant position into other relevant markets,87 to concerns 
regarding conduct of an online platform that seeks to extend its “data advantage” through accessing 
more data.88 These concerns, however important, are, nonetheless, not subject to further discussion, 
as the thesis is focused on the impact of refusals to supply as exclusionary anticompetitive 
behaviour and its relationship to access to big data. 
This chapter (and partially Chapter 1) sought to present the importance of accessing big data for 
online platforms, both in terms of the importance of data vis-à-vis methods of its analysis, but most 
of all as a crucial advantage that has the potential to strengthen an already strong online platform’s 
position. As a result, an online platform can become a “data-opoly” and concentrate large amounts 
of big data within its control, with the result that other competitors, in a variety of situations and 
markets, may not be sufficiently able to either access such data or collect it. The aim of this thesis, 
as also already presented in Chapter 1, is to examine under what circumstances and with what effect 
is it possible under EU competition law for undertakings, other than the dominant online platforms, 
to access big data held by these players. 
                                                 
85 See EZRACHI, STUCKE, op. cit. 20. 
86 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 21. 
87 See Chapter 4 and the Google Shopping decision discussed therein, which is an example of a dominant platform 
attempting to translate its advantage into other markets in a way contrary to EU competition law. 
88 With the latter case, it is not only EU competition law that comes into play, but possibly also concerns about privacy 
and data protection. STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 259-276; BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 22-25. 
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3. The Legal Framework for Refusal to Supply 
While the previous chapter provided the factual background for further assessment, the aim of 
the third chapter is to provide the legal framework applicable to the analysis of anticompetitive 
refusals to supply in EU law and to outline its development. The chapter starts with an account of 
the so-called essential facilities doctrine used in U.S. law (subchapter 3.1.), which is often 
mentioned in connection with refusal to supply cases (as is the question whether data is an 
“essential facility”). The second subchapter will show, however, that EU law never explicitly 
adopted this doctrine and instead went on to develop independently, while the U.S. doctrine 
seemingly stalled (subchapter 3.2.). Finally, the current framework on refusal to supply under Art. 
102 TFEU will be provided (subchapter 3.3.). 
 
3.1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in U.S. Antitrust Law 
This subchapter provides an overview of the U.S. antitrust law doctrine of essential facilities. 
Even though, as will be shown in the next subchapter, EU law develops independently of this 
doctrine, the term “essential facility” is still sometimes used in the EU law debate on the importance 
or indispensability of certain inputs for competition on various markets. In this way, the “refusal to 
supply” case-law developed by the Court of Justice is distantly connected to U.S. antitrust law,89 
albeit the doctrine is unquestionably one of its more controversial parts.90  
The doctrine was developed within the context of “refusal to deal” cases, which provided an 
exception to the basic rule that one does not have any obligation to deal with his or her 
competitors.91 Hovenkamp defines the doctrine as requiring the owner of a properly defined 
essential facility to share it with others, with a refusal to do so being against the law.92  
                                                 
89 While neither the Court of Justice nor the European Commission use the term essential facility explicitly on a regular 
basis, opting instead for notions of indispensability or objective necessity, Jones and Suffrin note that in EU law debate, 
as long as no specific legal significance is accorded to it, “essential facility” is nevertheless a convenient expression to 
use, due to its familiarity to competition lawyers. See JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 500. 
90 Some authors treat it only with mild reservation, as a doctrine with a “long and respected history as part of U.S. 
antitrust law.” See PITOFSKY, Robert, Donna PATTERSON and Jonathan HOOKS. The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Under United States Antitrust Law. Antitrust Law Journal. 2002 70(2), p. 445. Some reflections, on the other hand, are 
much more critical, especially the one of Hovenkamp, who stated that: “[t]he so-called ‘essential facility’ doctrine is 
one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for [the liability under Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act]. 
The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if [the doctrine] were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of 
the general doctrine of refusal to deal to fill any gaps.” See HOVENKAMP, Herbert. Principles of antitrust. St. Paul, 
Minnesota: West Academic Publishing, 2017. p. 282. 
91 PITOFSKY, PATTERSON, HOOKS, op. cit. 90, p. 446.  
92 HOVENKAMP, op. cit. 90, p. 281-283. 
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The earliest case with a form of essential facility was the Terminal Railroad case, a 1912 
judgment in which the U.S. Supreme Court considered an action against 38 defendants organized 
into the Terminal Railroad Association.93 Effectively, the association managed to hold all local 
facilities providing access to either bank of the Mississippi river, creating thus the first apparent 
example of an essential facility (also called a “bottleneck monopoly”).94 The Court found this 
arrangement in violation of the U.S. Sherman Act and in the end, the association was ordered to 
grant the use of its facilities to any non-participating party on a non-discriminatory basis and for 
rates within a reasonable range.95  
Another important decision was the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Otter Tail.96 Otter 
Tail was a vertically integrated company in Minnesota which produced electricity, sold it at retail 
level and owned the power lines for its transfer.97 Otter Tail wanted to force local municipalities to 
subscribe to its services, but when some of the municipalities decided to purchase power from an 
apparently cheaper source, Otter Tail refused to transfer that power through its own power line 
network.98 The Court held that Otter Tail “sought to substitute for competition anticompetitive uses 
of its dominant economic power [...]” and, similarly to the case discussed above, upheld a decree 
which ordered the company to transfer electricity through its power lines.99  
The MCI judgment then laid down the legal test for the doctrine in a way that remains accepted 
until today.100 MCI provided long distance telephone services; AT&T owned the local telephone 
loops the access to which MCI sought. The Supreme Court found for MCI, laying down the 
following 4-step formula for application of the doctrine, requiring that firstly, the essential facility 
must be under the control of a monopolist, secondly, that any competitor is practically or reasonably 
                                                 
93 United States v. Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. 390 (1912). 
94 The association managed to acquire a number of properties and companies, including the only bridge over the 
Mississippi river in St. Louis, the rail lines from which the bridge could be used from either bank and even a competing 
local ferry company and another bridge constructed later and its connecting facilities. The terrain in the area made it 
prohibitively expensive for any other company to replicate this structure. See United States v. Terminal Railroad, 224 
U.S. 390 (1912), p. 391-394, 397. See also SULLIVAN, Lawrence A. and Warren S. GRIMES. The law of antitrust: an 
integrated handbook. 2nd ed. St. Paul, Minnessota: Thomson/West, 2006., p. 125. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) is considered by academic literature to be the paramount 
precedent in unilateral refusal to deal cases. The approximately sixty years long gap between the two judgments 
discussed so far was obviously not devoid of any developments; for instance, in Associated Press the Supreme Court 
debated the notion of “indispensability” (which is a term used by the Court of Justice, though not in the same meaning) 
of news provided by AP, one of the largest news agencies. The decision held that a finding of indispensability of such an 
input was not a precondition for finding a breach of the Sherman Act (See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 
18). Sullivan and Grimes also point to a body of lower-court case law accumulated over the years in response to the 
development of the doctrine; see SULLIVAN, GRIMES, op. cit. 94, p. 125 and case-law cited there. 
97 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), p. 370-371. 
98 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), p. 378-379. 
99 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), p. 380-381. 
100 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); HOVENKAMP, op. cit. 90, p. 284. This is, however, 
conditional on how one reads the Trinko decision, which will be discussed subsequently. 
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unable to duplicate it, thirdly, that there is a denial to such competitor of the use of the facility, and 
lastly that the provision of access to the facility is feasible.101  
The development of the doctrine nonetheless suffered a significant setback in the 2004 Trinko 
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court decided that a refusal to deal claim was not possible in 
a situation where a dominant incumbent was obliged by statute to provide access to a certain 
network.102 However, a part of the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia came into prominence 
through its strong opinion on the doctrine as such, stating: “[w]e have never recognized such a 
doctrine [...] and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here [...]” and reducing it 
into a doctrine used only by U.S. lower courts.103  
By virtue of these statements, Trinko is seen as a watershed moment; even though the doctrine 
was merely declared inapplicable in that particular case, it is claimed that it is now “largely 
dormant”104 or that “little remains” of it;105 Hovenkamp argues that after Trinko, “not many 
essential facility claims will survive” the limitations placed on its application.106 
In conclusion, the essential facilities doctrine is undoubtedly influential and its “roots” go far in 
the history of law; at the same time, however, because of the ruling of the Supreme Court, it now 
appears to be dormant. As the following subchapters will show, in contrast, EU law, which has for a 
time developed alongside this doctrine, has not suffered a similar setback; nonetheless, at the same 
time, it is subject to its own framework and conditions. 
 
                                                 
101 Ibid.  
102 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). Under a specialised 
telecommunications regulation, Verizon was an incumbent (and dominant) operator of a local network and as such it 
was obliged to provide access to the network to AT&T who wanted to provide local telephone services. The plaintiff 
and customer, the Trinko law firm, claimed that failure by Verizon to comply with that (statutory) obligation in a precise 
manner amounted also to anti-competitive conduct. The decision distinguished the case from Otter Tail on the ground 
that power transmission in the 1973 decision was already being sold to others by the time the judgment was rendered, 
while the sharing obligation of local loop connections in Trinko was a new phenomenon only introduced by statute. See 
part III of the Opinion of the Court in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
103 See part III of the Opinion of the Court in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004). Ortiz claims that this part of the opinion, even though described as a mere obiter dicta, became its legacy 
which influenced the overall perception of the doctrine in the eyes of courts, making it harder for plaintiffs to 
successfully rely on it; see ORTIZ, Armando A. Old Lessons Die Hard: Why the Essential Facilities Doctrine Provides 
Courts the Ability to Effectuate Competitive Balance in High Technology Markets. Journal of High Technology Law. 
2012, 13(1), p. 190-191, and case-law cited therein under footnote 141. The judgment is also often seen as a 
culmination of the criticism levied against the doctrine; see ABRAHAMSON, Zachary. Essential Data. Yale Law 
Journal. 2014, 124(3), p. 869-870, or SULLIVAN, GRIMES, op. cit. 94, p. 127. 
104 ORTIZ, op. cit. 103, p. 190. 
105 ABRAHAMSON, op. cit. 103, p. 870. 
106 HOVENKAMP, op. cit. 90, p. 284; Hovenkamp argues that the judgment placed four limitations on essential facility 
claims: aside from 1) limitations flowing from the distinction from Otter Tail, there must be 2) no regulatory 
supervision of forced sharing, 3) rivals must be unable to supply the facility for themselves and 4) the sharing with 
competitors must be rationally profitable to the facility holder. 
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3.2. Development of the Refusal to Supply Case-Law in EU Competition Law 
This subchapter will provide a segue between the previous discussion of essential facilities and 
the current form of the refusal to supply framework in EU law. It will deal with the first steps 
towards such a framework taken by the Commission and the Court of Justice at the time when the 
essential facilities doctrine had been also developing in the U.S.; it will, nonetheless, show that EU 
law refrained from explicitly adopting this doctrine, albeit sharing similar concerns, and developed 
its own approach. 
The previously discussed U.S. essential facilities doctrine finds its closest counterpart (albeit 
with differences) in EU law in some of the so-called “refusal to supply” cases brought under Art. 
102 TFEU (or its previous versions).  
The essential facilities doctrine, as given shape by e.g. the MCI judgment, enables making 
relatively straightforward conclusions about the nature of a given facility and the inability of others 
to replicate it. It is thus not a surprise that an essential facility, thus properly defined, is most easily 
seen in various types of physical infrastructure, from “local loop” connections to sea ports. 
Arguably, some of the cases considered under Art. 102 TFEU could be viewed in light of the 
essential facilities doctrine.107  
On the other hand, in situations where the reality is much more complex, it is not pertinent to  
rely solely on the doctrine, but it is rather necessary to turn to the criteria developed for the 
assessment of refusals to supply, as they enable to consider and balance in more depth the interests 
of the undertakings concerned.108 As will be continually shown in further chapters, this is precisely 
the situation with access to data, including big data; it is not feasible to decide in advance and with 
sufficient clarity whether some type of data (or even big data in general) is an essential facility and 
it thus seems more reasonable to assess further on the question of access to big data in light of the 
refusal to supply approach. 
A dominant undertaking may fail to comply with the prohibition contained in Art. 102 TFEU 
when it refuses to supply its products or services or refuses to grant access to its facilities. Similarly 
                                                 
107 Under Art. 102 TFEU, any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or 
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. For greater clarity, references to any previous version of Art. 102 TFEU are replaced by 
references to the current article. This distinction between the essential facilities doctrine and the refusal to supply 
approach is based on the comparison of the test derived from the MCI ruling; in this sense, the refusal to supply case-
law offers not only a larger variety of cases to consider (as explained below in the subsequent subchapter, including e.g. 
intellectual property rights or interoperability information), but also presents a differently conceived test, where the 
notion of indispensability is only one part of the considerations taken into account. Nonetheless, the Commission has 
used the term “essential facility” on some occasions (see the decisions cited under footnote 118). 
108 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 98. 
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to the U.S. refusal to deal cases, these situations involve an intrusion into the principle that in a 
market economy, undertakings are free to choose with whom they wish to deal.109  
The first significant occasion when a refusal to supply was found to infringe Art. 102 TFEU 
was the 1974 Court of Justice Commercial Solvents judgment. Originally, the Commercial Solvents 
Corporation sold, through its subsidiary in Italy,110 raw material to the Zoja pharmaceutical 
company, which then processed it and used it to manufacture anti-tuberculosis medicines.111 For a 
certain period of time, Zoja ceased ordering the raw material from Commercial Solvents’ subsidiary 
and turned to independent suppliers; at the same time, Commercial Solvents changed its business 
policy. The Italian subsidiary was enabled to develop final products on its own and the supply of 
raw material was planned to be reduced in order to make space for its own production on the 
market. Consequently, when Zoja sought to return to the supply by the subsidiary, it was refused.112 
In the key part of the judgment, the nature of refusal to supply was summarized as follows: 
Commercial Solvents was the dominant undertaking in the market for raw materials; it sought to 
use that dominant position to compete with undertakings which processed the raw material (i.e. on 
the final product market) by refusing to supply them with the key input; this then caused the risk 
that any competition to Commercial Solvents on the final product market from Zoja (and any other 
undertaking in such a situation) would be eliminated.113 
Commercial Solvents thus marks the point of departure of the whole body of case-law on 
refusals to supply that followed; nonetheless, references to “essential facilities” or any allusions to 
U.S. antitrust law were absent in the reasoning of the Court (although the Otter Tail case was only 
decided a year prior to Commercial Solvents). Further case-law concerning refusals to supply 
gradually developed into two major lines of decisions with on line of cases involving the existence 
of both so-called upstream and downstream markets and the second line without such market 
definition.114 AG Jacobs explained in his Opinion in the Oscar Bronner case that: “[i]n many cases 
                                                 
109 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 496. According to AG Jacobs in his Oscar Bronner Opinion “it is apparent that the 
right to choose one’s trading partners and freely to dispose of one’s property are generally recognised principles in the 
laws of the Member States, in some cases with constitutional status. Incursions on those rights require careful 
justification.” See Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 56. 
110 Both being part of the same economic unit in terms of competition law. 
111 Joined cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, paras 23-24. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Joined cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, para 25; In the end, the Court of Justice 
also held that the Commission had the power to order the supply of certain amount of the material to Zoja. See Joined 
cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, para 46. 
114 E.g. see the distinction in JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 532, where the authors define the latter category as cases 
involving the supply of products for distribution and resale in light of the suppliers’ attempts to protect their commercial 
interests an example of which was the Sot Lélos kai case which involved a refusal to supply in order to prevent parallel 
trading of medicines. See Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:180. In the latter 
category, the Court of Justice came close to using the phrase “essential facilities” in the 1978 United Brands case, where 
26 
 
the relationship [between a dominant undertaking and the undertaking seeking supply of a certain 
product] is vertical in the sense that the dominant undertaking reserves the product or service to, or 
discriminates in favour of, its own downstream operation at the expense of competitors on the 
downstream market.”115 Furthermore, while there is not a legal distinction between the relative 
importance of either category, according to the European Commission only the first category is 
considered an enforcement priority.116 
It was precisely in 1998 after AG Jacobs submitted his opinion in Oscar Bronner that the key 
outline of the essential facilities doctrine and its relationship with EU law was laid down.117 Jacobs 
extensively described the understanding of the doctrine in U.S. law as well as the existing 
references to the doctrine in the practice of the European Commission.118 Nonetheless, the judgment 
did not explicitly endorse the doctrine and instead confirmed that EU law, including the rules on 
refusals to supply, was to develop independently of this concept. The notion of an essential facility 
then seemingly found its closest reflection when the Court delivered its judgment and laid down the 
conditions under which a refusal to supply was unlawful in light of the criterion of 
indispensability.119  
                                                                                                                                                                  
the company was accused of ceasing supplies of bananas to distributors and ripeners, for whom these presented an 
essential resource. See Case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 122. 
115 The Advocate General also noted there that “[the relationship in question] may however also be horizontal in the 
sense of tying sales of related but distinct products or services.” This, nonetheless, became only one of the examples of 
cases not defined by existence of upstream and downstream markets. See Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, 
Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 50. 
116 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, p. 7–20, paras 76-77. 
117 The Oscar Bronner case was shortly preceded by the decision of the Court of Justice in Joined cases C-241/91 P and 
C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (commonly referred to as Magill, by the name of 
the company seeking access to broadcasting information). Apparently, the Maggil judgment was at the time thought of 
as an endorsement of the doctrine which led AG Jacobs to briefly outline the logic of the doctrine and examples of 
recognised facilities, referring to among others, Otter Tail, Terminal Railroad and (importantly due to its enumeration of 
the criteria of the legal test for application of the doctrine) MCI. See Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, 
Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, paras 45-47. Compare also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 
98-99 for the current outlook on the doctrine. 
118 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, paras 50 and 
importantly 65, where Jacobs submitted that the case could have been solved either through the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine or through a response to a refusal to supply, but that he did not see much space for 
intervention in any eventuality. Before this Opinion, the Commission also brought two interim measures decisions in 
which it came up with the following definition of essential facilities: “a facility or infrastructure, without access to 
which competitors cannot provide services to their customers.” See Commission Decision COMP/IV/34.174 – 
Sealink/B&I Holyhead (interim measures), para 41 and Commission Decision COMP/IV/34.689 – Sea Containers 
Ltd/Stena Sealink (interim measures), para 66. Crucially, it could be argued that in Oscar Bronner, the Court of Justice 
effectively refused to explicitly recognise the doctrine as the leading legal test for future cases precisely because it 
decided to examine the refusal at hand in light of the rules concerning refusals; with that in mind, it still holds that a 
number of cases can be examined under both approaches. 
119 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, para 41. See also BAILEY, David and Laura Elizabeth 




The case-law on refusals to supply then further developed into several specific groups of cases: 
some authors distinguished them according to the type of input in question,120 while another method 
of categorising these cases differentiates between dominant undertakings refusing to further supply 
existing customers and cases concerning refusals to supply new customers.121 It is generally 
submitted that when the refusal comes in a situation without an existing contractual relationship 
between the undertakings concerned, the Court of Justice is more cautious to impose an obligation 
to supply than in cases of refusals to supply existing customers.122 Beyond these differentiations, 
there are also further ways how to sort out cases falling within the refusal to supply umbrella.123 
As this subchapter showed, since the referral to the U.S. doctrine was introduced into the EU 
law debate (precisely at the time when the EU legal test for refusals to supply started taking shape), 
the case-law on refusals to supply has steadily evolved and taken concrete contours. On the other 
hand, it has done so independently of the essential facilities doctrine known from U.S. law. The 
doctrine remains sometimes mentioned before the Court of Justice, 124 but nowadays the EU law 
concept of refusals to supply develops on its own and has evolved to the form presented in the next 
subchapter. 
 
3.3. The Current Legal Framework for Refusal to Supply in EU Law 
This subchapter will provide the current understanding of the analytical framework for refusal 
to supply cases under EU law. In doing so, it also contrasts the current state of EU law to the 
contemporary situation in U.S. antitrust presented above. Most of all, in discussing the form of the 
refusal to supply “test”, this subchapter presents the structure adopted in the following chapters of 
                                                 
120 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 499, 511, 521; e.g. refusals on part of car suppliers to supply spare parts to providers 
of repair services, refusals to supply concerning intellectual property rights (which partially build on the spare part 
cases) and refusals to provide information necessary to ensure interoperability in the IT sector. 
121 Based on BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 954-956; A similar categorization is made by Graef, who distinguishes 
between absolute refusals (where the dominant undertaking has not supplied to others before), disruptions of existing 
levels of supply, and discriminatory conditions of supply. See GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 209. 
122 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 956. 
123 Beyond those mentioned in this paragraph, more distinctions can be made e.g. between refusals made by non-
dominant undertakings (falling effectively out of the scope of Art. 102 TFEU), or other types of abuse (e.g. tying or 
bundling) that can fall under the definition of refusal to supply. See JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 497. A different 
way of looking at refusal to supply cases is to reflect on whether the dominant undertaking is making an outright refusal 
or whether it is a case of a so-called constructive refusal, where an offer to supply is formally made, but under 
unacceptable or unreasonable conditions (or supply is made after undue delays). Nonetheless, this distinction is usually 
only made in order to clarify that even constructive refusals are prohibited under Art. 102 TFEU See JONES, 
SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 496; BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 953-954; GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 209-210. 
124 See e.g. the Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-441/07 P, Alrosa [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:555, where the 
subject matter appears to have been discussed in terms of “essential facilities” right in the hearing before the Court. See 
Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-441/07 P, Alrosa [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:555, footnote 134.  
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this thesis, including, in particular, Chapter 7 on the interpretation and application of the criteria 
developed below. 
The current legal test defining refusal to supply as behaviour prohibited under Art. 102 TFEU is 
mainly influenced by four judgments of the Court of Justice: Magill, Oscar Bronner, IMS125 and 
Microsoft;126 only Oscar Bronner, however, is a case of a “generic” refusal to supply; in contrast, 
Magill and IMS deal with refusal to supply (or to provide access to) inputs protected by intellectual 
property rights, whilst Microsoft is a case on refusal to provide information necessary for 
interoperability of computer operating systems and other software.  
In Magill, the first of these cases, a peculiar situation occurred as a result of British and Irish 
copyright laws: the TV broadcast listings of RTÉ, ITV and BBC were all protected by copyright and 
as a result, each of these broadcasters published its broadcast listings individually; no 
comprehensive listings of their programmes existed at that time.127 Magill was a publishing 
company that attempted to produce such a comprehensive listing on a weekly basis, but was soon 
stopped through copyright infringement injunctions. The case went all the way up to appeal 
proceedings before the Court of Justice,128 which ruled that even though a refusal to license (deal) 
cannot in itself constitute abusive behaviour, a certain way of exercising exclusive rights by the 
rights holder may breach the prohibition on abuse of dominance.129 In particular, the stations130 
sought to reserve to themselves the secondary downstream market for weekly TV guides by 
excluding all competition on that market.131  
The judgment, upholding the Commission’s decision requiring the stations to license the 
information, was met with much controversy: in contrast to Commercial Solvents, Magill involved a 
new entrant to the market seeking access to a certain input.132 In the following Oscar Bronner case, 
                                                 
125Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257. 
126 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
127 The closest attempt at this which was authorised by the broadcasters was in the form of “highlights” for a given 
week; otherwise the stations were quick to resort to legal proceedings against publications not complying with these 
limited licence conditions, as was also the case of the Magill company. See Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 
RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, paras 7-9. 
128 Originally, the Commission issued a decision requiring the dominant undertakings to license their works with the 
decision subsequently being challenged before but upheld by the Court of First Instance in Case T-69/89, RTE v 
Commission  [1991] ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 and Case T-76/89, ITP v Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:T:1991:41. 
129 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, paras 49, 50. 
130 The broadcasting stations were already dominant on the upstream market for programme information, as only they 
were able to produce such information. 
131 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, para 56. It should 
be noted here that the Court relied on a set of “exceptional circumstances” to justify its decision; as summarized by 
Jones and Suffrin, these were: (1) the lack of substitute for a comprehensive TV programme; (2) the prevention of 
appearance of a new product due to the refusal; (3) lack of justification for refusal and (4) excluding all competition on 
the market for weekly TV listings; see JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 515.  
132 The controversy arose not in the least because it seemed to confirm the Commission’s policy of applying competition 
rules in a way that, at the time, was seen as a form of previously unseen interventionism; it is true that. in the years 
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Advocate General Jacobs summarised this in the following: “the Commission considers that refusal 
of access to an essential facility to a competitor can of itself be an abuse even in the absence of 
other factors, such as tying of sales, discrimination vis-à-vis another independent competitor, 
discontinuation of supplies to existing customers or deliberate action to damage a competitor[.]”133 
Jacobs, however, also presented the following view on refusals to supply in EU competition law: “it 
is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of Article 86 [i.e. the current Art. 
102 TFEU] is to prevent distortion of competition — and in particular to safeguard the interests of 
consumers — rather than to protect the position of particular competitors[.]”134  
In Oscar Bronner, Oscar Bronner published a daily newspaper with a low market share both in 
circulation and advertising; the Mediaprint company on the other hand published a newspaper with 
nearly a 50% market share in both. Oscar Bronner unsuccessfully sought the inclusion of its 
newspaper in Mediaprint’s distribution system which the large publisher developed on its own, but 
Oscar Bronner claimed it would be “unprofitable” for it to develop such a system independently.135  
However, the Court placed clear limits on the prohibition of refusals to supply as abusive 
behaviour under EU competition law rules. In order to become a breach of Art. 102 TFEU, a refusal 
would have to be likely to eliminate all competition in the market on the part of the person 
requesting the supply or access, this refusal would have to be incapable of being objectively 
justified, and the input access to which was sought would in itself have to be indispensable to 
carrying on that undertaking’s business without any actual or potential substitute in existence for 
that input.136 The case was decided on the last of the criteria: there were no obstacles of “technical, 
legal or economic” nature that would prevent Oscar Bronner to develop a second home delivery 
scheme, if needed, with the help of other publishers.137  
Furthermore, even before turning to that option, Oscar Bronner could have relied on other 
forms of distribution like kiosk sales, which were – though potentially less advantageous – still a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
between the first instance and appeal decisions, Commission also applied the doctrine to enable access to port facilities 
to a new ferry service operator in the Sea Containers/Stena decision cited above; however, as will be explained in 
further chapters, such decisions remain rare to this day. See also ALBORS-LLORENS, Albertina. The ‘Essential 
Facilities’ Doctrine in EC Competition Law. Cambridge Law Journal. 1999, 58(3), p. 492. 
133 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 50. 
134 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 58. 
135 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 4-8; According to the Court of Justice, the situation 
could have been hypothetically assessed as an attempt of a dominant undertaking (in a market for “delivery services”) 
seeking to reserve to itself the market for newspapers, which was nonetheless left to the referring court to verify; see 
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 33-36. 
136 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, para 41; Jones and Suffrin list these as four requirements, 
see JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 506. 
137 The Court explained that it could only rule to the contrary, if (drawing on the AG’s opinion) it was proven that “it 
[would] not [be] economically viable to create a second home-delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers 
with a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers distributed by the existing scheme[.]” See Case C-7/97, 
Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, para 46. 
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viable alternative.138 It can be argued that in doing so, the Court followed the general spirit of the 
Advocate General’s Opinion and confined the refusal to supply cases to narrowly defined 
boundaries. Furthermore, this consideration already points to the difficulties of finding a clear-cut 
essential facility even in cases that only slightly depart from the decisions concerning physical 
infrastructure; effectively, a network of contracts and contacts is much more cumbersome to 
describe as an essential facility as it is necessary to consider the alternatives an undertaking could 
take advantage of. In cases of intellectual property rights, interoperability information or data, such 
a conclusion appears even more complicated; this thus further supports the use of the refusal to 
supply approach for these situations. 
The IMS and Microsoft cases developed the criteria in the Oscar Bronner test. The IMS ruling 
crucially clarified that it suffices for the finding of a prohibited refusal to supply that there are two 
different stages of production and that they are interconnected so that the original input is 
indispensable for the secondary product; the Court claimed that the existence of a relevant market 
for the sought-after input could be only hypothetical.139  
The Court further held a refusal to supply would breach Art. 102 TFEU only if the input sought 
was indispensable in the sense that such a refusal would exclude any or all competition on a 
secondary market (in contrast to competition on part of the undertaking seeking access as in Oscar 
Bronner).140 This criterion was subsequently modified in Microsoft, where the alleged refusal 
concerned information necessary for interoperability between computer operating systems and 
software. The Court effectively used the same criteria as in IMS,141 but it is understood to have 
slightly softened the indispensability requirement, as it did not equate it with the exclusion of 
competition from the market (it was enough that competitors’ products would not work as well as 
                                                 
138 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 43-45. Shortly after its delivery, the judgment was 
commended for several reasons: not only it rejected a per se approach to refusals to deal (thus requiring additional 
circumstances to be present), but also clarified Magill (on which it nevertheless strongly drew with respect to the final 
form of the legal test) as an exceptional case while at the same time placing clear limits on the use of the doctrine. See 
JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 504, and ALBORS-LLORENS, op. cit. 132, p. 492. 
139 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, para 45. 
140 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 38 and 52. The Court held that a refusal to license a 
copyright was contrary to EU law under the following conditions: that the refusal prevented the introduction of a new 
product, that the license was indispensable in the sense that refusal would exclude any or all competition on a 
secondary market; and the refusal was unjustified. It should be, however, again emphasised that IMS was not a case 
concerning a “generic” refusal to supply as Oscar Bronner did, but concerned refusal to license intellectual property 
rights - this explains the “new product” criterion, not included in the Oscar Bronner test, but which was subsequently 
used in the Microsoft case. For further reflection on the developments in IMS, see PRETE, Luca. From Magill to IMS: 
Dominant Firms’ Duty to License Competitors. European Business Law Review. 2004, 15(5), p. 1071-1086. 
141 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 322-323; see also confirmation of this reading in 
JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 523. 
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Microsoft’s)142 but held that a refusal must not lead to the elimination of effective competition on 
the secondary market.143  
It was noted by Jones and Suffrin that the statements of the Court in Microsoft were not 
explicitly limited only to refusal to license copyright (under which interoperability information 
could also be protected),144 which raises questions about the precise understanding of the legal test 
for finding prohibited refusals to supply, especially with the view to applying this test to refusals to 
supply involving data as the indispensable input.145 Graef, for instance, proposes that the so-called 
“new product” criterion should be added to the criteria laid down in Oscar Bronner and modified in 
subsequent decisions, thus creating a four-step test even for refusals to supply concerning inputs not 
protected by intellectual property rights.146  
In conclusion, while, as presented in the previous subchapters, refusals to supply in EU law are 
not assessed with the outright application of the U.S. essential facilities doctrine (or its exact 
counterpart) and only some forms of (mainly physical) infrastructure could be described as properly 
defined essential facilities. They are subject to a framework designed by the Court of Justice, which 
has drawn tangible legal limits around the possibility of accessing inputs held by a dominant 
undertaking.  
As was already mentioned in Chapter 1, the notion of big data does not yet even have a settled 
definition; furthermore, as will the rest of this thesis show, the situations concerning the access to 
and the use of data and big data vary greatly in practice. Additionally, as this subchapter suggested, 
finding an essential facility even in cases that depart only slightly from the “classical” examples of 
physical infrastructure is not easy and much less so once the input in question takes the form of 
information of some type, as is e.g. the case with interoperability information. It thus does not seem 
feasible to straightforwardly define data or big data as essential facility; consequently, the thesis 
examines this phenomenon from the view of the refusal to supply approach. 
The next two chapters will cover the issues of the definition of relevant markets and the 
establishment of dominant position, respectively; for the purposes of Chapter 7, the three criteria of 
                                                 
142 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 530-531; This is also reflected in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 
83, citing the Microsoft ruling. 
143 Ibid.; in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 85, the notion is described this way, albeit without a 
reference to the ruling. 
144 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 530. 
145 Furthermore, the practical significance of any legal test is in practice also influenced by the Commission’s own 
guidelines on determining when will a refusal to supply become an enforcement priority; in particular, these are that 1) 
a product or service is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market, 2) the refusal is 
likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market, and 3) the refusal is likely to lead to 
consumer harm; see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 81.  
146 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 223. 
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indispensability, exclusion of effective competition on the downstream market and lack of objective 
justification are going to be used and analysed; the “new product” condition is going to be also 
examined, firstly, in terms of the merits of its inclusion and secondly, in terms of what kind of effect 
would the inclusion have on the possible outcomes of the legal test. 
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4. The Definition of Relevant Markets in Cases Involving Online Platforms 
In order to successfully present a scenario in which it is possible to access an online platform’s 
data through the Court’s case law on refusal to supply, it is first necessary to define a relevant 
market in which the online platform holds a dominant position, as well as a relevant market in 
which the refusal is supposed to manifest itself; only then it is possible to use Art. 102 TFEU as a 
viable route to gain access to such platform’s data.  
The determination of a relevant market and the position of a dominant undertaking is a so-
called indirect method of ascertaining market power: the definition of a relevant market is not an 
end in itself, but rather a tool or an aid used to conduct assessment of competition and identify 
which products (or services) are so closely similar that they can be substituted for each other and 
consequently exert competitive pressure on their respective suppliers.147 As written by the 
Commission, “[m]arket definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition 
between firms.”148 Unlike in some Art. 101 TFEU cases or merger decisions, a finding of abuse of 
dominance requires that the relevant market is defined much more precisely because of the need to 
subsequently decide on whether a certain undertaking is dominant in such a market. Specifically, in 
refusal to supply cases, the determination of a relevant market is also crucial in ascertaining what 
input can realistically be sought by another undertaking.149 
In most of the refusal to supply cases discussed in Chapter 3, an upstream and a downstream 
market were defined;150 an undertaking dominant on the upstream relevant market refused to supply 
an input vital for the competition on the downstream relevant market. Such a market structure 
appears to be the most pertinent for the issue of obtaining access to big data. Consequently, the rest 
of this chapter is structured as follows.  
The  three subchapters will discuss issues which, in practice, are not limited to the definition of 
downstream relevant markets and are regularly dealt with regardless of whether a given situation 
concerns an upstream and a downstream relevant market. Nonetheless, with respect to the 
assessment of access to big data, the analysis of these concepts and factors is essential for shedding 
light on the way a downstream market can look like in such a situation. In order to highlight the 
                                                 
147 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 56. 
148 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law. OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5–13, para 2. 
149 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 57. 
150 Nonetheless, the Microsoft case did not exactly fit this description (as will be explained further on) and e.g. in 
Commercial Solvents the judgment used different terms, which, nonetheless, largely corresponded to the notion of 
upstream and downstream markets. 
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importance of data as the potentially indispensable input in this kind of analysis, the questions most 
relevant to the definition of an upstream relevant market in such a setting will be discussed 
separately in Chapter 5. 
The first subchapter will thus provide an overview of the methodology used to define relevant 
markets and its applicability to cases with multi-sided markets. Furthermore, it will discuss possible 
modifications to such methodology (in particular the so-called SSNIP test) in order to better reflect 
the dynamics of multi-sided markets (subchapter 4.1.). Another question discussed will be the 
proper number of relevant markets defined on the downstream level as there is uncertainty on 
whether multi-sided markets should be viewed as composed of multiple separate relevant markets 
or one market encompassing the entire environment (subchapter 4.2.). The last issue discussed with 
attention to downstream relevant markets will be the geographical scope of relevant markets 
involving online platforms (subchapter 4.3.).  
 
4.1. The Methods of Defining Relevant Downstream Markets 
The questions discussed in this subchapter are firstly aimed at the understanding of how does 
the way online platforms operate (and which has been largely described in Chapter 2) translate into 
the legal and economic appraisal of relevant markets. They nonetheless carry another level of 
importance beyond such simple comprehension: if a refusal to supply case concerning data arises 
and an undertaking seeks access to data held by an online platform, then the data will constitute an 
input provided on an (at least a hypothetical) upstream market; the operation of an online platform 
then logically falls within the downstream level. Furthermore, the practice of defining relevant 
markets for services provided by online platforms is also indicative of the way a relevant market 
might be defined for the products provided by an undertaking seeking access to the data held by an 
online platform. 
This subchapter is further divided into four parts. Firstly, the standard method of defining 
relevant markets and the reasoning behind it is presented (4.1.1.). Secondly, it will be shown that 
the seemingly most important tool used in such a definition, the so-called SSNIP test, cannot be 
relied on in cases concerning multi-sided markets; furthermore, even if modifications to such a test 
are possible, it will be argued that they currently seem impractical for actual use (4.1.2.). 
Subsequently, further modifications of the standard method of defining relevant markets will be 
discussed, both in terms of the inclusion of competition on quality (including privacy and data 
protection) into the analysis (4.1.3.), but also in terms of the so-called competition on innovation 
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(4.1.4.). Lastly, as a summary, the implications of the problems discussed thus far will be briefly 
outlined (4.1.5.). 
 
4.1.1. The Standard Method of Defining Relevant Markets 
As suggested above, the purpose of this part of subchapter 4.1. is to provide a basis for further 
discussion and outline the approach used in defining relevant markets in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances such as the multi-sidedness of the examined markets. The feasibility of this approach 
in such a scenario is then discussed directly in the next part of this subchapter. 
The key element in the EU law approach to determination of relevant markets is substitutability 
or interchangeability: a relevant market consists of all products that can be substituted for each 
other, while products that are not interchangeable will fall out of such a relevant market.151 Products 
can be switched for both different products or the same products from a different area; therefore, a 
relevant market under EU law consists of both a product market and a geographical market.152  
In determining the precise scope of any relevant market, two so-called competitive constraints 
are of key importance: supply side substitutability, examining the ability of suppliers to switch 
production to the relevant products,153 and in particular demand-side substitutability, which takes 
into account the range of products that can be seen as substitutes by the customer.154 
A key tool in determining substitutability is the so-called SSNIP test, which is a manifestation 
of the hypothetical monopolist test.155 Naturally, this is not the only tool available to competition 
authorities, who can rely also e.g. on past evidence of substitution, enquiries to consumers and 
                                                 
151 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, paras 7-9.  
152 Ibid. The former aspect of a relevant market comprises “all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use.” The latter encompasses “area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and 
demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those area.” 
For completeness, a temporal aspect of relevant markets is sometimes considered, see JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 
58 or BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 324. 
153 Although it is also emphasised that supply-side substitutability may be taken into account when defining markets in 
situations, “in which its effects are equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy.” 
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, para 20. In practice, the analysis of supply-side substitutability in cases 
involving data has been used, but only in a limited number of decisions. For instance, in Commission Decision 
COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras 44-47, the supply-side perspective was dealt with in the discussion on the 
relationship between online and offline advertising; in Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 
44, the Commission analysed the supply-side substitutability with respect to so-called customer relationship 
management services. Nonetheless, supply-side substitutability is arguably given more attention while assessing market 
power. 
154 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, paras 13-14. 
155 KRÄMER, Jan and Michael WOLFARTH. Market power, regulatory convergence, and the role of data in digital 
markets. Telecommunications Policy. 2018, 42(2), p. 156. See also JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 61. 
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customers or consumer surveys.156 Besides, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the EU, the Commission is neither legally bound by any hierarchy of evidence nor by the need to 
compulsorily use any particular type in every analysis.157 Nonetheless, for reasons outlined below, 
the SSNIP test holds a special place among these ways of defining relevant markets and its usability 
in multi-sided markets is of crucial importance with respect to the shape of the Commission’s 
decision-making practice, as also presented further on. 
The rationale behind the hypothetical monopolist test and its expressions is that a monopolist 
has to be able to exert market power in a given relevant market; in conducting what is basically a 
thought experiment, by comparing different scenarios involving such a monopolist, competition 
authorities attempt to deduct the relevant market from cases in which a monopolist would be able to 
conduct itself in a certain way and cases where it would not.  
In terms of the SSNIP test, a small, but significant, non-transitory increase in price of the 
product or service provided by the hypothetical monopolist is examined. In practice, such a test 
takes the form of a simulation, where products are added to or excluded from the suspected relevant 
market according to the (expected) reaction of customers (in the same vein, different areas of 
provision of products are considered). As long as customers leave the hypothetical monopolist and 
switch to other suppliers in response to such a price increase, the exercise continues and the relevant 
market broadens; on the other hand, once a “SSNIP” becomes profitable, the boundaries of the 
relevant market are drawn and the test comes to its end.158  
The assessment of substitutability is of key importance in defining relevant markets; as will be 
shown below, however, in multi-sided markets such an analysis is complicated, crucially due to the 
nature of the SSNIP test. The “standard” method of delineating relevant markets is thus only a first 
step towards a usable determination of relevant markets in cases where access to big data is sought. 
 
                                                 
156 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, para 36-52; the types of evidence mentioned by the Commission for the 
definition of relevant product and geographical markets, respectively, are not entirely same, but for the purposes of this 
chapter it is important that, as pointed out in para 45 of EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148: “the same 
quantitative tests used for product market definition might as well be used in geographic market definition, bearing in 
mind that international comparisons of prices might be more complex due to a number of factors such as exchange rate 
movements, taxation and product differentiation.” 
157 See e.g. Case T-175/12, Deutsche Börse [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:148, para 133, where the General Court held that 
“[i]t is the Commission’s task to make an overall assessment of what is shown by the set of indicative factors used to 
evaluate the competitive situation. It is possible, in that regard, for certain items of evidence to be prioritised and other 
evidence to be discounted.” See similarly, Case T-699/14, Topps Europe [2017] ECLI:EU:T:2017:2, para 82, where the 
General Court explained further that “[t]he SSNIP test may also prove unsuitable in certain cases, for example in the 
presence of the ‘cellophane fallacy’, that is, the situation where the undertaking concerned already holds a virtual 
monopoly and the market prices are already at a supra-competitive level, or where there are free goods or goods the 
cost of which is not borne by those determining the demand.” 
158 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, paras 15-17. 
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4.1.2. Relevant Market Definition in Multi-Sided Markets 
This part of subchapter 4.1. is focused on the specific nature of multi-sided markets and its 
manifestation in the determination of relevant markets. It will outline the key problems with relying 
on the unmodified methodology and the SSNIP test presented above and discuss changes that could 
accordingly be made to the SSNIP test without focusing this simulation on a factor other than the 
price of a product. 
A number of important characteristics of online platforms have already been outlined in 
Chapter 2, two of which are pertinent to discuss here. Firstly, online platforms take advantage of 
cross-platform network effects, a version of indirect network effects. Secondly, the users of some 
online platform do not have to provide pecuniary payment for the products provided on these 
platforms, a situation often described as provision of services “for free”. These features of online 
platforms, however, cause difficulties in ascertaining substitutability of products and services 
according to the currently used methodology. 
The SSNIP test, useful as it is in “standard” situations, was nonetheless designed for “single-
side” markets and its accuracy is distorted in multi-sided markets. In its unmodified form, the test 
can reflect the preferences of customers based on the price of the relevant product. However, the 
position of customers is not solely dependent on prices in any given scenario159 and this holds true 
even more for customers on online platforms.  
The presence and the strength of cross-platform network effects can lead customers to remain 
with the hypothetical monopolist even if they are charged a price that would lead them to leave for 
other suppliers in a “single-side” market. As a result, if such a situation occurs, the simulated 
increase in price appears profitable. Through the lens of the SSNIP test, if left without adjustments 
for the multi-sided nature of certain markets, such a move leads to the premature termination of the 
test and determination of a relevant market within the boundaries drawn at the moment of such, 
apparently profitable, increase in price. Consequently, even though the customers may be motivated 
(even to a larger degree than by the price change) to remain with one online platform because of the 
benefits gained through network effects, the relevant market is in danger of being defined too 
narrowly.160 
When services to one side of a market are provided “for free”, the situation becomes even more 
complicated. Firstly, the SSNIP test is formulated by the Commission as a relative increase in price, 
in percentages of about 5% to 10% of the “original” price. Secondly, even if the test could be 
applied in a way that would cover the “jump” from a price of zero to any higher amount, the 
                                                 
159 See JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 66, 67. 
160 HOLZWEBER, op. cit. 58, p. 570. 
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accuracy of the test could be undermined by psychological factors associated with such a change.161 
In any way, it is widely accepted that the SSNIP test (or, for the matter, any quantitative test 
designed to monitor prices, be it through price levels or price elasticity162) may fall short of 
adequately ascertaining substitutability.163  
Some authors have proposed modifications of the SSNIP test: instead of looking only at the 
price charged to one group of customers, the prices across the entire platform would be taken into 
account.164 Effectively, the adjusted simulation would actually take account of the price structure 
that a platform operator has to choose in order to successfully launch and operate the platform, as 
already explained in Chapter 2. While such an approach goes into the heart of one of the definitions 
of multi-sided markets, it is not without complications.165  
The “success” of the SSNIP test in competition analysis can be attributed to at least two 
features. Firstly, it enables a convenient and relatively straightforward way to determine the 
substitutability of products (or geographic areas) and in doing so, determine the extent of limitations 
on the conduct of undertakings.166 Secondly, the SSNIP simulation is also quite rigorous, relying on 
a number of quantitative methods developed by economists,167 especially when compared to some 
qualitative assessments made in order to examine the characteristics and intended use of certain 
products, as was the case e.g. in the United Brands judgment.168  
On the other hand, once faced with the complexity of multi-sided markets, these characteristics 
may not apply anymore. In particular, as has been argued both by those authors who have tried to 
conduct a quantitative analysis in multi-sided markets and those who appraised the feasibility of 
modified SSNIP tests in terms of their use in legal analysis, conducting such an experiment requires 
different types and, in particular, larger amounts of data than in “traditional” hypothetical 
monopolist simulations.169 Furthermore, as admitted even by the proponents of modifications to the 
                                                 
161 KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 157. 
162 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 4-5, 61. 
163 HOPPNER, Thomas. Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms: The Case of Search Engines. World Competition. 
2015, 38(3), p. 355-356. See also HOLZWEBER, op. cit. 58, p. 569-571, KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 157. 
164 See authors mentioned in KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 156, 157. 
165 See ROCHET, TIROLE, op. cit. 54, p. 665, and ROCHET, TIROLE, op. cit. 50, p. 990-992. 
166  JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 62. 
167 Ibid., p. 64. See also JUST, Natascha. Governing online platforms: Competition policy in times of platformization. 
Telecommunications Policy. 2018, 42(5), p. 388. 
168 See Case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 31, where the Court decided that “[t]he banana 
has certain characteristics , appearance , taste , softness , seedlessness , easy handling , a constant level of production 
which enable it to satisfy the constant needs of an important section of the population consisting of the very young , the 
old and the sick.” 
169 DEWENTER, Ralf, Ulrich HEIMESHOFF and Francizska LÖW. Market Definition of Platform Markets [online]. 
Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 176, 2017 [cit. 2019-06-25], p. 11. 
Available at: https://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/wp-content/uploads/sites/572/2017/08/hsu-wp-vwl-176.pdf. See also 
KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 157; HOPPNER, op. cit. 163, p. 356; HOLZWEBER, op. cit. 58, p. 570. 
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test, since online platforms vary in practice, the assessment of substitutability through such a SSNIP 
experiment may only apply in certain situations or may differ depending on the nature of various 
platforms.170 
In conclusion, the application of the SSNIP test is far from straightforward in multi-sided 
markets and highly questionable when a product on one side of a market is provided “for free”. 
While in theory, modifications have been proposed, their practical use remains uncertain. It is with 
this in mind that non-price factors, such as quality or innovation, could be taken into account in 
defining relevant markets and they are accordingly discussed below. 
 
4.1.3. Competition on Quality in the Definition of Relevant Markets 
As suggested above, another suggested response to the shortcomings of unmodified SSNIP tests 
is the increased focus on non-price factors of competition. This part of subchapter 4.1. discusses 
firstly the overall logic of using such criteria (common for both quality and innovation 
considerations) and subsequently focuses on the role of quality as a non-price factor and the impact 
it could have on the definition of relevant markets. Furthermore, competition on privacy and data 
protection is also discussed in connection to the criterion of quality. 
Consideration of non-price factors may involve assessments of competition on quality, 
innovation or (if considered separately from quality171), privacy and/or level of data protection. It is 
widely accepted that overall, competition enforcement has relied heavily on prices and their 
assessment in competition analysis.172 Nonetheless, there is a slow, but continuing trend in the 
acceptance of non-price factors in enforcement practice; in theory, competition on non-price 
elements has long been accepted, but even more so, the role of non-price factors of competition was 
relatively recently highlighted by the Court of Justice in the Post Danmark I judgment, where it 
                                                 
170 FILISTRUCCHI, Lapo, Damien GERADIN, Eric VAN DAMME and Pauline AFFELDT. Market Definition in Two-
Sided Markets: Theory and Practice. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2014, 10(2), p. 332-333. These authors 
propose to take account of the transaction/non-transaction market typology, otherwise used to determine the number of 
relevant markets, which is, along with the discussion of this typology, a question dealt with in subchapter 4.2.; for 
instance, while the authors argue that generally, account of both sides of a market irrespective of the number of such 
markets needs to be taken, “in the particular case of a two-sided non-transaction market with only one externality […] 
one could safely perform a market definition exercise on that side of the market irrespective of the other side. For 
example [e.g. in the context of newspapers or platforms where the content side is subsidised by advertising], if one  
were to find that advertising has no effect on the readers’ side of the market, one would need to take into account the 
advertising market when defining the readers’ market, but could safely define the advertising market irrespective of the 
readers’ market.” 
171 For instance, in JUST, op. cit. 167, p. 388, privacy is mentioned separately from quality. Further in the thesis, 
however, privacy and/or data protection (mentioned in this form mainly because a number of authors cited in this thesis 
do not distinguish between those two and actually present concerns pertinent to one of them as relevant to the other) is 
included in the notion of quality. 
172 In fact, a number of statements from various authorities show that pricing has been the foremost factor taken into 
account by competition authorities, surpassing any other determinants. See JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 63. 
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held that: “[c]ompetition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or 
the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from 
the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.”173 The Commission 
has already on a number of even relatively recent occasions accepted that quality can be a factor of 
competition. On the other hand, competition on factors such as innovation, privacy and/or data 
protection level is a relatively novel concept that deserves further clarification.  
Quality considerations can take two different forms. The first one is an examination of 
arguments based on quality as a non-price factor of competition which does not take the form of a 
rigorous SSNIP-like test. For instance, in a telecommunications merger case, the Commission 
undertook a thorough analysis of one notifying party’s claim that the merger would enable it to 
provide higher quality services and thus compete with the market leader.174 In other cases, it 
determined separate relevant markets for different products or services based on quality 
considerations; e.g. the Commission decided that express and deferred delivery of packages were 
qualitatively different175 or that gender-differentiated deodorants had different features.176 In these 
decisions, quality was considered on a case-by-case basis, through the examination of 
characteristics and use, and without any structured reasoning, capable of being applied beyond such 
a case or category of cases with similar products or services, resembling the SSNIP test.  
On the other hand, a number of authors have proposed a modification of the SSNIP test to 
account for quality changes: a so-called SSNDQ test (standing for small, but significant, non-
transitory decrease in quality). The problem with the use of such a test is, as one OECD paper 
summarised, that quality, despite being probably the most important non-price factor of 
competition, “refers to the flow of service, or the level of value, that consumers derive from a 
product. It is multidimensional in nature, encompassing a wide variety of factors [and] is a 
subjective concept, insofar as different consumers may perceive or value certain quality attributes 
to a differing extent.”177 Any attempt at designing a SSNDQ test thus faces a difficulty, inasmuch a 
                                                 
173 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 22. 
174 Commission Decision COMP/M.6992 – Hutchison 3G UK / Telefonica Ireland, paras 638-640 of the Decision and 
paras 64, 84-85 of Part III of Annex II to the Decision. 
175 Commission Decision COMP/M.6570 – UPS/ TNT Express, paras 192-219. 
176 Commission Decision COMP/M5658 – Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care, para 40. 
177 OECD. The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis [online]. OECD, 2013 [cit. 2019-06-25], p. 5-
6. Available at: www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf. As further explained by the paper 
therein, “[i]dentifying a single exhaustive definition of quality is a challenging endeavour. Quality is a 
multidimensional concept that encompasses, inter alia, the durability, reliability, location, design and aesthetic appeal, 
performance and safety of a product.” 
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SSNIP test works with the more or less objective factor of price, whereas such a modified test 
would most likely have to be further adjusted in any given market.178  
In spite of that, a way towards using such a test is feasible if the criterion of quality is reduced 
to a narrower and therefore more objective category (Stucke and Grunes use the example of car 
safety179) or if normative benchmarks helping with the structuring of different levels of quality can 
be found (as is the case of data protection described below). 
The use of privacy and data protection as factors of quality (or even their consideration in 
competition law in itself) is not without controversy. Some authors contest the inclusion of privacy 
and/or data protection as a non-price factor on the basis of alleged lack of evidence of their 
pertinence to competition law or because any privacy-related concerns are allegedly outweighed by 
the utility obtained from services which are provided “for free”.180 Furthermore, a number of 
statements in the decisions of EU institutions in the past dissociated privacy and data protection 
issues from competition matters. E.g. in Asnef-Equifax, the Court of Justice held that “any possible 
issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law [but] 
they may be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.”181 In 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission similarly claimed that “[a]ny privacy-related concerns 
flowing from the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a result of the 
[acquisition of WhatsApp] do not fall within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within 
the scope of the EU data protection rules.”182 
                                                 
178 Even though the idea of a SSNDQ test has its shortcomings, it is still supported as the seemingly most viable route to 
systematically assess non-price factors. For instance, Mandrescu attempted to construct a SSNIP-like test covering 
information and attention costs to consumers – a so-called SSNIC test – only to conclude that such a method would not 
be suitable for practical use due to the difficulty in quantifying attention costs. See MANDRESCU, Daniel. The SSNIP 
Test and Zero-Pricing Strategies. European Competition and Regulatory Law Review. 2018, 2(4), p. 250-252. On the 
other hand, Wu (not cited in Mandrescu’s paper) has proposed an attention-based SSNIP test simulating increases in the 
“advertising load” and assessing the reaction of consumers: “[t]he attentional version of the SSNIP test tries to 
determine how consumer might react to a small but significant and non-transitory increase in the advertising load for a 
given product. It might be conducted simply by adding advertising to a product in a non-transitory fashion, and 
determining whether that addition might make a significant number of consumers spend their time with a different 
product.” WU, Tim. Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law [online]. Columbia Law School Scholarship 
Archive, 2017 [cit. 2019-06-15], p. 31. Available at:  https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2029. 
It nonetheless remains unclear whether such a method would be workable in practice. 
179 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 261-263. 
180 MANNE, Geoffrey A. and Ben SPERRY. The problems and perils of bootstrapping privacy and data into an 
antitrust framework [online]. CPI Antitrust Chronicle. May 2015 (2), 2015 [cit. 2019-06-25], p. 2-6. Available at: 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/ManneSperryMay-152.pdf. 
181 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:734, para 63. 
182 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 164. See also Commission Decision 
COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para 368, which was criticised by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
because of the focus on paid services and the lack of recognition of the relevance of “free” digital services: “[s]ince 
that case was closed, the evolution of the digital economy has been marked by an explosion of data collection. An 
equivalent, relevant market analysis today would examine new business models and assess the value of personal 
information as an intangible asset.” See EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR. Preliminary Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor: Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data. The interplay between 
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On the other hand, there is growing consensus on that there is no logical reason why privacy 
and data protection should be excluded from competition law altogether and that these criteria can 
be included within quality as a non-price factor.183 The German and French competition authorities 
have similarly claimed that the existence of specific legal instruments on the protection of personal 
data does not make competition law irrelevant with respect to data protection or privacy issues.184 
Moreover, the Commission itself has apparently changed its stance on the matter in 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, where it explicitly stated that privacy can be a factor of competition, while also 
recognising the relevance of data protection rules for competition law analysis (later confirmed in 
the Google/Sanofi merger decision185).186  
While both competition on privacy and competition on data protection is thus likely acceptable 
in competition law, between privacy and data protection, it is seemingly the latter that has a better 
chance to be used in a SSNDQ-type test.187 As already mentioned above, data protection is covered 
by EU legislation188 giving it a solid normative benchmark; there is not only a legally recognised 
level of protection that needs to be observed when providing services to customers, but also a list of 
criteria that can, under certain circumstances, be assessed quantitatively. 189 In practice, the scope of 
purposes for which personal data is processed, the length of storage of such data, the range of 
situations in which a data subjects has to consent to the collection of personal data etc. are all 
                                                                                                                                                                  
data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy. [online]. European Data Protection 
Supervisor, 2014 [cit. 2019-06-15], para 57. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-
26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf. 
183 For academic consensus, see COSTA-CABRAL, Francisco and Orla LYNSKEY. Family Ties: The intersection of 
data protection and competition law in EU law. Common Market Law Review. 2017, 54(1), p. 20, and the authors cited 
under footnotes 45-46. See also STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 4-5, 10-11. 
184 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 23, 24. 
185 Commission Decision COMP/M.7813 – Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, para 69. 
186 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 255 (where the Commission mentioned that EU 
data protection rules limited Microsoft in accessing and using LinkedIn’s full set of data) and in particular para 350. On 
the other hand, Commission made a proviso in footnote 330, where it claimed that “[t]he finding of the importance of 
privacy as parameter of competition [in Microsoft/LinkedIn] is consistent with the Commission's findings in 
Facebook/WhatsApp […] in relation to consumer communication services.” According to the author, such a conclusion 
can only be understood as an attempt by the Commission not to undermine its earlier decision in light of the post-
merger developments. In particular, once privacy and security features of WhatsApp, which partially made it so popular 
in the first place, started to be rolled back, a public backlash ensued. See WINDER, Davey. How WhatsApp Merger 
With Facebook Messenger Puts Your Privacy At Risk. Forbes.com [online]. Forbes Media LLC, 2019 [cit. 2019-06-14]. 
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/01/27/how-whatsapp-merger-with-facebook-messenger-
puts-your-privacy-at-risk/#1b578cf14e57. 
187 In fact, the proceedings against Facebook by the German competition authority already point to the relevance of data 
protection law within non-price factors of competition. See VOLMAR, Maximilian N. and Katharina O. HELMDACH. 
Protecting consumers and their data through competition law? Rethinking abuse of dominance in light of the Federal 
Cartel Office’s Facebook investigation. European Competition Journal. 2018, 14(2-3), p. 195-215. 
188 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
189 COSTA-CABRAL, LYNSKEY, op. cit. 183, p. 30.  
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comparable on some scale, giving thus the much needed measure of objectivity and rigorousness to 
a hypothetical data protection-based SSNDQ simulation.  
With respect to privacy, such a use is, without a doubt, possible190 but references would need to 
be made to rules protecting privacy, from case-law of the Court of Justice to legislation such as the 
E-Privacy Directive.191 At the very least, a SSNDQ test could be used for clear breaches of such 
rules; nonetheless, the number of concrete criteria that could be put on a scale the “movement” on 
which would be used in such a test seem to be lower than in the case of data protection.192 
In conclusion, focusing on quality as a non-price factor of competition could alleviate some of 
the problems with the use of the SSNIP test discussed above. At the same time, however, it only 
seems feasible to construct a SSNDQ test if “quality” can be narrowed down to a more measurable 
characteristic and crucially, if some normative benchmarks can be found to add more objectivity to 
any development of such a test. In particular, data protection in EU law provides for a regime that 
could be used in order to assess substitutability of certain products in light of the level of data 
protection granted within their provision and this way, a relevant market could be defined in spite of 
the shortcomings of the SSNIP test. 
 
4.1.4. Competition on Innovation in the Definition of Relevant Markets 
Lastly, the issue of innovation and its role in defining relevant markets is discussed. While 
being covered by the same general reasoning as other non-price factors, it will be shown that in 
practice, competition on innovation is more difficult to measure than competition on quality.  
In contrast to quality (including privacy and/or data protection), the non-price factor of 
innovation is built on a slightly different background. In short, the concept of competition on 
innovation is constructed on the  “disruptive” power of online platforms, that is, their potential to 
quickly enter and dominate existing relevant markets or even create new markets or at least change 
the way some markets have worked until such entry. In contrast to innovation as one of the values 
protected by competition law, in this meaning, innovation, or more precisely, the potential of an 
online platform to further develop and innovate, is taken as a factor that may influence customers’ 
choices in the same way as price or quality. Because of their disruptive potential through 
                                                 
190 But see STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 263-268, who refer to a method which would not need such normative 
benchmarks, albeit still in development. 
191 See in particular recitals 1-2 and Art. 1(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector, OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47. Further cited as “E-Privacy Directive”. 
192 One of the criteria that could be used in such a way is the confidentiality of communications in Art. 5 of the E-
Privacy Directive and the number of situations in which such communication can be intercepted or the number and/or 
type of authorities and persons that can gain access to it.  
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competition on innovation, online platforms are alleged to be not only competing in relevant 
markets, but perhaps because of their ability to dominate markets for certain kinds of services (e.g. 
search engines, social networking etc., including markets created as a result of their entry into 
business), they are also competing for markets.193  
The potential of new developments is often overlooked in favour of defining current markets. 
In fact, the Commission itself has admitted that in certain contexts, research and development 
efforts of undertakings may affect competition in a way that may not be sufficiently recognised;194 
on the other hand, the Commission has explicitly constrained any examination of potential 
developments to those scenarios where the “process of innovation is structured in such a way that it 
is possible at an early stage to identify competing R&D poles.”195 If such a “progress ladder” in 
innovation cannot be ascertained, the Commission will not engage in speculation as to the shape 
and impact of future innovation.196 
Nonetheless, competition on innovation is invoked by a number of authors as a crucial element 
of the “new economy”.197 The aims of their propositions are sometimes presented as ensuring a 
cautious approach of competition law towards negative effects on innovation.198 In terms of 
practical use, however, competition on innovation suffers from two main drawbacks.  
Firstly, the role of innovation is mostly associated with positive effects for consumers and 
competition; conversely, some practices that are innovative in themselves may actually be designed 
to impair the operation of other undertakings and exclude them from effective competition or to 
exploit customers for one’s own gain.199  
                                                 
193 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 77, 106-107. See also EDELMAN, GERADIN, op. cit. 55, p. 4-5. 
194 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements. OJ C 11, 
14.1.2011, p. 1–72, paras 112, 119. 
195 Ibid., para 121. 
196 Ibid., para 122. 
197 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 77, 106-107. CURZON PRICE, Tony and Mike WALKER. Incentives to Innovate v Short-
term Price Effects in Antitrust Analysis. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, 7(7), p. 476-477. See 
also the explanation provided in KERBER, Wolfgang. Competition, Innovation and Competition Law: Dissecting the 
Interplay. [online]. Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics no. 42-2017, 2017 [cit. 2019-06-15], p.5. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051103. Kerber explains that competition has been always understood in terms of the 
efforts of undertakings to offer lower prices, better quality, and new products; in this meaning, innovation has always 
been connected to competition law, but “currently no convincing integrated and well-established concept of 
competition exists that also includes innovation [in the sense of] ‘dynamic competition’ [which] today is mostly only 
used as a synonym for innovation […] with new products or production technologies, but is not based upon a clear 
theory about the dynamics of competition.” 
198 Compare e.g. MANNE, Geoffrey A. and Joshua D. WRIGHT. Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust. Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics. 2010, 6(1), p. 154-156. On the other hand, granting such a non-price factor a prominent 
role in competition analysis may lead to very broad definitions of relevant markets, which would arguably serve best the 
current incumbents. 
199 See for the concept of “predatory innovation” in SCHREPEL, Thibault. Predatory Innovation: The Definite Need for 
Legal Recognition. SMU Science & Technology Law Review. 2018, 21(1), p. 22, where such a notion is described in 
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Secondly, competition on innovation is even further from being sufficiently defined than  other 
non-price factors; most reflections on innovation in EU competition law “stop” at the necessity to 
consider at some point the effects of innovation.200 On the other hand, the current academic writing 
on innovation makes a “jump” straight to imagining what kind of vaguely defined markets could be 
used, without presenting a standard at least remotely close to the rigorousness of the SSNIP test; in 
this respect Graef suggests e.g. a relevant market “for attention”.201  
Furthermore, while there are some academic analyses of innovation as a non-price factor,202 in 
competition law, innovation lacks any normative benchmark comparable to those available to 
privacy and data protection. This does not mean that the two steps suggested above for the 
usefulness of the SSNDQ test cannot be replicated to some extent; it is arguably possible to narrow 
down the criterion of “innovation” to cover only a particular sector or a pre-defined set of 
developments (in fact, according to the Commission, such an approach is possible e.g. in the 
pharmaceutical sector203). On the other hand, since innovation is a forward-focused process, any set 
of benchmarks (and their relevance) will have to be pre-defined with some degree of uncertainty, 
which may complicate the development of any SSNIP-like test for innovation.204 
In summary, while innovation benefits from the same general acceptance as other non-price 
factors of competition, its use in relevant market definition appears too complicated in practice to be 
used in foreseeable future. This, on the other hand, does not necessarily apply for sectors where a 
clear “innovation” path can be ascertained, which, however, is a matter for case-by-case analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
terms of “all practices that, under the guise of real innovations, are anticompetitive strategies aimed at eliminating 
competition without benefiting consumers [and which] may take two different forms—the modification of a 
technological platform and the technical design of a product—which are aimed at removing the compatibility of third 
party technologies with those of a dominant firm, or at impairing competing technologies operations.” 
200 Compare e.g. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 194, paras 112, 119-122. See also EZRACHI, Ariel. EU 
Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy [online]. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2018, 2018 
[cit. 2019-06-15], p. 11-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191766. 
Innovation is also increasingly taken into account in merger analysis; see EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Competition 
Policy Brief: EU Merger Control and Innovation [online]. European Commission, 2016 [cit. 2019-06-15]. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf. 
201 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 107-109. Note also the criticism drawn by Wu, who argues in response to a similar proposal 
for an attention market that: “[t]he main problem with [an attention market approach] is that it defines the market so 
broadly that economists and antitrust authorities would immediately reject the definition as ridiculous in the context of 
a cash market. Cash is also a limited resource, but that does not mean everything that costs money is a substitute.” See 
WU, op. cit. 178, p. 30-32. See also EVANS, David. The Economics of Attention Markets. [online]. 2017 [cit. 2019-06-
15]. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044858. 
202 PETIT, Nicholas. Innovation Competition, Unilateral Effects and Merger Control Policy. [online]. 2018 [cit. 2019-
06-15]. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113077. 
203 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 194, para 120. 
204 Some examples of products or services which face constant innovation include online translation services (the 
quality of which should be measurable and at least hypothetically some set of benchmarks could be derived from the 
expected translation quality in the future) or so-called digital assistants (where a scale of the quality of responses could 
be constructed based e.g. on how close does any such service come to succeeding in the Turing test). A further problem 
with these benchmarks is their objectivity; most of these will have to be made by private persons or bodies (including 
experts) and will need to be recognised as objective in order to be used. Legislation-based benchmarks could arguably 




4.1.5. The Implications of the Shortcomings of Relevant Market Definition in Multi-sided 
Markets 
In summary, the shortcomings of the SSNIP test in multi-sided markets, as well as the lack of 
precisely defined “substitutes” for such a method for the non-price factors of quality or innovation, 
manifest themselves in two ways, firstly, in academic writing, and secondly, in practice, especially 
in the decisions of the European Commission concerning such markets.  
In simple terms, it can be argued that due to the aforementioned deficiencies in legal analysis, 
academic writing is still mainly concerned with only generally defined methods of defining relevant 
markets; at best, some authors try to present typologies of platforms that could ease the problem of 
complexity of online platforms and their varieties.205 In practice, due to the same difficulties, 
competition authorities may completely refrain from using any rigorous quantitative methods like 
the SSNIP test (or any of its modifications) and rely on a case-by-case qualitative analysis of 
various features of the products and services provided on online platforms.206  
In the Commission’s practice, both quality and innovation have been considered as factors of 
competition; nonetheless, as presented above, these considerations apply only on a case-by-case 
basis without the possibility to use such findings in a systematic way. Furthermore, the 
acknowledgment of these factors does not always come within the part of such decision concerning 
the definition of a relevant market.  
In an otherwise important decision in Google/DoubleClick, competition on quality is sparsely 
mentioned and innovation is not considered at all.207 In Microsoft/Yahoo, the Commission admitted 
that search engines compete on the basis of quality of their results, mentioning relevance to users 
and speed of returning results as relevant factors, but unfortunately without considering the 
relevance of results or the speed of result delivery in terms of a quantitatively analysable scale as 
suggested above.208 It further recognised competition on innovation between search engines, but 
                                                 
205 FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 332-333. Nonetheless, these authors, who 
use the transaction/non-transaction typology, described in subchapter 4.2, admit that even with this typology, the 
resulting application of a price structure-oriented SSNIP test is difficult in practice and that their typology is not 
sufficiently followed in practice. See FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 325. 
206 As noted by Yang: “competition authorities tried to avoid applying complex econometric methods due to time 
constraints, lack of proper data or methodical complexity which often comes along with limited robustness and 
difficulties in interpreting and communicating results.” See YANG, Sung Yoon. Rethinking Modes of Relevant Market 
Definition for Multi-Sided Platform: Comparative Research on EU and Korea Cases [online]. 2018 [cit. 2019-06-15], p. 
35. Available at: www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2018_ps6_pa4.pdf. Mandrescu further notes that “this final outcome, 
wherein the most basic tools of competition law practice are the most suitable for the market definition of one of the 
most recent and innovative business practices, is admittedly rather ironic.” See MANDRESCU, op. cit. 178, p. 256. 
207 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras 273,274 or footnote 143. 
208 Commission Decision COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, para 101. 
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once again only referred to past innovations as a proof for the high degree of innovation in these 
markets and refrained from outlining any sequence of future innovations that could be used as a 
benchmark for competition on innovation.209  
In both of these decisions, however, quality and/or innovation is only considered once the 
relevant markets have been defined. In Microsoft/Skype, Facebook/WhatsApp and 
Microsoft/LinkedIn the situation is largely the same.210 Interestingly, in the Google Shopping 
decision, the Commission undertook an analysis of the number of users that could multi-home if 
Google were to degrade the quality of its general search service and in doing so, turn Google’s 
business less profitable; on the other hand, as is the case with the previous decisions, this simulation 
was only conducted once the relevant markets had been drawn.211  
In practice, the analysis of relevant markets with online platforms thus relies on the qualitative 
assessment of functionalities: e.g. in Microsoft/LinkedIn, the Commission identified a relevant 
market for “professional social networking” (or “PSN”) services, distinct from “general” social 
networking services as well as from “enterprise social networks” (which differ from PSN services 
in that they function within closed networks or as put in the decision, in a “walled garden”).212 
In conclusion, neither the state of legal writing nor the current state of the Commission’s 
practice brings sufficient clarity or legal certainty for future cases concerning multi-sided markets. 
Furthermore, as will be shown in two subsequent subchapters, the deficiencies of the quantitative 
toolkit available to competition authorities present themselves in two other areas. 
 
4.2. Defining One or Multiple Downstream Relevant Markets 
As already explained at the beginning of Chapter 4, besides the methods that can be used to 
define relevant markets (discussed above), one of the additional questions that needs to be answered 
                                                 
209 Commission Decision COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, paras 109-110. 
210 See Commission Decision COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/ Skype, para 81, Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – 
Facebook/WhatsApp, para 36, Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 389. 
211 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), paras 312-315.  
212 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 95-117; it is particularly noteworthy that as a 
result of the Commission’s inquiry “most respondents indicated that, for a social network currently not substitutable 
with LinkedIn, it would not be possible to develop and become substitutable to LinkedIn in the short term and without 
significant investments.” See Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 110. This decision built 
on Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 45-47, 51-55; in this decision, the Commission 
held that in particular social networking services have as their defining features the creation of a personal profile and a 
list of contacts or friends, as well as exchanging messages, sharing information, commenting on others’ posts on the 
network or recommending friends or contacts to others (noting in the process that to qualify as a social networking 
service, it is not necessary to fulfil all of these functionalities). With respect to the overlap in functionalities with 
communication services, Commission found that “social networking services tend to offer a richer social experience 
compared to consumer communications apps” and that “consumer communications apps facilitate instant real-time 
communication [whereas] messages in social networks, such as comments on a posting, are not normally expected to be 
responded to in real time.” See Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 54. 
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is the number of relevant markets on the downstream level. Since online platforms operate in multi-
sided environments and connect multiple groups of customers, there is a question of how many 
relevant markets must be defined; whether one relevant market can encompass the entire operation 
of the platform or whether each “side” of a multi-sided market must have its own relevant market. 
Accordingly, this subchapter is devoted to this issue. 
The relevance of this question to the issue of seeking access to data through the refusal to 
supply case-law can be explained in the following way: if an undertaking seeks access to data held 
by an online platform, the consequences of a refusal will have to be assessed on the downstream 
market. Such an undertaking may itself be an online platform or it can operate on a downstream 
market where it competes with an online platform; therefore, better understanding of the probable 
scope of relevant markets can bring more clarity for potential refusal to supply cases.213 
With the exception of the clarification provided in the subsequent paragraph, the rest of this 
subchapter is structured into two parts. Firstly, an overview of the methods devised in academic 
writing to determine the “correct” number of relevant markets is provided (4.2.1.) and secondly, 
these methods are analysed in light of the case-law of the Court of Justice and the decision-making 
practice of the Commission (4.2.2.). 
It should be clarified at the outset of this subchapter that some authors turn to the question of 
the correct number of relevant markets before any other matter pertinent to multi-sided markets.214 
On the other hand, according to the author, it is necessary, at least in terms of the presentation of the 
peculiarities of multi-sided markets and the adjustments needed in competition law analysis, to 
firstly understand what methods of determining relevant markets can be successfully used and only 
subsequently turn to concrete issues of market definition. This is even more important in light of the 
conclusions from the previous subchapter: as shown above, the “classic” quantitative test is not 
usable in multi-sided markets, at least not without substantial modifications. Furthermore, as also 
already suggested in the subchapter above, precisely because of the uncertainty surrounding the use 
of the SNNIP test (and consequently, the rigorousness of the assessment of substitutability), a 
number of authors have resorted to using typologies of platforms, which, firstly, are not backed by a 
                                                 
213 Evans suggests that in theory, the definition of one or more relevant markets should not matter as long as the analysis 
of competitive constraints in either scenario is conducted properly (albeit without further explaining this argument). See 
EVANS, David S. Antitrust Economis of Free [online]. Competition Policy International, Spring 2011, 2012 [cit. 2019-
06-07], p. 22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1813193. On the other hand, other authors point out that 
neither the Commission nor the Court have the means to conduct such a thorough analysis and consequently, the 
approach chosen in defining one or more markets may have an effect on the outcome of any such case. 
FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 295-296. 
214 E.g. FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 302; GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 81; 
BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 303-304. 
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consensus, and secondly, do not always correspond to decision-making practice, as will be also 
outlined below. 
 
4.2.1. Methods for Determining the Number of Relevant Markets 
As presented at the beginning of subchapter 4.2., it is first necessary to look at the methods 
which have been devised as solutions to the question of the number of relevant markets in multi-
sided settings. In the discussion below, a general overview will be provided and a small number of 
methods will be analysed more closely. Two of these methods will subsequently be compared to the 
decision-making and judicial practice in the next part of this subchapter. 
The views on the number of relevant markets that ought to be defined and the situations in 
which a particular approach should be taken vary greatly. For instance, Evans proposes to define 
one relevant market for a platform as a “business ecosystem”, in which a product is provided to one 
side of the market for free. This approach is suggested mainly to overcome, firstly, the claims that 
no relevant market can be defined in cases of “free” products215 and, secondly, to help surmount the 
complexities associated with the application of the SSNIP test for two separate, but mutually 
influenced markets.216 With respect to Google’s search engine, it has been proposed by others to 
combine so-called “organic” search (i.e. the general search service) and search advertising into one 
relevant market based on the interrelatedness of pricing for both products.217 As will be further 
shown, however, this proposal fails in light of the Commission’s practice.  
Beyond these rather anecdotal proposals, some more complex methods for determining the 
number of markets have been created.  
                                                 
215 EVANS, op. cit. 213, p. 20-21. The argument against defining any relevant markets (also because competition law 
could not apply to such situations) when products are provided at zero-price is mostly associated with references to the 
case of  Kinderstart v. Google (cited and explained in EVANS, op. cit. 213, p. 2-3); nonetheless, most authors dealing 
with EU competition law argue that such an argument is untenable, provided, that there is some form of commercial 
relationship between the undertaking and the decision to provide a product “for free”, e.g. if such provision is actually 
subsidised by another group of customers. See SOLANO DIAZ, Pablo. EU Competition Law Needs to Install a Plug-in. 
World Competition. 2017, 40(3), p. 395-396, HOPPNER, op cit. 163, p. 354, or SOUSA FERRO, Miguel. “Ceci n’est 
pas un marché”: Gratuity and competition law. Concurrences.com [online]. Institut de la droit de la concurrence, 2015 
[cit. 2019-06-15], p. 2-3. Available at: https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2015/articles/Ceci-n-est-
pas-un-marche-Gratuity-70679. 
216 EVANS, op. cit. 213, p. 22-23. 
217 RATLIFF, James D. and Daniel L. RUBINFELD. Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can 
Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability? Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2015, 10(3), p. 517-
541. See also a slightly differently formulated method proposed for two sided markets where an undertaking collects 
some form of transaction fees from both sided of a market in WRIGHT, Julian. One-sided logic in two-sided markets. 
Review of Network Economics, 2004, 3(1), p. 62. Wright uses an example of rental agencies; he proposes one relevant 
market in a scenario where the market for “rental agencies for tenants” is controlled by one undertaking, but “rental 
agencies for landlords” are in fierce competition. In such a situation, he argues against defining separates markets for a 




Firstly, it has been proposed to establish the dividing line between determining a single relevant 
market and multiple ones along the difference between transaction and non-transaction 
platforms.218 The former type is characterised by that the product offered is the possibility to 
transact through the platform. Such a possibility, however, “takes the form of two distinct products, 
one for each side of the transaction, because such possibility needs to be offered to both sides.”219 
Such a finding warrants the establishment of a single relevant market. In contrast, a non-transaction 
platform does not contain such a strong link; there is, however, a connection between the 
corresponding multiple markets because of indirect network effects, but not one so strong that it 
would imply the necessity of defining a single relevant market.220  
Secondly, an alternative typology has also been suggested, which examines the types of 
interactions that characterise various platforms and distinguishes between so-called unilateral 
matching and bilateral or multilateral matching.221 Unilateral matching means that one user group 
wishes to reach another, separate customer group or groups on the platform, but this is not 
necessarily observable the other way around. Bilateral or multilateral matching occurs where the 
interaction between customer groups on the platform is sought by all relevant groups that are part of 
a particular interaction. Depending on a precise case-by-case analysis, one or more markets shall be 
possible to define with bilateral or multilateral matching occurring on the platform, while with 
unilateral matching, there will always be multiple relevant markets.222   
A third proposed method relies instead on the strength of network effects between different 
customer groups: “a single market for both platform-sides under investigation may be defined when 
a sufficient number of participants on one platform-side would switch to another platform if there 
were a moderate price increase for the products or services on the other platform-side.”223 Under 
this method, strong cross-platform network effects make it difficult for an undertaking to treat 
different sides of its platform independently of each other.224 
What these approaches share is that any one of them can be used to explain some of the less 
complicated decisions on the number of relevant markets made by the Commission, especially those 
                                                 
218 FILISTRUCHI, Lapo. 1. Market definition in multi-sided markets. In: Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided 
Platforms [online]. OECD, 2018, p. 37-54 [cit. 2019-03-07], p. 42. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms-2018.pdf. 
219 Ibid.  
220 Ibid. See also FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 296-300. 
221 MANDRESCU, Daniel. Applying (EU) competition law to online platforms: Reflections on the definition of the 
relevant market. World Competition. 2018, 41(3), p. 464-465.  
222 Ibid. 
223 HOLZWEBER, op. cit. 58, p. 576. 
224 Ibid., p. 575-577. 
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in which it separated markets for various forms of content from advertising markets. Conversely, 
each of these methods has its shortcomings.  
The second method only brings clarity in one category of cases, while leaving the other, 
arguably more complex category, subject to further analysis of the necessity of the so-called 
“intermediary matching service”.225 Nonetheless, besides this slight complication, it appears as 
usable as the transaction/non-transaction typology. The third method does not in itself bring any 
typology or a usable scale of network effects, but essentially requires the assessment of cross-
platform network effects in any given case. The transaction/non-transaction typology is probably 
the most advanced, at the very least in that it actually offers straightforward guidance for the 
complete spectrum of possible cases. Unfortunately, relying on this method in practice is 
complicated, because its suggestions are not recognised in a series of cases concerning payment 
cards, which have, all the more, been confirmed by the Court of Justice.  
It thus appears that the transaction/non-transaction typology, along with the matching method 
are the best developed. Consequently, these two methods will be analysed in light of the legal 
developments concerning the definition of one or multiple relevant markets in multi-sided setting.  
 
4.2.2. Decisions on the Number of Relevant Markets  
In the discussion below, the methods chosen in the previous part of subchapter 4.2. will be 
compared to the current state of EU law practice. Both older decisions and more recent cases will be 
considered. As will be presented, both of these tools correspond largely to the outcome of numerous 
decisions across decades of practice; at the same time, however, it will be argued that they depart in 
their proposed solutions for cases concerning payment cards. Furthermore, it will be shown that 
while the decision-making practice of the Commission corresponds largely to these typologies, 
most cases are still decided on a case-by-case basis. 
In practice, the Commission has defined separate markets for specific sides of two-sided 
markets at least since 1990s, where it issued a number of merger decisions concerning 
newspapers.226 Here, the Commission has distinguished between “reader” markets (i.e. markets for 
                                                 
225 As Mandrescu explains, in the latter category, one must take account of the intermediary matching service provided 
by the platform; if it is indispensable for meeting the demands of each separate customer group, then only one relevant 
market should be defined. On the other hand, separate markets ought to be delineated when the demand of one or more 
of the user groups can also be met through other means and the intermediary matching function of the platform is a 
matter of efficiency or convenience rather than necessity. See MANDRESCU, op. cit. 221, p. 468-469. 
226 See Commission Decision COMP/M.1455 – Gruner + Jahr / Financial Times / JV, para 15, where the Commission 
summarised its decision-making from that time period and uses a similar method (though left without conclusion) to 
assess the case at hand. 
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newspapers) and “advertising” markets: “[i]n the market for newspapers the consumers are the 
buyers of the newspapers as a source of information. In the advertising market, the consumers are 
the advertisers who buy advertising space to promote the sales of goods or services.”227 
 In another line of decisions, the Commission thoroughly separated advertising markets from 
other, “content-based” markets. In Google/DoubleClick (with the exception outlined in the 
following paragraph) and Microsoft/Yahoo, the Commission established a separate market for online 
advertising, with publishers as sellers of online advertising space and prospective advertisers as 
buyers of that space.228 The Facebook/WhatsApp decision further defined a market for social 
networking services,229 independently of any sort of online advertising market, also defined in the 
decision.230 In Microsoft/LinkedIn, a similar finding came into light independently of the 
determination of a relevant market for online advertising.231 Lastly, in Google Shopping, the 
Commission defined a separate relevant market for “general search services”232 while recognising 
that: “[g]eneral search services and online search advertising constitute the two sides of a general 
search engine platform.”233 Nonetheless, according to the Commission, a general search engine 
platform such as Google connects “distinct but interdependent demands.”234  
While the cases presented above led to the “separation” of relevant markets within a multi-sided 
setting, in a relatively recent line of decisions, the Commission has turned to defining single 
relevant markets based on the intermediation of travel services, e.g. in 
Booking.com/HotelsCombined.235 In Travelport/Worldspan, the Commission even undertook a 
thorough analysis of the network effects characterising the so-called global distribution systems 
(“GDS”) enabling the aggregation of content from various parties involved in the travel industry on 
one hand and the distribution of such information to travel agents and final consumers on the 
                                                 
227 Ibid. 
228 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para 56, Commission Decision COMP/M.5727 – 
Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, para 62; advertising services, in particular digital advertising services, were also 
analysed in further cases such as in Commission Decision COMP/M.6967 – BNP Paribas Fortis/ Belgacom/ Belgian 
Mobile Wallet, paras 58-68. 
229 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 45-47, 51-55. 
230 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 69-79; according to the Commission, 
Facebook’s “activities in the advertising sector consist of the provision of online (non-search) advertising services on 
Facebook’s core social networking platform, both on PCs and on mobile devices.” 
231 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 152. 
232 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), paras 154-160. 
233 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), para 159, which also states that “[t]he level of 
advertising revenue that a general search engine can obtain is related to the number of users of its general search 
service: the higher the number of users of a general search service, the more the online search advertising side of the 
platform will appeal to advertisers.” 
234 Ibid. 
235 Commission Decision COMP/M.9005 – Booking Holdings / HotelsCombined, paras 28, 69. 
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other.236 Crucially, the Commission found that because of the strength of network effects on such an 
intermediation platform, any relevant product market needed to be defined solely around the GDS 
service, as no substitutes could match its functionalities or lower costs.237 Similarly, in 
Google/DoubleClick, a market for intermediation in online advertising was also defined; however, 
on a closer look the driving force behind such a decision was not the conscious adoption of any of 
the methods presented above or a thorough analysis of network effects, but rather the recognition of 
a case-specific lack of substitute services (including direct selling of advertising space) for a certain 
category of customers.238  
All of these decisions are in line with both the transaction/non-transaction typology as well as 
the matching method proposed by Mandrescu (when the necessity of the intermediary matching 
function of platforms is taken into account). It thus appears that in practical assessment, the 
intermediation nature of some services can play a significant role. 
In contrast, the transaction/non-transaction theory was clearly not followed in the payment card 
cases outlined below; the authors of this typology suggested a “market for transactions by payment 
cards”, based on previous practice, which would clearly fall within the transaction market 
category.239 The payment cards cases were not explicitly addressed by the author of the matching 
typology; still, it could be argued that because a market “for transactions by payment cards” entails 
a bilateral matching function, which, however, is, strictly speaking, not necessary to perform a 
transaction (i.e. a transaction can still happen through e.g. cash240), the matching typology appears 
to be closer to the result of these cases. 
Following an analysis proposing separate relevant markets in the Commission’s decision in the 
MasterCard case, the Court upheld such decision and the delineation of relevant markets contained 
within.241 MasterCard attempted to propose a definition of a “payment systems” relevant market 
where both payment card acquirers and issuers jointly co-operated as partners within a “joint 
                                                 
236 Commission Decision COMP/M.4523 – Travelport/Worldspan, paras 9-11. This is also one of the few cases where 
network effects played a role in defining the quality of a product and could thus be considered in terms of 
substitutability analysis. Arguably, as presented in Chapter 2, both direct and indirect network effects can have impact 
on the quality of service and be thus considered also in this way when defining relevant markets; since, however, so 
many of the existing decisions turn mostly to examining the features of products and services instead of giving larger 
space to quality, this kind of reasoning is actually rare. 
237 Ibid., paras 12, 58-59. 
238 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para 68. 
239 Nonetheless, its authors present the judgments of the Court and decisions of the Commission as inter alia failures to 
properly account for the insights gained from economic theories. See FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, 
AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 295. 
240 Such a conclusion would nonetheless also depend on any quality preferences of both sides; e.g. the speed or 
convenience of payment by card could not be replicated by cash payment. 
241 Commission Decision COMP/34.579 – MasterCard, paras 250-267; Case T-111/08, MasterCard [2012] 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:260 and Case C-382/12 P MasterCard [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201. 
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venture” payment system, supplying an alleged “joint product” which competed with other such 
payment systems as well as with non-card payment methods (including. e.g. cash or cheques); 
MasterCard suggested the name MasterCard service for this proposed relevant product.242 Instead, 
the relevant markets were separated into separate product markets: an upstream market for card 
schemes (defined by competition between different card networks, i.e. “inter-system” competition) 
and downstream markets for acquiring and issuing services, respectively (mostly including banks or 
other financial institutions competing by issuing cards to individuals and acquiring merchants for 
card payment acceptance).243  
In reviewing the Commission’s decision in a challenge launched by MasterCard, which claimed 
that the Commission erred in defining a separate acquiring market (crucial for the finding of 
violation of Art. 101 TFEU in the case), the General Court  admitted on the issue of relevant market 
“that there are certain forms of interaction between the ‘issuing’ and ‘acquiring’ sides, such as the 
complementary nature of issuing and acquiring services, and the presence of indirect network 
effects, since the extent of merchants’ acceptance of cards and the number of cards in circulation 
each affects the other.”244 On the other hand, it crucially held “that despite such complementarity, 
services provided to cardholders and those provided to merchants can be distinguished, and, 
moreover, cardholders and merchants exert separate competitive pressure on issuing and acquiring 
banks respectively.”245  
A similar conclusion was reached by the Commission in the Cartes Bancaires case (although 
this case had a much longer route to being finally confirmed by the Court of Justice), where the 
Commission held that “the ‘two sided’ nature of an economic activity by no means signifies that the 
system concerned constitutes a single market.”246 It further held, along similar lines as in 
MasterCard, that payment card systems competed with one another (within inter-system 
                                                 
242 Commission Decision COMP/34.579 – MasterCard, paras 250-257. 
243 Commission Decision COMP/34.579 – MasterCard, paras 257-267, 278-280; as restated in Case C-382/12 P 
MasterCard [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201, para 11: “It is necessary to distinguish between three different product 
markets in the sphere of open bank card systems: first of all, the ‘inter-systems market’, in which the various card 
systems compete; then the ‘issuing market’, in which the issuing banks compete for the business of the cardholders; 
and, lastly, the ‘acquiring market’, in which the acquiring banks compete for the merchants’ business. The relevant 
market for the purposes of the decision at issue is made up of the national acquiring markets in the Member States of 
the EEA.” 
244 Case T-111/08, MasterCard [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:260, para 175. 
245 Case T-111/08, MasterCard [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:260, para 176; the key part of the appeal to the Court of Justice 
concerning definition of the relevant market fell through as the Court found it ineffective, see Case C-382/12 P 
MasterCard [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201, paras 159-160. 
246 Commission Decision COMP/38606 – Groupement des Cartes Bancaires "CB", para 180; upheld by the General 
Court only after a finding of a by-object violation was struck down on appeal by Court of Justice. 
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competition) to induce financial institutions to opt for membership in their system,247 while 
financial institutions themselves competed against each other in the markets for payment card 
issuance and acquiring of payment and withdrawal transactions.248 Both in MasterCard and in 
Cartes Bancaires, the Commission then subsequently focused on a single market for the assessment 
of prohibited conduct: the market for acquiring in MasterCard and the market for issuing in Cartes 
Bancaires.249  
In summary, although the practice of the Commission incrementally brings more certainty into 
the determination of the number of relevant markets, the analysis therein is still dependent on a 
case-by-case analysis of the features of various multi-sided markets. The abovementioned methods, 
especially the transaction/non-transaction and matching typologies, do provide a degree of certainty 
in explaining the outcomes of these decisions, but as the payment cards cases show, they may not 
always be followed in practice.  
These cases also demonstrate that the typologies may point to different results; one more 
example where the two typologies outlined above may differ in practice is online marketplaces.250 
Nonetheless, it could be convenient to follow both of these methods when defining relevant 
markets, especially if the result of their application would be the same.  
In conclusion, the downstream market level may be composed of one relevant market 
encompassing the entire platform, but that does not by any means exclude defining even a relatively 
narrow market for a specialised product or service separately from other sides of the multi-sided 
market when describing multiple relevant markets.  
 
4.3. Relevant Geographical Markets and Online Platforms 
This subchapter focuses on the geographical dimension of relevant markets containing online 
platforms. As already pointed out in the introduction to Chapter 4, the geographic dimension of a 
relevant market is not an issue that would only concern downstream relevant markets; in fact, 
among the three subchapters of Chapter 4, this one is the least downstream level-specific. At the 
                                                 
247 And subsequently issue their cards rather than those of competing systems and to ensure that their cards are actually 
used rather than those of other systems. See Commission Decision COMP/38606 – Groupement des Cartes Bancaires 
"CB", para 167. 
248 Commission Decision COMP/38606 – Groupement des Cartes Bancaires "CB", paras 165-167. 
249 Commission Decision COMP/34.579 – MasterCard, para 329; Commission Decision COMP/38606 – Groupement 
des Cartes Bancaires "CB", paras 162-164. 
250 An online marketplace is a transaction platform; on the other hand, it also exhibits bilateral matching function. If 
consumers and retailers can fulfil their needs in a different way (e.g. through direct retail sale), the two methods lead to 
different outcomes. See, MANDRESCU op. cit. 221, p. 467-468, and FILISTRUCCHI, GERADIN, VAN DAMME, 
AFFELDT, op. cit. 170, p. 298. 
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same time, however, the problems with analytical tools discussed in subchapter 4.1. also translate to 
the subject-matter discussed below.  
In contrast to the relevant product market, the notion of the geographical relevant market can 
be said to be less problematic when it comes to online platforms.251 Most academic writing on the 
challenges presented by online platforms to relevant market analysis pays relatively little attention 
to the determination of geographical markets. Nonetheless, in any particular case, the relevant 
geographical market will have to be established and may have undoubtedly a marked effect on the 
scope of the relevant market in such circumstances.  
Some authors suggested that the likely effect of the definition of a geographical relevant market 
with respect to online platforms will be to narrow, restrict the relevant market.252 Others have 
proposed that there might be an emerging trend within the Commission’s merger decisions towards 
more broadly defined geographical markets.253  
In practice, in its decisions relevant to the issue of online platforms, the Commission has not yet 
adopted a discernible pattern in defining the scope of geographical markets; instead, it determines 
the geographical relevant markets on a case-by-case basis (partially also due to the problems with 
using e.g. a SSNIP test to determine relevant markets); the nature of the service at hand usually 
influences the scope of relevant markets. In most cases, the Commission decides between dividing 
of relevant geographic markets along national or linguistic lines and, on the other hand, European 
Economic Area (hereinafter “EEA”) wide market (or sometimes even a global market).  
For instance, the Commission has on multiple occasions dealt with the scope of relevant market 
for online advertising; while some advertisers purchase advertising space on a broader geographic 
scale, most of them tailor their campaigns to national or linguistically delineated audiences and 
accordingly seek advertising space. In Google/DoubleClick,254 the Commission held that national 
preferences, cultural differences, and linguistic factors prevailed in its assessment of the relevant 
market in online advertising over the increasing cross-border nature of advertising campaigns 
                                                 
251 In fact, one view summarised the issue of defining geographical markets in that their determination is a “traditional 
market definition question” and does not raise as many issues as the establishment of the relevant product market in 
cases of online platforms. As written in the summary of the OECD publication: PIKE, Chris. Part I. Introduction and 
Key Findings. In: Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms [online]. OECD, 2018, p. 9-34 [cit. 2019-03-07], 
p. 30. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms-2018.pdf; 
also see GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 99. 
252 MANDRESCU, op. cit. 221, p. 477. 
253 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 75-76; Graef suggested that the relevant market (based on earlier statements by the 
Commission) for web search services could be at least EEA-wide. Compare, however, the outcome of Commission’s 
proceedings against Google in Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) below. 
254 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick. 
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asserted by Google.255 This was subsequently confirmed in the Microsoft/Yahoo256 and 
Facebook/WhatsApp257 decisions.  
In contrast, intermediation of online advertising was found to be much less dependent on 
country or language specificities and considering the low technological barriers to expansion of 
such service to other Member States, the Commission recognised such intermediation as carried out 
on an at least EEA-wide scale in the case at hand.258  
In other instances, the Commission ruled on the geographical markets for social networking, 
consumer communications, online search and comparison-shopping services. In 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission determined that because consumer communications apps 
were offered under largely uniform conditions, not varying significantly in different Member 
States,259 and because social networking services similarly operated only with limited adjustments 
at Member State level, both of these services were provided on an at least EEA-wide relevant 
market.260 In contrast, in the recent Google Shopping decision, the Commission held that markets 
for both comparison-shopping services and online search were divided along national lines, 
clarifying its open position on the matter with respect to the latter service from Microsoft/Yahoo.261 
In these cases, the localisation of use and language barriers played a significant role.262 
As was the case with the question of the “correct” number of relevant markets in subchapter 
4.2., due to the problems with using quantitative methods described in subchapter 4.1., the analysis 
of relevant geographical markets also largely turns to a case-by-case analysis where platforms are 
assessed by their features in light of a number of pertinent elements, such as language factors or 
national specificities. At the same time, however, because of the number of decisions in which 
                                                 
255 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras 82-83. 
256 Commission Decision COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, paras 91-93. 
257 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 81-83. 
258 Commission Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras 86-88; as summarised therein by the 
Commission: “geographic expansion to various Member States successfully occurs because the intermediation service 
does not depend on the different “content” of the intermediated advertisements.” If one was looking for a generalised 
test for the scope of geographical markets in the analyses conducted by the Commission, the notion of dependency on 
the “content” of service could serve well as an important (albeit in other decisions not explicitly used) rule. On the other 
hand, the precise geographical scope of the market for online advertising intermediation was left open in Commission 
Decision COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, para 94. 
259 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 36-37. 
260 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 64-68; while social networking services were 
provided in different languages, the impact of linguistic differences was (arguably) not as strong as in Commission 
Decision COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick and other online advertising decisions (or the decision on online 
advertising in Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp). 
261 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), paras 253-255 and 257-263; see also 
Commission Decision COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! Search Business, paras 96-98. 
262 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), paras 254, 259. 
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geographical relevant markets were determined, at least some clarity exists with respect to the core 




5. Relevant Markets for Data as an Input 
The previous chapter has mostly dealt with questions important for the definition of relevant 
market (or markets) on the downstream level in a potential case where access to big data is sought 
through the refusal to supply case-law of the Court. This chapter, however, turns to the need to 
define an upstream relevant market on which an online platform must hold a dominant position in 
order for Art. 102 TFEU to apply.  
After a brief introduction and explanation of the importance of defining an upstream relevant 
market for data provided below (including a clarification on the meaning of the term “market for 
data”), this chapter is divided into three subchapters. The three subchapters aim to gradually present 
the picture of data as an input sought on a relevant market and subsequently outline a possible 
“transition” in focus to big data as the relevant input. Therefore, firstly, the existing practice of the 
Commission in defining markets for data is outlined (5.1.). These decisions, however, concerned 
markets where data was usually already traded. With respect to big data, a scenario may occur in 
which the sought-after data was not already provided to third parties. For such cases, it is necessary 
to analyse the possibility of defining potential upstream markets for data (5.2.) and to discuss the 
issue of substitutability of big data which is going to be vital for the correct definition of a potential 
upstream relevant market (5.3.).  
Since the aim of this thesis is to analyse the legal possibilities of access to data and big data in 
particular, the issues of how data fits in the relevant market analysis and under what conditions is it 
feasible to speak of a market for data need to be addressed. The upstream market is supposed to be 
the source of data subsequently used by undertakings on downstream markets to provide their 
services.  
In abstract, the determination of an upstream market appears to be the more difficult part of 
defining relevant markets for refusal to supply cases concerning data as the sought-after input. In 
practice, the upstream market will be often defined with the use of the request of the undertaking 
seeking access which will delineate the input sought; however, since such a case concerning big 
data is yet to come (at least in the practice of the Commission), it is necessary to outline the possible 
definitions of upstream relevant markets in order to provide more clarity and understanding for such 
a situation. 
Before the actual analysis, one clarification must be made. As already presented in Chapter 2, 
data is sometimes considered as a type of consideration provided in place of money as payment in 
cases where a product is seemingly provided “for free”. This raises the question whether online 
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platforms do not actually compete in a very broad relevant market “for users’ data”. The author 
disagrees; with the current understanding of the relevance of data, it is indisputable that data serve 
as an important input, but based both on the considerations in Chapter 2 (e.g. on the role of data in 
enhancing, but not defining network effects) and the practice of the Commission and the Court of 
Justice (where data is always understood as an input necessary for the competition on other markets, 
which are nonetheless defined by the products and services provided therein and not by competition 
for data), such a conclusion does not have enough support.  
Furthermore, any attempt to define a market “for data” other than as an input vital for further 
competition (as presented below) would turn to the same difficulties and potentially criticism as the 
suggestions made concerning markets “for attention” discussed above in subchapter 4.1. 
 
5.1. Decisions Concerning Relevant Markets for Data 
Firstly, it is necessary to look at the current state of law and decision-making practice of the 
Commission. As Graef suggests: “current competition law standards only allow for the definition of 
a market for data in case the information is actually traded.”263 Furthermore, on EU law level, 
there is not yet a case where a market for personal data was defined.264 The Commission has, 
nonetheless, over the last decade, built a body of decisions which deals with markets where 
specifically defined data had already been sold and consequently a market for some types of data 
used as an input on other markets could have been defined. 
In a vertical merger decision concerning two undertakings strongly involved in the 
manufacturing and operation of navigation devices, the Commission identified an upstream market 
for compilations of geographic information about various map features, their additional attributes 
and display information, often stored together in tables rather than digital maps.265 This data was 
then subsequently used on the intermediate market for navigation software, which in turn enabled 
the definition of a market for portable navigation devices.266 In this case, the Commission 
considered that producing such a compilation of data – a so-called “map database for navigational 
purposes” – independently of its existing providers would be very costly and resource-intensive as 
such data would have to be compiled manually and kept regularly updated.267  
                                                 
263 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 81. 
264 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 259. At the same time, the Commission has issued a material in which the question of 
refusing access to data is discussed, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, in particular p. 98-104. 
265 Commission Decision COMP/M.4854 – TomTom/Tele Atlas, paras 1, 17. 
266 Commission Decision COMP/M.4854 – TomTom/Tele Atlas, paras 14-16, 45, 54. 
267 Commission Decision COMP/M.4854 – TomTom/Tele Atlas, para 24. 
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In other cases, the Commission assessed the nature of financial information, especially various 
forms of market and economic data, and defined several relevant markets for the supply of data 
including, but not limited to, the provision of real-time market data or historical data.268 An 
upstream market for data was possible to define partly due to the specific nature of such data, but 
mainly because such data was already traded.  
In these decisions, the necessary input was represented by relatively precisely defined data, 
sometimes essentially taking the form of a database and an upstream relevant market thus could 
have been defined with relative ease. This conclusion is corroborated by opinions across the whole 
spectrum of positions: from proponents of a more creative approach to refusal to supply, like 
Graef,269 to authors who take an otherwise openly dismissive stance towards giving big data a 
decisive, law-changing, role in competition analysis.270 Furthermore, a similar conclusion may be 
inferred from the opinions of national competition authorities.271 
In another line of decisions, the Commission examined markets for various forms of data 
analytics products or services. In some of its earlier findings, the Commission mainly dealt with 
data-related services concerning marketing and so-called audience measurement.272 In the 
VNU/VPP/JV decision, the Commission even identified an upstream market for television audience 
measurement (“TAM”) services and a downstream market for media buying which “require[d] 
TAM data as input.”273 On the basis of these decisions, the Commission went on to specifically find 
relevant markets for data analysis services in subsequent cases, concerning e.g. the creation of so-
called digital wallet schemes and corresponding services.274  
In these cases, data analytics was mostly intended by the notifying undertakings to be provided 
to customers of another service provided by them or their proposed joint venture;275 only in one of 
these decisions, BNP Paribas Fortis/ Belgacom/ Belgian Mobile Wallet, did the notifying parties 
                                                 
268 Commission Decision COMP/M.3692 – Reuters/Telerate, paras 10, 14; Commission Decision COMP/M.4726 – 
Thomson Corporation / Reuters Group, paras 34-35, 109-110. 
269 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 269. 
270 SIVINSKI, Greg, Alex OKULIAR and Lars KJOLBYE. Is Big Data a Big Deal? A Competition Law Approach to 
Big Data. European Competition Journal. 2017, 13(2-3), p. 209. 
271 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 45. 
272 With “audience measurement” involving the provision of data on individual customers, analysis of purchasing 
patterns or measuring audiences of specific media. See Commission Decision COMP/M.2291 – VNU/ACNielsen, paras 
10-12; Commission Decision COMP/M.5232 – WPP/TNS, paras 10,14. 
273 Commission Decision COMP/M.3512 – VNU/VPP/JV, paras 8-11. 
274 Commission Decision COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK / Vodafone UK / Everything Everywhere / JV, paras 195-203; 
Commission Decision COMP/M.6956 – Telefonica/ Caixabank/ Banco Santander / JV, paras 21-27; Commission 
Decision COMP/M.6967 – BNP Paribas Fortis/ Belgacom/ Belgian Mobile Wallet, paras 73-83. 
275 Commission Decision COMP/M.6956 – Telefonica/ Caixabank/ Banco Santander / JV, para 21; BNP Paribas Fortis/ 
Belgacom/ Belgian Mobile Wallet, para 73; Commission Decision COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK / Vodafone UK / 
Everything Everywhere / JV, para 191. 
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envisage providing the data analytics service separately in the future.276 Furthermore, in the medical 
sector, the Commission has also approved the creation of a joint venture between Google and 
Sanofi, which is expected to be active, among other markets, on a relevant market for data analytics, 
presumably using healthcare data collected by the joint venture.277  
Although in these cases, the upstream/downstream relationship between relevant markets was 
not explicitly identified, it could be argued that data analytics markets could be (especially in 
proceedings other than the merger procedure, where the scope of relevant markets is often left open) 
systematically assessed as downstream markets, making it necessary to propose upstream markets 
for the specific data required on the downstream level, similarly to the VNU/VPP/JV decision. 
As the practice currently stands, the above presented cases exhaust the examples where a 
market for data was either defined outright or at least could have been rather easily defined because 
of the specific focus of related data analytics services.278 Since the data in the decisions discussed 
above was either put into what was essentially a form of a database (e.g. in the case of navigational 
data) or narrowed down to a subset of data from any category (e.g. historical market data as a subset 
of financial or market data), none of these decisions dealt with a relevant market for big data; this is 
further corroborated by the fact that no authors cited above have expressly associated these 
decisions with the notion of relevant markets for big data.  
What these decisions show, however, is that the notion of data as an input provided on an 
upstream market and subsequently used at the downstream level has some support in practice. 
Furthermore, there are two takeaways for additional discussion of relevant markets for big data. 
Firstly, it is necessary to look into how data, in any given scenario, is circumscribed; in order to 
fulfil e.g. the “Four Vs” definition of big data (if taken as the relevant standard for distinguishing 
“standard” data from big data), it probably should not be possible to place such data into a quickly-
implementable and standardised database because due to the volume, variety or velocity of data 
such a task would be too demanding (a similar argument could be made regarding segmenting of 
data into subsets). Secondly, it may be indicative (for the purposes of defining a relevant market for 
big data) to look at the subsequent use of data; arguably, the more data needs to be first analysed, 
sorted out or inferences need to be made from such data, the more it seems possible to arrive at a 
                                                 
276 Commission Decision COMP/M.6967 – BNP Paribas Fortis/ Belgacom/ Belgian Mobile Wallet, para 74. 
277 Commission Decision COMP/M.7812 – Sanofi/Google/JV, paras 44-50. The precise definition of data analysis 
markets is usually (this decision included) left open because it does not raise sufficient concerns to be examined more 
thoroughly in the merger procedure. See also Graef’s analysis in GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 260-261. 
278 As the report by the German and French competition authorities also explains, “in most merger cases examined by 
competition authorities in the area of data-related markets, the parties involved used their data solely as an input for 
their own production, e.g. did not sell their data to third parties, and thus were not active in any possible market for 
data. As a result, a market for data did not have to be defined.” See BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 45. 
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finding of a relevant market for big data, rather than in cases where data is already provided in a 
format (or a database or even a subset of data) that mostly requires only its implementation into a 
product. 
It nonetheless remains to see whether further cases concerning existing data markets will come; 
until then, it is necessary to also consider potential markets for big data, as is the topic of the 
following subchapter. 
 
5.2. Defining Potential Markets for Big Data 
Defining an upstream relevant market for data (and big data in particular) becomes much more 
difficult once we leave the relatively safely determined scenarios described above. Since, as 
proposed at the beginning of this subchapter, refusal to supply cases concerning access to big data, 
which was not yet provided to any third party, may occur, it is also necessary to determine whether 
potential upstream markets for big data can be defined. As will be shown below, there is some legal 
authority supporting the definition of such markets, but its application on online platforms is not 
without complications. 
The core problems of defining relevant markets with respect to online platforms can be 
illustrated on the example of a classification of possible refusal to supply cases concerning big data 
proposed by Graef.279 According to her, there are two main scenarios: firstly, cases where the new 
or potential competitor seeks access to big data in order to provide a product that does not stand in 
direct competition to the product of an incumbent platform and, secondly, cases where the data 
access seeker is aiming at providing a product in direct competition, in essence at offering a 
competing service or platform.280  
In terms of market definition, the first category of cases can include undertakings providing 
various form of data analytics services; as discussed above, the definition of a relevant market could 
then be straightforward. On the other hand, both within the first and the second category of 
hypothetical cases, a potential market for big data not yet traded nor safely definable might have to 
                                                 
279 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 257-258. 
280 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 257, 258; the example of the first scenario is a provider of a social networking service, which 
uses data as an important input not only to provide this particular service, but also to analyse data within its own data 
analytics service, being asked to provide data by the provider of another data analytics service; the example of the 
second  case is a provider of search engine being asked to provide data to the provider of a new search engine service. 
Compare also the scenarios with respect to access to data discussed in the Commission’s material on competition policy 
for the digital era: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p.101-103. 
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be delineated.281 Such a type of market has been already suggested as an analytical tool that may 
shed light on the position of the most prominent platforms such as Google or Facebook.282 The 
possibility of defining such markets in practice is, on the other hand, not straightforward, as will be 
shown below. 
As is often mentioned, according to the IMS case, it is strictly speaking not necessary to confine 
refusal to supply findings to situations where the essential input is already provided to others.283 In 
fact, the Court itself stated that “it is sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical market 
can be identified,” but it also held that “it is determinative that two different stages of production 
may be identified and that they are interconnected[.]”284  
That finding was based on the relationship between a hypothetical relevant market for a so-
called “brick structure” which was essentially a database superimposed on a map that was used to 
represent regional pharmaceuticals sales data, the supply of which was defining in the downstream 
relevant market.285 On the other hand, a significant aspect of the case was that the “brick structure” 
apparently became the industry standard.286 The conclusion reached in IMS is subject to criticism 
for being extremely broad; Jones and Suffrin point out that “there are few production processes that 
cannot be divided as in IMS if one thinks hard enough[.]”287  
In Microsoft, the Commission’s definition of relevant markets was unusual as it defined a main 
and a derivative market, while the essential input in that case (interoperability information) was 
necessary to make a connection between the products from both markets;288 however, because of 
this peculiarity, it arguably was possible to place interoperability information into some definition 
of “production processes”. It remains unclear what is the precise meaning and weight of this 
requirement, but the author argues that in order to apply the refusal to supply case law with at least 
                                                 
281 For the first category, such a situation might ensue when an undertaking is seeking to provide a specialised service 
not already offered by the online platform (e.g. a “productivity” or “fitness” app that requires information on the time an 
individual has spent on social networking websites, the range of his movement, daily routines etc. that can be derived 
from data held by such a platform). The second category is much more controversial; it essentially covers cases where 
one search engine operator would seek to gain access to another search engine operator’s data. 
282 BAGNOLI, Vicente. The Big Data Relevant Market [online]. Concorrenza e Mercato, 2016, Vol.  23, 2017 [cit. 
2019-06-11], p. 25-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064792; GRAEF, Inge. Market Definition and 
Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms. World Competition. 2015, 38(4), p., p. 503-504. 
283 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 44-45. 
284 Ibid. See also the conclusions in the Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2003] 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:537, para 57: “[t]hus, in applying the case-law cited on the refusal to grant a licence I consider it to 
be sufficient that it is possible to identify a market in upstream inputs, even where the market is a ‘potential’ one only, in 
the sense that operating within it is a monopoly undertaking which decides not to market independently the inputs in 
question (notwithstanding that there is an actual demand for them) but to assert exclusive rights over a downstream 
market by restricting or eliminating all competition on that market.” 
285 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 4, 46. 
286 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 6, 12. 
287 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 520. 
288 Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, paras 321-323; GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 213-214. 
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some degree of clarity and legal certainty, an attempt to define such processes ought to be made 
when defining potential markets for big data. 
In contrast to IMS, however, the operations of online platforms are much more convoluted once 
one takes into account their multi-sided nature. Furthermore, it is questionable to what degree can 
any set of data collected or created by online platforms be compared to a de-facto industry standard, 
which arguably made the determination of “production processes” in IMS feasible. Besides that, 
most platforms do not simply collect individuals’ data from one key service, such as a search 
engine, but collect data from multiple sources, usually multiple applications or services and only 
subsequently use this data further.289 Most academic writing looking into the importance of big data  
as an input does not yet present a workable method of deconstructing the use of such data or the 
“production processes” in online platforms sufficiently clearly in order to arrive at a definition akin 
to the one in IMS.  
Hypothetically, it could be suggested that an upstream market would be centred around the 
collection and storage of big data from its users by an online platform, while the analysis 
(including, for instance, matching search results to queries based on insights acquired from the 
analysis of the collected and stored data) would be put on the downstream market.290 This would 
make it feasible to present big data as an essential input for subsequent analysis; furthermore, such 
an approach resembles to a degree the abovementioned line of decisions on data analytics services 
and one could argue that in doing so, the definition of potential markets follows earlier Commission 
practice. Even more, this method of approaching the problem of defining relevant markets for big 
data would follow the two takeaways presented in the previous subchapter.  
 This approach (albeit not in the context of the abuse of dominant position) was already 
presented in a few papers, suggesting this sort of definition of inner workings of online platforms.291 
It could also be argued that such a delineation is also in line with the definition of relevant markets 
in Facebook/WhatsApp as well as Microsoft/LinkedIn, where the Commission explicitly considered 
                                                 
289 A good illustration is the account of personal data collected by Google from its users which clearly shows that data 
can and regularly is collected from multiple services: GOOGLE. Data Transparency. Google.com [online]. 2019 [cit. 
2019-06-11]. Available at: https://safety.google/privacy/data/.  
290 Interestingly, as a result, online platforms could be seen as entities that primarily collect data from multiple sources 
and store them, while the use of data comes second. Even though it has been argued above that defining markets such as 
“markets for attention” is without sufficient support, this paradigm would suggest that it may be possible to think about 
similarly broad “markets for data”, if such an approach attracts more authority from the Commission and perhaps the 
Court of Justice. 
291 The closest any academic writing known to the author gets to such a finding is Bagnoli (cited above), who presents a 
basic attempt to understand the “relevant market for data” as the aggregate of several types of conduct, namely big data 
collection, big data storage and big data analytics. Nonetheless, he only presents these suggestions in the course of a 
reflection on the Facebook/WhatsApp merger case and not with respect to abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU. See 
BAGNOLI, op. cit. 282, p. 25-29. For an earlier example, see also LUCHETTA, Giacomo. Is the Google Platform a 
Two-Sided Market? Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2014, 10(1), p. 185–207. 
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a hypothetical market for data relevant for advertising purposes.292 Furthermore, the latter decision 
also supports such an approach and even corresponds to the conclusions made in the previous 
subchapter with respect to the provision of so-called customer relationship management (CRM) 
software (further discussed in Chapter 7 in connection to the notion of indispensability). The 
Commission discussed the functionalities of such software, which could “leverage” a very wide 
variety of data (from customer data and activity to social networking data or e-mails) and 
subsequently analyse such data using “machine-learning” and “predictive” analysis,. i.e. going 
much further than simple implementation of data into a product. In order to provide such an 
analysis, the software requires datasets of sufficient variety, the availability of which was an issue in 
the decisions. The Commission thus also discussed a “hypothetical market […] for the provision of 
data for the purposes of [machine-learning] in CRM software solutions.”293  
In conclusion, it appears that defining hypothetical, potential upstream relevant markets for big 
data is legally feasible on the basis of the IMS ruling; at the same time, however, such an approach 
is controversial and will require careful application. It is proposed to always attempt to describe the 
“production processes” within an online platform in order to arrive at a reasoning similar to IMS 
and thus provide some legal clarity and predictability to the process of defining relevant markets. A 
potential method of doing so with respect to big data is to follow the collection, storage and analysis 
of data and delineate relevant markets according to this conduct. 
 
5.3. Substitutability in Potential Markets for Big Data 
Even if it is legally permissible to define a potential relevant upstream market for big data, as 
suggested above, such an exercise is not without complications. Accordingly, the issue of 
substitutability of big data and its impact on relevant market definition is discussed below. 
Furthermore, this assessment also serves as a basis for the findings in subsequent chapters, where 
the outcome of some scenarios often depends on the extent to which substitutability is defined at 
this stage of competition analysis. 
The proponents of determining potential markets for data (including markets for big data) often 
invoke the importance of data as an input for various products and services and, as a result, suggest 
the possibility to segment data into markets for e.g. search data, social network data or e-commerce 
                                                 
292 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 184-189. To the extent data was recognised as 
an input and its availability was discussed. Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 179-180; 
a hypothetical relevant market for data was also mentioned in Commission Decision COMP/M.7023 - Publicis / 
Omnicom, para 11, but was not considered any further. 
293 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 196-197, 253-254. 
67 
 
data, instead of relying on one entirely generally defined market for “online data”.294 They thus seek 
to deal with the problem of sufficiently precise description of data on a potential upstream market. 
However, in all of the successful refusal to supply cases brought before the Court, the input sought 
by the applicant undertaking was relatively clearly defined, as was also the case in the decisions of 
the Commission presented in subchapter 5.1.295  At the same time, however, it seems that arriving at 
such a precise description is going to be difficult in the case of big data, as discussed below.  
While the importance of big data as a crucial input cannot be denied in any of these sectors, it is 
hard to see what exactly is the content of e.g. “search data” in order to firstly define a relevant 
market and subsequently provide access to such data to other undertakings. Is “search data” all of 
the data Google holds on all of its users’ search queries and search results or is the data necessary to 
compete in the search engine relevant market instead only a limited segment of the search queries 
and results?296 Furthermore, the relevant data might not be in practice limited only to search queries 
and results and can even comprise additional data collected from users and used to personalise their 
search results.297 Going even further, it might turn out that the indispensable input that enables the 
operation of a competitive search engine is a number of insights or know-how derived from data.  
Defining big data as the relevant product will thus require a thorough and case-by-case 
assessment of the competitive constraints that help to delineate relevant markets, i.e. supply- and 
demand-side substitutability.298 In ascertaining substitutability, some key properties of big data will 
have to be examined, in particular the volume and variety of data (in order to reach a conclusion 
e.g. on how large and varied datasets are actually seen as substitutable by the undertakings on the 
downstream market), although other characteristics, such as the velocity of data may also come into 
play (e.g. for downstream markets centred around data analytics services, it can be argued that 
having access to continually updated data may be very important).  
While such an assessment will have to be conducted in any potential case, deriving any general 
conclusions on potential markets in this sense turns difficult because it requires insight into the 
actual use of data on downstream markets. In its decisions concerning advertising data, the 
                                                 
294 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 262. 
295 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 4, 7, 10, 12, including the fact that such a specific 
database became the industry standard in Germany; Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2003] 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:537, paras 4, 7. See also Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, para 37. 
296 See in this respect the inference made in BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 48 with respect to the Microsoft/Yahoo decision. 
297 Applied to a hypothetical market for online (general) search services, if the use of additional data for personalisation 
was found determinative for the scope of relevant markets, Google and e.g. DuckDuckGo (which refrains from using 
other user-provided data than search queries) would not be placed on the same relevant market. Furthermore, it is 
possible to distinguish data according to the way of its collection; data thus may be e.g. volunteered, observed or 
inferred, i.e. collected with varying level of effort on part of the undertaking; see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 
13, p. 101. 
298 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, paras 13-14. 
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Commission has so far mainly worked with the notion of “data usable for advertising purposes”, 
pointing to a very broad definition of any upstream relevant product market, but also, in 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, it discussed the idea of data necessary for the development and operation of 
machine-learning functionality in a CRM software product, an advanced form of analysis that 
requires datasets that could fit under the description of big data.299 On one hand, the case of 
advertising data represents exactly the problems with description and substitutability outlined in this 
subchapter (as ultimately, since the notion of “data relevant for advertising purposes” was not 
narrowed down in any of the decisions, the Commission dismissed all concerns about the 
concentration of such data as also discussed in further chapters); on the other, the case of CRM 
software points to a potential way to dealt with these issues.  
The approach of the Commission in Microsoft/LinkedIn arguably corresponds to the findings of 
previous subchapters and may present a reasonable approach towards defining relevant markets for 
big data. It not only takes into account (in the author’s interpretation) the category of data (not being 
too narrowly circumscribed but also not entirely without boundaries) and its subsequent use (in 
terms of analysis, not only implementation), thus following the takeaways from subchapter 5.1., but 
also follows the method looking at the collection, storage and analysis of big data outlined in 
subchapter 5.2, thus also corresponding to the possible solution to the issue of defining potential 
markets discussed therein. Finally, while the Commission only examined a hypothetical market, it 
nonetheless was able to make conclusions (albeit very brief) on the substitutability and 
indispensability of such data (largely led by the need to use it for the purposes of machine learning; 
further discussed in Chapter 7). At the same time, the problems with delineating relevant markets 
for big data are still significant and it remains to be seen whether further cases will follow and 
expand on the thinking in Microsoft/LinkedIn, e.g. with respect to search data or social networking 
data.  
In conclusion, the definition of an upstream market for big data is so far complicated by the fact 
that existing EU law practice brings only a limited degree of clarity on such definition. In terms of 
potential markets for big data, two problems arise with the tasks of describing “production 
processes” within online platforms and with the precise description of data provided on an upstream 
market. At the same time, it appears that defining a potential market for big data is possible. 
Unfortunately, until an actual case where access to big data will be sought (unlike the considerations 
presented so far, which came from merger decisions) is brought forward, it is possible to present 
only limited clarifications on the definition of upstream markets in such a setting. 
                                                 
299 See e.g. Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 166 or Commission Decision 
COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 176, 253-254. 
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6. Establishing Dominant Position in a Relevant Market for Big Data 
The previous chapter led to the outline of the relevant markets that need to be defined in refusal 
to supply cases. As was noted in the previous chapter, the definition of a relevant market, 
particularly of the upstream relevant market, has immense influence on the next steps of the 
analysis in such situations. In order to find an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU, it has to be first 
established that an undertaking holds a dominant position on a relevant market; only subsequently 
can the abusive nature of the conduct of such an entity be analysed.300 In terms of the refusal to 
supply case-law, this entails the finding of a dominant position on the upstream market. When 
access to big data is concerned, an undertaking will thus have to be dominant on a market for big 
data and, as was the issue with the definition of relevant markets, the determination of a dominant 
position on such a market is again not straightforward.  
According to the guidance prepared by the Commission, in which it summarised past findings 
and developed them into a concise communication, the factors used to ascertain dominant position 
fall into three categories.301 Firstly, it is the market position of undertakings on the relevant market, 
standardly expressed through market shares. Secondly, barriers to the expansion of current 
competitors and entry of potential ones are considered.302 Thirdly, competitive constraints can also 
result from the so-called countervailing market power, expressed through the bargaining strength of 
the dominant undertaking’s customers.303 While a number of concrete aspects of competition will be 
examined in any given case and the finding on the existence of a dominant position will be made on 
the basis of all of such factors, it is suggested that the first two elements outlined above will have 
essential influence on the determination of a dominant position in a market for big data.  
This chapter is therefore structured as follows. Firstly, the concept of a dominant position in EU 
law is explained (subchapter 6.1.). Further on, the subsequent subchapters deal each with one of the 
main factors used to assess market power and ascertain dominant position, i.e. market position 
(subchapter 6.2.) and barriers to entry and expansion (subchapter 6.3.).304 
                                                 
300 As the Court of Justice explained in the Continental Can judgment, which became a regular reference point for 
further cases, “for the appraisal of [a] dominant position […], the definition of the relevant market is of essential 
significance, for the possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to those characteristics of the products in 
question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited 
extent interchangeable with other products.” See Case 6/72, Continental Can [1973] ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 32. 
301 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, paras 12-18. 
302 Thus taking account of, in contrast to the definition of a relevant market, potential competition. See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, op. cit. 148, para 24. 
303 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 18. 
304 The assessment of countervailing buying power is still rather limited with respect to digital markets; on the other 




6.1. The Concept of a Dominant Position in EU Competition Law 
This subchapter aims to outline the meaning of the concept of a dominant position in EU law 
and the consequences that result from the finding of such a status, in particular the limitations on the 
conduct of undertakings.  
The legal concept of a dominant position stems from the economic notions of “position of 
economic strength” or “substantial market power”.305 However, it does not in itself have a legal 
definition provided by Art. 102 TFEU or EU secondary law. Furthermore, the idea of a dominant 
position in EU law is a “binary” one: an undertaking either is a in a dominant position or it is not; in 
contrast, market power is a matter of degree.306 It thus falls to the Court to outline the concept and 
provide a way to connect the legal term to the economic reality.  
Under settled case-law of the Court that has as its basis the judgments in United Brands and 
Hoffmann-La Roche,307 a dominant position is understood as the power of an undertaking to prevent 
effective competition from being maintained by virtue of its ability to behave, to an appreciable 
extent, independently of the usual competitive constraints facing an entity operating on a market, 
i.e. its competitors, consumers and ultimately its consumers. Such a position does not preclude the 
existence of some competition on a relevant market. Nonetheless, it enables a dominant undertaking 
to have an appreciable influence on the development of such competition (and to disregard it as 
long as such disregard does not work to the dominant undertaking’s detriment).308 As this definition 
shows, the Court chose a definition that can encompass a variety of situations, but which, as a 
result, requires a thorough case-by-case analysis of the position of any such undertaking.  
As a result of the finding that an undertaking holds a dominant position on a relevant market, 
such an entity is subject to what is called the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking.309 
Consequently, EU law effectively discriminates against dominant undertakings and prohibits them 
from conducting themselves in a certain way; actions, which are otherwise permitted to non-
dominant undertakings, are legally forbidden.310 This does not mean that the dominant position 
                                                                                                                                                                  
economic power, analogically to situations such as the position of Apple (through its iTunes service) in terms of 
“purchasing” music in the case Commission Decision COMP/M.3333 – SONY/ BMG, para 146. 
305 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 869. 
306 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 187. 
307 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36. 
308 Case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, paras 65-66; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, paras 38-39; JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 286-287. 
309 See JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 357-358. 
310 As the Court held in Michelin, “a finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination 
but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a position, the undertaking concerned has a 
special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.” See 
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itself is a problem in the eyes of the law,311 but undertakings that manage to achieve it are restricted 
to so-called competition on the merits. This responsibility manifests itself in that dominant 
undertakings must refrain from abusing their dominant position.312 In practice, various forms of 
behaviour are consequently placed “outside” of the scope of competition on the merits. For 
instance, in Google Shopping, the Commission explained that: “it is not novel to find that conduct 
consisting in the use of a dominant position on one market to extend that dominant position to one 
or more adjacent markets can constitute […] a well-established, independent, form of abuse falling 
outside the scope of competition on the merits.”313 
In light of the above, it is clear that the finding of a dominant position has serious consequences 
for the freedom of action of any undertaking in such a position. Furthermore, the relevant markets 
and conditions of competition on them can in practice greatly vary. This means that the methods of 
determining dominant position, briefly outlined above and dealt with in detail in subsequent 
subchapters, are of paramount importance because their use in competition analysis can determine 
whether an undertaking will be subject to the limitations discussed. 
 
6.2. Analysing Market Position on a Relevant Market 
As presented above, the second subchapter is devoted to the analysis of market position, the 
first key factor used in assessing market power mentioned by the Commission. As this subchapter 
will explain, the most common way of determining market position is through the use of market 
shares; it will thus aim at explaining the issues with using market shares in a relevant market for big 
data. Furthermore, the way dominant position was ascertained in past refusal to supply cases will 
also be discussed. The eventual goal of this subchapter is to suggest an appropriate method that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Case 322/81, Michelin [1983] ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, para 57. This position is commonly repeated in the case-law of the 
Court; see e.g. Case C-209/10, Post Danmark [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 23 or the judgment in Case C-280/08 
P, Deutsche Telekom [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 203, according to which a dominant undertaking that adopts 
pricing practices contrary to the prohibition of abuse of dominant position “must, in view of its special responsibility 
under Article 82 EC [i.e. today’s Art. 102 TFEU], be in a position itself to determine whether its pricing practices are 
compatible with that provision.” 
311 As summarised in Case C-209/10, Post Danmark [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 22: “not every exclusionary 
effect is necessarily detrimental to competition[.] Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure 
from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers.”  
312 On the other hand, some authors claim that because of the specific nature of the “digital economy”, anti-competitive 
practices (such as impeding multi-homing) of undertakings in a “superior” but not yet dominant position should also be 
taken out of the scope of competition of the merits. See e.g. SCHWEIZER, Heike. Modernising the law on abuse of 
market power. Oxford Business Law Blog [online]. Oxford University, 2018 [cit. 2019-06-21]. Available at: 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/10/modernising-law-abuse-market-power.  
313 See Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), para 649. See also e.g. Case C-280/08 P, 
Deutsche Telekom [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 177, where the Court explained that EU competition law: 
“prohibits a dominant undertaking from, inter alia, adopting pricing practices which have an exclusionary effect on its 
equally efficient actual or potential competitors [and] thereby strengthening its dominant position by using methods 
other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits.” 
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could serve as the “first step” of market power analysis with respect to a market for big data. In 
doing so, it will also attempt to reflect on the properties of big data and their place in the assessment 
of market power.  
This subchapter is therefore further divided into four parts discussing at the outset the use of 
market shares in general (6.2.1.) and the establishment of dominant position in past refusal to 
supply cases (6.2.2.). It subsequently turns attention to the modifications that need to be made to the 
“traditional” use of market shares, including the feasibility of its use (6.2.3.), and finally analyses 
the methods of ascertaining the availability of data (6.2.4.). 
As a preliminary point, it must be emphasised that while the analysis of market position and in 
particular market shares of undertakings on a relevant market for big data is vital for any such case, 
it appears in light of the subject matter that is going to be discussed in the next subchapter (i.e. 
barriers to entry and the claims about low costs of obtaining data) that only a finding of very high 
market shares (on a near-monopoly level) will point to a dominant position in such a setting. 
 
6.2.1. Market Shares as a Tool of Assessing Market Position 
Market shares are the most common way to determine market position. As the Commission 
states, market shares are “a useful first indication” of the structure of the relevant market and of the 
(relative) importance of different undertakings present therein.314 Their relevance and weight is thus 
discussed below. At the same time, their use is not without complications, even more so in the so-
called dynamic markets and accordingly these are also discussed. 
The most cited precedent for the relevance of market shares in the finding of dominant position 
comes once more from the Hoffman-La Roche case, where the Court explained that “an 
undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for some time […] is by virtue of that 
share in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner and which , already 
because of this secures for it, at the very least during relatively long periods , that freedom of action 
which is the special feature of a dominant position.”315 The relevance and value of market shares in 
the analysis of market power can be proved by the sheer number of judgments and decisions that 
have dealt with the meaning of variously high market shares; effectively, the Court with the 
                                                 
314 At the same time, however, it adds that when interpreting market shares, it will also consider, among others, the 
conditions on the relevant market and its dynamics. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 13. 
315 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 41. 
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Commission have developed a scale of market share percentages and the conclusions that can be 
drawn from them.316  
For the highest market shares, the following conclusion applies: “although the importance of 
the market shares may vary from one market to another the view may legitimately be taken that very 
large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of 
a dominant position.”317 Past cases have shown a number of undertakings which exceeded the 90% 
threshold; these market shares have been described as “quasi-monopolies” or through the position 
of “super-dominance”.318 Market shares between 70% and 80% have been held to be “in 
themselves” a clear indication of dominance.319  
Furthermore, a 50% market share is understood to create a rebuttable presumption of 
dominance,320 while market shares below 40% are highly unlikely to create a dominant position 
(and such findings are extremely rare).321 Furthermore, it is also crucial, especially with market 
shares close to the 40% threshold, to take account of the market shares of competing undertakings; 
market shares that do not of themselves and in the absence of exceptional circumstances present an 
indication of dominance may have different consequences depending on the market shares of other 
undertakings.322 
At the same time, in spite of the usefulness of using market shares, a great number of authors 
caution against the over-reliance on these indicators.323 In particular, it has been pointed out that 
market shares only cover the competitive constraints presented by actual competitors or that market 
                                                 
316 See the reflection in JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 323-326, BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 874, or WHISH, 
BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 47-49. 
317 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 41. 
318 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 48, 195. See e.g. Case T‑66/01, ICI [2010] ECLI:EU:T:2010:255, paras 258-259. 
Furthermore, in the Google Shopping decision the Commission identified Google’s market share to be above 90% over 
all national markets for the so-called general search services and accordingly held that Google was in a dominant 
position on such a market. See Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), para 685. On a 
slightly different note, market shares of 100%, i.e. monopolies, have been defined in the past, but remain rather rare. 
See e.g. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 74. 
319 See e.g. the case-law cited in Case T‑66/01, ICI [2010] ECLI:EU:T:2010:255, para 257. 
320 See Case C-62/86, AKZO [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, paras 58-62 and the interpretation by Whish and Bailey in 
WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 48.; similarly, JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 323. 
321  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 14. 
322 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 875. 
323 See BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 872; WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 43. A particularly detailed analysis of 
market shares was brought by Kaplow, who explained that a number of the problems associated with the use of market 
shares (some of which are outlined in this subchapter) come from the fact that competition analysis requires the answers 
to two questions: firstly, how much market power is actually present in a relevant market and secondly, how much of 
this market power is legally relevant as a position of legally recognised dominance. Kaplow argues that the use of 
market shares does not in itself answer any of these two questions, be it the former empirical or the latter policy 
question. See KAPLOW, Louis. Market Share Tresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assessments and Legal Policy 
Judgments. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2011, 7(2), p. 252. 
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shares do not necessarily reflect the concrete competitive processes and decisions taken by 
undertakings on relevant markets.324 Additionally, as suggested above by the reference in the 
Hoffmann-La Roche ruling to “some time” or “relatively long periods” of time during which a 
market position is enjoyed, the period of time across which a market share is held by an undertaking 
can have influence on the implications taken from such an indication.325 These points are even more 
emphasised when it comes to so-called dynamic markets, i.e. markets which are emerging, fast-
growing or prone to rapid changes, as shown below.326  
A number of these considerations came into practice in the assessment of market power in 
consumer communications markets: e.g. in Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission described 
consumer communications as “a recent  and  fast-growing  sector  which  is  characterised  by  
frequent  market  entry  and short innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn out to 
be ephemeral.”327 Even prior to this decision, the Commission decided that in Microsoft/Skype, in 
spite of Microsoft obtaining a combined market share between 80% and 90% in certain markets,328 
high market shares in consumer communications provided only “limited” indication of competitive 
strength precisely because of the dynamic nature of such sector.329 The same reasoning was then 
upheld by the Court of Justice in response to a challenge against the Commission’s decision 
approving the transaction, noting that “[i]n such a dynamic context, high market shares are not 
necessarily indicative of market power.”330  
This judgment lead some authors to point out a potential problem in the enforcement of EU 
competition law in dynamic markets, inasmuch the statements of the Court in Cisco Systems (one of 
which is reproduced in the preceding paragraph) could also be interpreted as dismissing the 
relevance of market shares in such situations altogether.331 In such a circumstance, the analysis of 
                                                 
324 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 872.  
325 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 15. 
326 See e.g. BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 29-30; KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 158-160. 
327 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 99. Nonetheless, arguments of this kind are not 
novel; in Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, the company submitted a proposition that undertakings 
active in the  “new economy” faced a particular form of competition: “[a] product which might presently give the 
appearance of being in a strong or dominant position in the market would in fact be at constant risk of being displaced  
by  a  completely  new  product,  which  would  currently  not  be  a  demand substitute in the traditional sense.  By 
extension, the implication was that there would be no position of entrenched market power in such industries.” See 
Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, para 466. 
328 Commission Decision COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/ Skype, para 109.  
329 Ibid., paras 78-80. 
330 Case T‑79/12, Cisco Systems [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 69. 
331 LAMADRID, Alfonso. A comment on Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems and Messagenet v European Commission 
(Microsoft/Skype). Chillin’ Competition [online]. 2014 [cit. 2019-06-17]. Available at: 
https://chillingcompetition.com/2014/05/12/a-comment-on-case-t-7912-cisco-systems-and-messagenet-v-european-
commission-microsoftskype/. Although this account of the case was presented by a lawyer who represented the 
unsuccessful challengers, a similar view was adopted in SOLANO DIAZ, op. cit. 215, p. 401. 
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market power would be deprived of the “useful first indication” provided by market shares.332 On 
the other hand, as the report by the German and French competition authorities suggests, any 
arguments concerning “dynamic competition” should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, keeping 
thus market shares as the default first indication of market power in future cases.333 Such a 
conclusion seems reasonable; market shares should not be taken as absolute and irrefutable proof of 
market power, but should be regularly taken into account with the possibility to disprove the 
conclusions drawn from them further on in the process of determination of dominant position. 
In summary, in practice, market shares are usually a valuable tool of assessing the market 
position of undertakings, albeit not without reservations to the over-reliance on them, especially in 
the context of dynamically evolving markets. In the following part of subchapter 6.2., however, it 
will be shown that in some of the past refusal to supply cases, the explicit consideration of market 
shares was not even necessary and that the dominant position in such situations was based on 
factual findings. 
 
6.2.2. Market Position in Refusal to Supply Cases 
This part of subchapter 6.2. outlines the ways the Commission and the Court have dealt with the 
issue of determining dominant position when presented with anticompetitive refusals to supply. It 
shows that in a number of cases, the dominant position was clear in light of the factual 
circumstances. On the other hand, as will be presented subsequently in further parts of subchapter 
6.2., the determination of a dominant position on a relevant market for big data is more complicated 
that the decisions presented below.  
In the Commission’s original decision in Magill, the Commission turned to an ad-hoc 
examination of the factual and legal state of affairs. The Commission pointed out that, irrespective 
of any intellectual property rights on part of the allegedly dominant undertakings, “broadcasting 
organizations have a factual monopoly over the production and first publication of their weekly 
listings […] because programme listings are a by-product of the programme scheduling process, 
carried out and known only to the programme planners themselves.”334 It was only on top of this 
                                                 
332 Ibid.  
333 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 29-30. 
334 Commission Decision IV/31.851 - Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, para 22, where the Commission additionally 
clarified that  “the listings only become marketable products when the schedules themselves are finalised (subject to last 
minute changes), a short time before transmission [and in light of the limited possibility to obtain such schedules and 
the impossibility of replicating them, third] parties are therefore in a position of economic dependence which is 
characteristic of the existence of a dominant position.” In terms of overall market power analysis, legal barriers are 
most often taken into account within the assessment of barriers to entry and expansion; here, they merely added to the 
already factually determined dominant position. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 17. 
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finding that the Commission also added that the broadcasters’ position was strengthened by the 
protection granted by copyright law.335 This assessment was then subsequently confirmed by the 
Court of Justice, which held that the mere ownership of intellectual property rights does not grant a 
dominant position, but that since the undertakings in question held a de facto monopoly, the 
exercise of these rights could have been reviewed in light of EU competition law.336 
In Oscar Bronner, based on a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court refrained from 
conducting much of the relevant market and market power analysis and ultimately left those 
questions for clarification to the referring court.337 Nonetheless, the Court appears to have suggested 
that Mediaprint – the allegedly dominant undertaking – could have also been in a position of de 
facto monopoly.338  
The IMS case, another preliminary ruling of the Court, dealt with the question of market power 
even more briefly, as the case was essentially based on the presumption that IMS had been in a 
dominant position;339 it could nonetheless be argued that the Court would have been able to conduct 
a similar assessment as in Magill, because the “brick structure” was largely produced by IMS and 
also protected by intellectual property rights.340 The case, taken broadly, nonetheless did contain 
some form of assessment of market position as the Commission issued an interim measures 
decision on the basis of a prima facie finding of dominance of IMS on the relevant market for 
“regional sales data services”.341 While the Commission did analyse a sample of actual sales in the 
relevant market and determined market shares, the information was redacted from the decision.342 
In Microsoft, the market shares have been safely determined with respect to the relevant market 
for client PC operating systems343 and in Commercial Solvents, the Commission effectively 
identified a monopoly.344 The approach in a number of refusal to supply cases nonetheless points to 
                                                 
335 Ibid.  
336 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, paras 46-48. 
337 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 34-35. 
338 On the basis of the order for reference, it appeared that Mediaprint operated the only nationwide home-delivery 
service in Austria. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, para 35. 
339 Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, para 22; Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-418/01, 
IMS Health [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:537, paras 13-14. 
340 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 520, where they point out that the copyright protection in the case was “weak” and 
that IMS managed to “hijack” the industry standard. 
341 Commission Decision COMP D3/38.044 — NDC Health/IMS Health (interim measures), paras 56, 62. 
342 Ibid., paras 58-59; it nonetheless appears that the market share held by IMS must have been particularly high, as the 
Commission held that IMS was in a “quasi-monopoly”. 
343 Both in terms of their level and of their stability, see Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, paras 431-
432. Note, however, that in the Microsoft case, refusal to supply was determined with respect to interoperability 
information relevant to the connection between markets. 
344 Commission Decision IV/26.911 – ZOJA/CSC – ICI (interim measures), section A of the decision (decision not 
structured into paragraphs, text not available in English). 
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the fact that the situation in those circumstances was so clear that no further assessment, including 
the identification of market shares as a first step, needed to be explicitly made.  
Furthermore, turning back to the discussion of the concept of refusal to supply in Chapter 3 as 
the rather controversial exception to the rule that one can chose his or her trading partners (and one 
that imposes a significant obligation on the dominant undertaking in case a refusal is found to be 
anticompetitive) it should be noted that the obligation to supply, to provide access to an input, was 
only imposed once it was certain that the dominant undertaking was effectively in a position of a 
monopoly or a near-monopoly. Especially with the cases of interoperability information or inputs 
protected by intellectual property rights, the obligation to provide access was provided in cases 
where the dominant undertaking or undertakings held these inputs alone and dealing with them was 
unavoidable. As already suggested, the possibilities of replicating this approach will be discussed 
further below, with the conclusion that relevant markets for big data will only rarely enable such an 
analysis, especially in cases where the dominant undertaking will not be the only holder of data 
with such properties. 
 
6.2.3. Determining Market Shares in a Relevant Market for Big Data 
As presented above, in cases where market shares can be and subsequently are determined, the 
competition authority or a court has at its disposal a first, even if preliminary, indication of whether 
an undertaking holds a dominant position. This indication may be later refuted by other evidence, 
but it arguably enables to focus the entire market power analysis towards the position of 
undertakings with the highest market shares, while removing the need to extensively examine the 
situation of undertakings with the lowest ones.  
The key problem with a relevant market for big data stems from a problem arguably not limited 
only to big data but to data in general (therefore, in line with the academic literature discussed 
below, the problem is presented with respect to data in general with additional discussion of the 
specific nature of big data dealt with in the next part of this subchapter). Data does not simply fit 
into either of the two scenarios presented in the subchapters above, where at least a “first step” 
towards the determination of a relevant market could have taken place. This part of subchapter 6.2. 
will therefore focus on the issue of market shares with respect to relevant markets for data, while 
the next part of subchapter 6.2. will analyse the particular features of availability of data and its 
assessment in ascertaining market power. Together, the author argues, these two methods can 
present a suitable “first indication” test for assessing market power in such a relevant market. 
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Market shares are generally measured in terms of the volume or value of sales,345 where the 
latter is argued to be more reliable in cases where the relevant products vary in price.346 In contrast, 
where products or services are provided without charge, the Commission suggests that measuring 
market shares in volume (of provision of such a product or a service) may be more appropriate as 
was e.g. the case for measuring the number of unique users in the Microsoft/Skype decision.347 
While Chapter 5 outlined the cases where data was already sold or provided to third parties, in 
potential upstream markets, also discussed therein, the existing methods of calculating market 
shares will not work because of the following reasons. 
In the absence of provision of data, there is no conduct (sale or other provision) with respect to 
which market shares could be calculated according to the standard methodology presented above.348 
Nonetheless, Graef has suggested a modified approach for determining market shares with the 
following rationale. If a market for data is defined, but such data is not traded or provided to third 
parties, one can seemingly only measure properties such as the volume, variety of data etc. 
Hypothetically, these characteristics could take the place of the volume or value of sales (or other 
provision of relevant products) in the “classic” approach for defining market shares. On the other 
hand, Graef warns that, in practice, every dataset has different “strengths and weaknesses”: in 
particular, it is not certain whether a larger dataset is better than a smaller, but more varied and 
better organised dataset in any given situation.349 Therefore, it is complicated to place these 
properties at the heart of the determination of market shares.  
Instead, she proposes using the value of data (that may in practice stem from various properties) 
held by different undertakings. Using such an approach, market shares would be derived from the 
“revenue gained by a provider through licensing of data to third parties and/or delivering targeted 
                                                 
345 In some cases, however, modifications have been made to account for the specificities of certain relevant markets; 
e.g. in Commission Decision COMP/39.525 – Telekomunikacja Polska, para 668, where the number of connected 
telecommunication lines for retail customers has been considered; in Commission Decision COMP/38113, Prokent-
Tomra, where a relevant market for so-called reverse vending machines was defined, Commission took into account the 
numbers of units of such machines sold and installed. See Commission Decision COMP/38113, Prokent-Tomra, paras 
1, 59. 
346 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 54. See also BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 872-873.  
347 Commission Decision COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/ Skype, paras 78-80. 
348 The Commission itself admits a range of other variables that could be taken into account, such as “capacity, the 
number of players in bidding markets, units of fleet as in aerospace, or the reserves held in the case of sectors such as 
mining.” See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 54. On the other hand, as explained further in this 
subchapter and to some extent the next subchapter on availability of data, the characteristics of big data complicate 
replacing the volume or value of sales by e.g. volume of data. 
349 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 256. 
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advertising services[.]” 350 This means that instead of selling data, it would be the monetisation of 
data that would be taken into account.351 
Such an approach is ingenious in that it enables to “circumvent” the question of comparing 
datasets held by various undertakings at this stage of market power analysis. On the other hand, it 
carries one significant drawback. The test requires that the data on a potential relevant market must 
be monetised. This means that the test will fall short of being dependable when only one platform 
on a market for data currently monetises its data; a similar situation might ensue it one platform 
vastly overperforms its rivals in terms of its ability to monetise data, even though, in terms of their 
monetising “potential”, two or more datasets may be comparable.352 Furthermore, it is not certain if 
the test would be usable in a situation where two undertakings collect and store comparable data 
from their users, but one of them monetises it through targeted advertising while the other only uses 
it for improved user experience and provides its product or service for a one-time or a subscription 
fee.353 Nonetheless, in some cases, this modified method can undoubtedly bring more clarity into 
the analysis of market power. 
In summary, determining market shares standardly requires the sale or other provision of 
products or services in order to calculate the value or volume of such sale or provision. Since in 
some cases data may not be provided to third parties at all, such an approach is not feasible; it could 
nonetheless be possible to modify it and account for the monetisation of data. Even such an 
approach would, however, not be accurate where data is not even monetised.  
 
6.2.4. Availability of Big Data and Market Power 
As outlined above, in some cases, the determination of market shares with respect to data, 
including big data (to which the discussion in this part of this subchapter applies as well, as was the 
case above), can be complicated and inaccurate. Therefore, it is proposed below to use the 
                                                 
350 Ibid., p. 267. 
351 In doing so, the determination of market shares could also become aligned with the valuation of a company, often 
derived from its ability to monetise data. See SOKOL, Daniel D. and Roisin COMERFORD. Does Antitrust Have a 
Role to Play in Regulating Big Data? In: BLAIR, Roger D. and Daniel D. SOKOL, eds. The Cambridge Handbook of 
Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High-Tech. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 
303. See also BAGNOLI, op. cit. 282, p. 21-22. 
352 The first example is admitted by Graef, who points to the example of WhatsApp, which did not in the past monetise 
the data it held on its users, see GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 267. The second scenario can be described on the example of 
social network platforms, which are monetised through advertisements - such a social network may grow simply 
because it was the first one to arrive at the market and subsequently through direct network effects. However, while it 
may make the most money from using its data for targeted advertising, it does not mean that any other social 
networking service cannot provide similar or even better data (most likely not to greater volume of data, but e.g. 
through larger variety of data collected).  
353 This could arise e.g. with music or podcast streaming and listening applications. 
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availability of big data discussed in this part of subchapter 6.2. as a complementary criterion when 
conducting a “first indication” analysis of market power. While even together, these two tests are 
not devoid of the need for further clarification, such an approach could improve the precision of the 
modification suggested by Graef; at the same time, the properties of big data that distinguish the 
concept from “standard” data, can pose a problem to this modification, as also discussed. 
It has been also outlined above that for some refusal to supply cases, dominant position was 
determined through the simple assessment of factual circumstances. Arguably, few cases involving 
data will be so clear as to enable such an assessment.354 Nonetheless, the Commission has recently 
started to conduct a factual assessment of the availability of data, in particular of data relevant for 
advertising purposes. It is argued below that such a factual assessment can be used when the 
modified market share test outlined by Graef runs into difficulties, e.g. in situations where data is 
not monetised, to compare the position of an undertaking monetising data and its competitor which 
does not. Together, these could present the first analytical step needed in order to determine a 
dominant position in a potential market for data, including a market for big data. 
In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission was faced with the proposition that the merger at hand 
might affect Facebook’s position in the online advertising market due to the increased amount of 
data under its “control”. The Commission thus examined the availability of user data valuable for 
online advertising purposes and held that “there are currently a significant number of market 
participants that collect user data alongside Facebook.”355 One of these was Google, which 
“controlled” about a third of such data, overperforming any other competitor.356 Eventually, the 
Commission decided that “there will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that are 
valuable for advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook's exclusive control.”357 
In other words, factually, enough relevant data was available for others to collect and use. 
Although this decision did not find problems with the access to relevant data, it is nonetheless of 
vital importance because of the two decisions following it. In a rather short succession, similar 
questions were raised in Microsoft/LinkedIn and Verizon/Yahoo, where the Commission not only 
                                                 
354 In particular, the most likely “candidates” would be the markets for data subsequently used in data analytics services. 
In fact, a similar situation (albeit one where data was already provided) occurred in the U.S. in the PeopleBrowsr v 
Twitter case. See PeopleBrowsr, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc.No. C-12-6120 EMC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) and JEFFRIES, 
Adrianne. After suing Twitter, PeopleBrowsr wins data access back in settlement. The Verge [online]. Vox Media, 2013 
[cit. 2019-06-21]. Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/25/4266692/after-suing-twitter-peoplebrowsr-wins-
data-access-back-in-settlement. 
355 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 188-189 and in particular the figure in para 188. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 184-189; this decision is only one in a line of 
cases using the same rationale, see BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 42-44. 
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explicitly considered a hypothetical market for advertising data, but also confirmed that in such 
situations, it will conduct an analysis of the availability of data.358  
On its own, the assessment of availability of data would not present a sufficiently clear method 
to provide the first indication of market power that is usually the result of the determination of 
market shares. This is due to the two reasons explained below. 
Firstly, if “control” (as the Facebook/WhatsApp decision put it) of data were to be the decisive 
factor in a “first indication” test of market power, one would first have to define what does 
“control” mean with respect to data. As a consequence, it would be necessary to firstly divide the 
relevant data into a number of categories, to properly reflect the possibilities of their legal 
protection, e.g. into personal data as defined by the General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”)359 and non-personal data.360 With respect to big data, such a categorisation should in 
principle be also feasible, albeit more demanding (e.g. it would be most likely necessary to base the 
“categorisation” of data on the sources of data or ways it is obtained, instead of going through the 
actual data). As a next step, each category would require a separate assessment and a determination 
of what degree of “control” would be sufficient for the purposes of the test; for illustration, when it 
comes to personal data, an undertaking can be either a data processor or a data controller under 
GDPR and even beyond these two categories, it can have various levels of permission to use such 
data.361 Such an exercise might turn out to be unnecessarily complicated for the purpose of 
providing a first indication of market power. 
Secondly and similarly to the modification of market shares suggested in the previous part of 
subchapter 6.2., the availability of data will also be influenced by the various properties of big data. 
Even if the substitutability of data is properly ascertained when defining relevant markets362 and the 
relevant characteristics of data are known,363 analysing the availability of data would still require 
comparing various datasets to each other and run into the same problems as the determination of 
                                                 
358 Nonetheless, the Commission did not find an issue with the availability of data in any of these cases. See 
Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 180 and Commission Decision COMP/M.8180, 
Verizon/Yahoo, paras 80-83. 
359 Art. 4 (1) of GDPR. 
360 See Art. 1 of EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union. Brussels, 13.9.2017, 
COM/2017/0495 final - 2017/0228 (COD). 
361 See Art. 4 (2) and (7) of GDPR. Furthermore, “control” over personal data (in terms of the Facebook/WhatsApp 
decision) can be expressed through legal terms; this is not, however, guaranteed for every category or type of data 
“control” over which might need to be assessed. 
362 See Chapter 5 in this respect. 
363 E.g. while the Facebook/WhatsApp decision left the definition of data relevant for advertising purposes largely open, 
it also gave a few indications on what sort of concrete data may fall within such a category by noting that “WhatsApp 
does not currently collect data about its users concerning age, verified name, gender, social group, activities, 
consuming habits or other characteristics that are valuable for advertising purposes” See Commission Decision 
COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 71. 
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market shares presented above. Furthermore, if the relevant market would be defined broadly and 
the analysis of substitutability would not reveal sufficiently precisely the key attributes of data in a 
given situation, looking only at availability could actually distort the assessment of market power, 
e.g. by unduly focusing on one aspect of big data such as its volume.364  
Instead of using availability of data in absolute terms, it may be more appropriate to use the 
availability of data as a relative test in cases where the market shares determined by the analysis of 
monetisation of data do not precisely describe the market power in relation to data.  
In practice, the market shares of undertakings on a relevant market would be ascertained at first; 
subsequently, the availability of data (specified according to circumstances; if “standard” data was 
in question, it could be described in concrete terms, while with the case of big data, a description 
would also be possible, but in more general terms) would be analysed to examine whether there are 
undertakings which, on one hand, do “control” the same volume, variety etc. of data as the 
undertaking with e.g. the highest market share, but on the other, do not monetise such data. Both the 
type and degree of “control” and the pertinent data characteristics would be derived from the 
position of the undertaking with the highest market share, not determined in absolute terms. Finally, 
the undertakings in similar position in terms of availability of data would be viewed as if they held 
similar market shares.  
With respect to big data, the above presented approach, as well as the modification proposed 
therein, runs into one potential obstacle. As already mentioned, if big data is defined by the 
properties of volume, variety, velocity etc. that go beyond the characteristics of “standard” data, it 
may turn difficult to determine, to measure, these properties in a way that would benefit the test. 
The modified approach towards market shares presented here relies on the feasibility of comparing 
the properties of big data (i.e. in a scenario where multiple undertakings control big data, 
distinguishing them from controllers of “standard” data, big data still could be compared in terms of 
their properties). The author would argue that even though big data (as suggested in Chapter 2) can 
bring the ability to provide qualitatively different results when analysed, its properties could still be 
assessed quantitatively (e.g. the variety or volume of big data could still be compared, albeit only 
with the volume or variety of big data held by a different actor). Therefore, if it still could be 
possible to compare big data controlled by different actors (albeit with less clarity than if such a 
case concerned “standard” data), the added assessment of availability of data would complement the 
                                                 
364 A test of market power aimed mainly at the volume of data might actually distort the perceived availability of data in 
favour of the undertakings “controlling” the largest volumes. This issue can be illustrated on the study that was used in 
the Facebook/WhatsApp decision in order to make a conclusion on the availability of data relevant for advertising 
purposes. The study (and the graph reproduced in the decision) showed that Facebook “controlled” only a single-digit 
percentage of data available for advertising purposes, while the majority of such data was actually out of the hands of 
the largest platforms. See Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 188. 
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market share method proposed by Graef and lead to results that would better reflect the situation on 
a relevant market for big data.365 
Even with the test outlined, however, it would be necessary to keep in mind that market shares, 
even if complemented by the analysis of availability, still only provide a first indication as to the 
market position of undertakings. As will be presented in the subsequent subchapter, the level of 
barriers to entry or expansion can have a significant impact on the eventual finding of a dominant 
position on a market for big data. 
 
6.3. Barriers to Expansion and Entry 
The previous subchapter has dealt with the analysis of the market position of an undertaking on 
a relevant market, one of the three key factors examined by the Commission when assessing market 
power. In contrast to market position, which covers existing competitive constraints posed by actual 
competitors, the second factor and the subject-matter of this subchapter, i.e. barriers to expansion 
and entry, focuses on the potential developments with respect to the relevant market.  
These events can take the form of expansion on part of the actual competitors as well as 
possible entry by undertakings which are potential competitors to the allegedly dominant entity.366 
If the findings concerning market position, especially through the use of market shares, provide a 
“useful first indication” of market power, then the analysis of barriers to entry and expansion  can 
confirm, clarify or even correct such an indication. 
In contrast to the determination of market position, which is focused on market shares, barriers 
to entry and expansion can take a much larger number of forms. These can range from legal 
barriers, such as the ownership of intellectual property rights,367 or technological advantages368 to 
obstacles to entry and expansion of economic nature.369 These barriers need not to be absolute, but 
in order to be relevant for the determination of a dominant position, they should either impede an 
actual competitor in competing with the market leader or deter a potential competitor from entering 
the market.370 As the Commission put it, a sufficiently relevant entry “cannot be simply [a] small-
scale entry, for example into some market niche, but must be of such a magnitude as to be able to 
                                                 
365 At the same time, the author acknowledges that the combination of these two tests would not be without problems; 
the issue of “control” would still need to be clarified and the choice of “metrics” could be questioned, but the relative 
assessment of availability would present less serious issues than if the analysis were to be conducted in absolute terms. 
366 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 188. 
367 See the discussion of the Magill case in the previous chapters; see also BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 880-882. 
368 See e.g. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 48. 
369 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 17. See also in general WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 188, 
BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 879. 
370 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 879. 
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deter any attempt to increase prices by the putatively dominant undertaking in the relevant 
market.”371 Furthermore, such an action must be sufficiently swift to prevent the exercise of the 
dominant undertaking’s market power.372 
In terms of a relevant market for big data, the key question with respect to barriers to entry and 
expansion will be the difficulty in obtaining data that would enable an undertaking to exert 
sufficient competitive pressure on the supposed dominant undertaking. The inquiry into these 
barriers will be heavily influenced by the definition of the relevant market and, once again, by the 
substitutability of big data on the upstream relevant market. Nonetheless, in terms of a relevant 
market for big data, it is likely that two questions will arise and are thus subject to further 
discussion in the subsequent parts of this subchapter: the costs of obtaining big data (6.3.1.) and the 
relevance of network effects in the collection of big data (6.3.2.).  
 
6.3.1. Costs of Obtaining Data 
This part of subchapter 6.3. argues that barriers to entry and expansion may be created by the 
costs of obtaining big data and such a factor will most likely have to be ascertained in practice if 
access to big data is sought with reference to EU competition law. This part of subchapter 6.3. (in 
contrast to the next part) focuses on obstacles that apply to data in general but may also influence 
obtaining big data. 
Data, in general, is not a scarce resource. To the contrary, it is nearly universally accepted that 
data can be easy to acquire, because it is non-rivalrous: the fact that one undertaking holds and uses 
a certain dataset does not preclude another undertaking from doing the same if both can (e.g. 
without legal obstacles) access the data.373 The German and French competition authorities pointed 
out that this statement, between the collection of data offline and online, may apply even more 
strongly to the latter as data may be generally easier to collect on digital markets.374  
Over the last couple of years, a significant amount of literature has been devoted to the 
relevance of data for the assessment of market power; its conclusions, however, vary significantly, 
as the authors take positions across the whole possible spectrum of opinions on the significance of 
                                                 
371 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 16. 
372 Ibid. 
373 See DAVILLA, Marixenia. Is Big Data a Different Kind of Animal? The Treatment of Big Data Under the EU 
Competition Rules. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 2017, 8(6), p. 371. See also NUCCIO, 
GUERZONI, op. cit. 44, p. 6; SOKOL, COMERFORD, op. cit. 351, p. 299; STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 44-45.  
374 BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 46. 
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data.375 In particular, those commentators who support the connection between holding large 
amounts of data and market power base their arguments on the scale and scope of data held by an 
undertaking they argue has significant market power.376 The opponents of such arguments point to a 
number of other characteristics of big data, including the loss of value over time and diminishing 
returns on scale after reaching a certain critical volume.377 Most of all, the authors sceptical of the 
connection between big data and market power ague that data is generally easy to obtain, as it is 
ubiquitous, inexpensive and easy to collect; the marginal cost of collecting additional data is 
claimed to be “nearly zero”.378  
On the other hand, it is not a given that all data collected online is easy and cheap to acquire. In 
particular, while the marginal costs for obtaining additional data may be very low for undertakings 
that have already set up their operations, the collection of data may be subject to high initial 
investments or even expensive in itself, depending on the characteristics of data.379 
For illustration, in TomTom/TeleAtlas, the Commission ascertained that creating so-called digital 
navigable map databases was a very expensive and time-consuming process.380 Although some 
difficulties in creating this sort of data can be alleviated in the online environment (e.g. by using 
online upload or entry of data instead of manual entry), some claim that mapping information or 
mapping data is different from other kinds of data collected online and is by no means less 
demanding to produce than outside of the online environment.381 For instance, the need to regularly 
update mapping data (relevant for any mapping service) might present significant costs that other 
undertakings will not be able to cover and thus collect comparable data by themselves.382 Further 
support for such a claim can be found in two major acquisitions of mapping services in the last 
couple of years.383 This would suggest that in some cases, difficulties and costs associated with 
                                                 
375 Compare STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 42-47 and SIVINSKI, OKULIAR, KJOLBYE, op. cit. 270, p. 209, 213-
215. 
376 NEWMAN, Nathan. Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data. Yale Journal on Regulation. 
2014, 31(2), p. 414, 423. See also STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 42-43; BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 49-52. 
377 TUCKER, Darren S. and Hill WELLFORD. Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data [online]. Antitrust Source, American 
Bar Association, December 2014, 2015 [cit. 2019-06-22], p. 6-9 Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549044. 
LAMBRECHT, Anja, and Catherine E. TUCKER. Can Big Data protect a firm from competition? [online]. CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle, January 2017, 2017 [cit. 2019-06-22], p. 1-4. Available at: 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CPI-Lambrecht-Tucker.pdf.  See also for 
an overview of the existing literature SOKOL, COMERFORD, op. cit. 351, p. 294-295. 
378 SOKOL, COMERFORD, op. cit. 351, p. 288-299. 
379 For instance, the German and French Competition authorities submit that fixed costs may have to be invested in 
order to collect and exploit sufficient amounts of data and might prevent new entrants making use of the same volume 
or variety of data as large incumbents. See BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 38. 
380 Commission Decision COMP/M.4854 – TomTom/Tele Atlas, para 132. 
381 STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 170-173. 
382 Ibid. 
383 These are the attempted acquisition of Nokia’s mapping service mentioned in STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 42-
43, (although the service was eventually acquired by a consortium of German car-makers rather than Uber) and the 
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collecting data may persist in spite of the service’s online element. On the other hand, even these 
economic obstacles did not prevent Google from creating its own maps service and quickly rising in 
importance.384  
Consequently, in a potential refusal to supply case, it will be necessary to take precise account 
of the costs of obtaining data instead of relying on the general claims about its collection presented 
above. Such costs will most likely have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis as one of the possible 
types of barriers to entry or expansion dependent on the nature of data. Beyond economic limits and 
as is the case with barriers to entry and expansion in general, the collection of data may be hindered 
by other types of obstacles, e.g. those presented by contract, intellectual property or trade secret 
law385 or by obstacles of technical nature.386 As is the case with the costs of obtaining data, these 
factors will most likely have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis as well. 
 
6.3.2. Network Effects as Barriers to Entry or Expansion 
When assessing barriers to entry or expansion, it is vital to look at the importance of network 
effects. As suggested in Chapter 2, network effects are associated with the ability to quickly develop 
the position of a product or service provider that takes advantage of these effects, as well as with the 
possibility to “tip” a certain relevant market towards one undertaking. In this context, network 
effects have to be viewed as the tools that enable undertakings to collect large amounts of data and 
thus strengthen their position on a market for big data. This part of subchapter 6.3. thus discusses 
their importance and influence. 
As is the case with the availability of data in light of the costs of obtaining it, the role of 
network effects is subject to discussion as well. Some authors claim that network effects, or rather 
their successful use, enables a new undertaking to enter, to contest a relevant market and quickly 
rise in importance;387 other point out that network effects present an advantage to the incumbent 
undertakings and that unless an undertaking achieves a critical size, it will be hard for it to remain  
or even advance on the market.388 
                                                                                                                                                                  
acquisition of the Waze community mapping service by Google; see in this respect the reflection on Google’s 
acquisition of Waze in STUCKE, GRUNES, op. cit. 8, p. 93-99, and CLEMENS, Georg. and Mutlu ÖZCAN. The 
relevance of supply-side substitutability for “Big data”. [online]. 2018-10-16 [cit. 2019-06-22], p. 7-8. Available at 
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254088. 
384 CLEMENS, ÖZCAN, op. cit. 383, p. 6-7. 
385 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 267-268; RUBINFELD, GAL, op. cit. 38, p. 359. 
386 RUBINFELD, GAL, op. cit. 38, p. 350-352. 
387 NUCCIO, GUERZONI, op. cit. 44, p. 7-8; SIVINSKI, OKULIAR, KJOLBYE, op. cit. 270, p. 217. 
388 See BKA/ADC, op. cit. 13, p. 27-28; KRÄMER, WOLFARTH, op. cit. 155, p. 165-166, SOLANO DIAZ, op. cit. 
215, p. 401-402. 
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The actual relevance of network effects may be influenced already at the stage of defining 
relevant markets, especially when because of the analysis of substitutability, some special properties 
(e.g. variety, velocity etc.) turn out to be “defining” for big data in a given situation. Furthermore, 
even if such characteristics are not explicitly identified when determining relevant markets, they 
might turn out to be vital in order to make a sufficiently swift and successful entry or expansion into 
the relevant market, as is required by the Commission’s view on these barriers.389 
In practice, two situations can occur: firstly, an undertaking may try to develop network effects 
from zero; secondly, an undertaking which already takes advantage of network effects on one 
relevant market can attempt to leverage these effects and expand its activities into another relevant 
market.390 The likelihood of their success will have to be analysed on a case-by-case basis as 
different relevant markets vary in their “capacity” to absorb new product or service providers that 
could subsequently take advantage of network effects. Some factors, such as the innovative nature 
of a product or service provided by a potential entrant391 or the willingness of users to multi-home 
in various relevant markets can play a role in such an assessment.392 
For instance, WhatsApp, prior to its acquisition, actually managed to surpass Facebook in terms 
of market share in the consumer communications sector; at that time, WhatsApp did not serve 
advertisements to its users, which became an important aspect of its wide adoption.393 On the 
contrary, Google was not able to use its position in other relevant markets to successfully develop 
its Google+ social networking service.394 It thus appears that in practice, each relevant market will 
have to be analysed in terms of the impact innovative products can make on competition on the 
market or the factors driving multi-homing of users.  
It was suggested by the Commission that in the market for consumer communications, multi-
homing is wide-spread and that consumers pay attention to the functionalities of various services.395 
On the other hand, in terms of so-called professional social networking services, incentives to multi-
home are apparently much lower because of the significant time-investments on part of users with 
                                                 
389 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 16. 
390 Interestingly, prior to its acquisition by Facebook, WhatsApp found itself in the first situation at the start of its 
operation. However, as some authors have argued, WhatsApp was potentially in the second type of situation outlined 
above and it could have been feasible for it to “venture” into the social networking services market. See CLEMENS, 
ÖZCAN, op. cit. 383, p. 1. 
391 Although, as will be argued in the next chapter, if it is possible to successfully enter into a relevant market with an 
innovative product, access to data will be less likely to be indispensable for competing in such a setting. 
392 SOLANO DIAZ, op. cit. 215, p. 401-402. 
393 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 41,87, 96. 
394 WELCH, Chris. Google begins shutting down its failed Google+ social network. The Verge [online]. Vox Media, 
2019 [cit. 2019-06-23]. Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/2/18290637/google-plus-shutdown-consumer-
personal-account-delete. 
395 Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para 87. 
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respect to the curating of their professional profiles.396 As a consequence, the Commission 
suggested in Microsoft/LinkedIn that the network effects in such a market are not easily mitigated 
and much less so possible to replicate.397  
With respect to search services, the Google Shopping decision suggested that multi-homing (on 
part of users with Google as their preferred search service) was infrequent; obtaining search data on 
a competitive scale thus appears highly difficult.398 With respect to social networking services, 
academic writing suggests that in the absence of innovative features or superior content (which, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, is nonetheless provided by users), consumers will tend to move to the 
services with the largest user bases and, accordingly, strongest network effects.399 
In conclusion, network effects can play a significant role in terms of determining barriers to 
entry. However, as is the case with all barriers to entry and expansion, they need to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. In particular, the impact of innovative features or the general likelihood of 
consumers multi-homing will need to be examined. For this reason, the successful modification of 
the market share determination method appears all the more important, as it may focus the analysis 
of market power in the right direction and make the determination of barriers to entry and expansion 
more effective. 
 
6.4. The Feasibility of Determining Dominant Position on a Market for Big Data 
As most of this chapter dealt with the methodology of determining a dominant position on a 
relevant market for data, it is necessary to outline (even though the actual determination of 
dominant position will be case-specific) the possibility of such a finding.  
The author argues that although there are significant obstacles in determining dominant position 
on a relevant market for big data, such a conclusion should be feasible. This is based mainly on the 
findings of Chapter 5, where it was shown that defining a (even potential) relevant market for big 
data as an input ought to be possible (but once again, with difficulties in the process). As suggested 
on the example of the Microsoft/LinkedIn decision with respect to the CRM software and data 
needed for its machine learning functionality, a possible delineation of a relevant market could 
entail partial description of the category of data in question (i.e. customer data involving data on 
user activity, e-mails etc.) while also making it possible for such data to reach the volume, variety 
                                                 
396 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 344-345. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Commission Decision COMP/AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), paras 306-309. 
399 MITAL, Monika and Sumit SARKAR. Multihoming behavior of users in social networking web sites: a theoretical 
model. Information Technology & People. 2011, 24(4), p. 389-390. 
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etc. to fall within the definition of big data (and subsequently be only usable with advanced 
analytical methods on downstream level). 
In such a scenario, only one undertaking could control data fitting this description and at the 
same time fulfilling the properties necessary to view it as big data, but (provided that big data of 
multiple actors would be substitutable) multiple undertakings could be in principle able to provide 
such data at the same time. For a finding of dominance, in light of the discussion of barriers to 
entry, however (especially with the imposition of the obligation to provide access to big data in 
mind), an undertaking should ideally be in a position of near-monopoly; as was the case with 
dynamically evolving markets, only the highest market shares (if possible to calculate) should be 




7. Application of the Refusal to Supply Test 
After the definition of relevant markets and the finding of a dominant position of an 
undertaking on the upstream market, the next step in the analysis of a potentially anticompetitive 
refusal to supply, to provide access to big data, is the application of the test outlined in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, in turn, the relevant conditions that must be fulfilled in order to determine a refusal of 
supply in violation of Art. 102 TFEU, are discussed in the four chapters below in the order starting 
with indispensability (subchapter 7.1.) and continuing with the exclusion of effective competition 
on the downstream market (subchapter 7.2.), the “new” product criterion (subchapter 7.3.) and 
ending with the discussion of objective justifications for refusals to supply (subchapter 7.4.). 
 
7.1. Indispensability 
This subchapter discusses the criterion of indispensability of an input for the competition on the 
downstream relevant market; firstly, it briefly outlines the general understanding of the condition in 
light of the Court’s case-law and secondly, it deals with its use in cases concerning data. 
The first criterion needed to be fulfilled in order to find abusive conduct in a refusal to supply 
under Art. 102 TFEU is based on the premise that the position of dominance is in itself not enough 
to require an undertaking to deal with customers on the downstream relevant market. Thus, the 
product or service an undertaking seeks access to must be indispensable for such a competitor to 
carry on with its business, or, in other words, indispensable in order to compete.400 It has been 
proposed that the criterion of indispensability has two dimensions:401 the input sought must be 
objectively necessary for competing on the downstream relevant market402 and there must be no 
actual or potential (but economically viable) substitutes for it.403  
The access to the input sought must go beyond simply being commercially useful or 
convenient; if the Court’s interpretation of law was to the contrary, undertakings would face an 
immensely broad duty to deal.404 Therefore, the refusal to supply test contains a rather strict 
condition of indispensability. In a recent judgment in Slovak Telekom, the Court also held that while 
                                                 
400 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 742; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 98-99. 
401 Some authors apparently do not take this view, at least with respect to the Oscar Bronner case, and point to these 
dimensions separately: JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 506. 
402 Also mentioned as a factor in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 81. 
403 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 216. 
404 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 507; the rule that indispensability goes beyond mere commercial usefulness was 
also confirmed in the Tiercé Ladbroke and European Night Services judgments. See Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke 
[1997] ECLI:EU:T:1997:84, para 10, and Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night 
Services Ltd [1998] ECLI:EU:T:1998:198, paras 205-221. 
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demonstrating indispensability (by the Commission) is not necessary in all refusal to supply cases, 
it cannot be disposed of where no regulatory framework for the provision of access exists.405 
A number of findings from the case-law of the Court as well as Commission’s practice is 
relevant for clarification of the criterion. In order to qualify as objectively necessary, an input has to 
offer the possibility of competing effectively with the incumbent dominant undertaking, i.e. exerting 
a competitive constraint on such an undertaking in the downstream market.406 On the other hand, a 
product or service might still be held indispensable in spite of the existence of some (albeit small, 
fringe) competitors in a given market.407 It is also not necessary for the lack of access to the 
indispensable input to cause other competitors to leave the relevant market altogether, it merely 
suffices if such competitors cannot reach a critical competitive position.408 
The absence of actual or potential substitutes must be assessed in light of any obstacles of 
technical, legal or economic nature409 that would make it at least unreasonably difficult, if not 
impossible, to produce a substitute, an alternative solution, to the required “facility” in foreseeable 
future.410 The alternatives must not necessarily be equally advantageous to the access-seeking 
undertaking,411 but it may be taken into account that it is not economically viable to replicate the 
input on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking controlling it.412 Furthermore, these 
alternatives need not to be developed solely by the undertaking seeking access, but in principle can 
be created together with other competitors.413According to the Commission, “an input is likely to be 
                                                 
405 Case T-851/14, Slovak Telekom [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:929; while the Court did not state this in such unequivocal 
terms, the author argues that this conclusion should follow from the consideration of paras 118, 120-121 and 128 read 
together. 
406 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 83. See also Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 51 and in particular para 66, where AG Jacobs explains: “the test in my 
view must be an objective one: in other words, in order for refusal of access to amount to an abuse, it must be extremely 
difficult not merely for the undertaking demanding access but for any other undertaking to compete. Thus, if the cost of 
duplicating the facility alone is the barrier to entry, it must be such as to deter any prudent undertaking from entering 
the market [and] it will be necessary to consider all the circumstances, including the extent to which the dominant 
undertaking [...] must pass on investment or maintenance costs in the prices charged on the related market.” 
407 JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 530 with respect to the Microsoft case. 
408 Commission Decision COMP/39.525 – Telekomunikacja Polska, paras 815-818. 
409 See WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p.743-747 for an account of the cases where an input was considered to be 
indispensable or at least it could be argued that such an input was indispensable based on those three types of barriers. 
410 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 45-46; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, 
para 83. 
411 See e.g. the account of refusal to supply case-law in Case T-851/14, Slovak Telekom [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:929, 
para 116. 
412 See Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, para 28, which confirmed this reading of the Oscar 
Bronner case. 
413 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, para 44. 
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impossible to replicate when it involves a natural monopoly due to scale or scope economies, where 
there are strong network effects or when it concerns so-called ‘single source’ information.”414 
In practice, the assessment of this criterion will show whether and if so, to what extent, is the 
reliance of data a significant aspect of competition on the downstream market. Two closely related 
issues will have to be examined: firstly, whether is it possible to successfully compete on the 
downstream market without relying on data at all, especially through the introduction of innovative 
products and services, and secondly, in cases where data is required for competing on the 
downstream market, what scope and scale of data is objectively necessary to effectively exert 
competitive pressure on the incumbent undertaking or undertakings. 
Although the fulfilment of the criterion of indispensability will have to be analysed on a case-
by-case basis, some past decisions of the Commission already shed light on the indispensability of 
data (or more precisely, the data of a certain undertaking) in certain situations. For instance, in line 
with the discussion on the issue of availability of data in Chapter 5, data relevant for online 
advertising is unlikely to be held indispensable, because it is possible to access this type of data 
from other sources.415  
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, the indispensability of data for so-called customer relationship 
management (“CRM”) software was also effectively discussed (as already suggested in previous 
chapters, this type of data could fulfil the definition of big data). One of the competitors in the CRM 
services sector argued that access to LinkedIn’s data would enable Microsoft to develop, as the only 
undertaking able to do so, a CRM service with a “machine-learning” functionality.416 On the 
contrary, the Commission found that this conclusion was unlikely to materialise in the future, not 
only because there were legal barriers to Microsoft’s access to the full extent of LinkedIn’s data,417 
but mostly because of the two following reasons. Firstly, Microsoft’s competitors have already 
started to develop their own machine learning functionalities and none of them required LinkedIn’s 
data for such action and, secondly, once again, other data that could enable the development of such 
a functionality, namely so-called “in-house” data,418 was available to them.419 Nonetheless, it 
                                                 
414 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 83 (footnote 58); furthermore, the Commission adds therein that “in 
all cases account should be taken of the dynamic nature of the industry and, in particular whether or not market power 
can rapidly dissipate.” 
415 See e.g. Commission Decision COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paras 188-189 or similarly with regard to 
advertising data, Commission Decision COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK / Vodafone UK / Everything Everywhere / JV, 
para 558. Furthermore, as the Commission explains, goals for which data is sought (unlike e.g. physical infrastructure) 
may vary greatly in practice and may be complex. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 100. 
416 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 246. 
417 Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn, paras 254-255. 
418 In contrast to data obtained from a third party such as LinkedIn. See Commission Decision COMP/M.8124 – 




appears that in cases where the competition on the downstream level is connected to the use of (big) 
data analysis (e.g. in the form of machine-learning), the indispensability of data will have to be 
examined more closely and, in particular, with an understanding of the use of such data in any 
concrete process.420 
Furthermore, there has been an intensive debate on the position of Google, both in terms of its 
search engine (and as a consequence, access to search data), but also of its overall platform that 
enables the combination of data from different parts of its online environment, that can illustrate the 
complexities associated with analysing whether data is indispensable due to its properties. It has 
been argued that the market for general search services is very likely to “tip” towards a single 
provider because of the amount of data Google has at its disposal and can use to improve its search 
engine.421 If that were to be proved in practice,422 two situations, both of which would be relevant to 
the question of indispensability, could ensue.  
Firstly, other search engine providers could request Google’s search data (also potentially 
fulfilling the definition of big data), as it would be only possible to compete in the general search 
services market with access to this data.423 In that case, it would have to be ascertained whether 
“effective competition” could be possible on part of undertakings that do not rely on Google’s data, 
but build their own engines and work with a limited amount of data; for instance, the position of 
engines such as DuckDuckGo or Qwant, both promoting the privacy of their customers as an 
advantage of their product.424 Secondly, the relevance of the scope and scale of Google’s data could 
be ascertained for differentiated, “value-added” services: from specialised search engines (e.g. 
focused on travel information) to completely separate products that could even require access to the 
data collected across services.425 
In conclusion, the practical assessment of the criterion of indispensability is going to shed light 
on the importance of big data for competition on a given market. What competition authorities will 
have to examine closely is the nature of services provided on the downstream level, in particular 
when consisting of data analytics, and the possible reliance of data of certain scope, scale or other 
                                                 
420 SIVINSKI, OKULIAR, KJOLBYE, op. cit. 270, p. 222. An interesting conclusion was recently also reached by the 
Commission (or in a material sanctioned by the Commission): the Commission recommends to distinguish between 
situations where access is sought for analytics purposes related and unrelated to the market in which a data holder is 
active, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 75-76 and 100. 
421 ARGENTON, PRÜFER, op. cit. 40, p. 90. 
422 See also the discussion on multi-homing with respect to Google in Chapter 6. 
423 ARGENTON, PRÜFER, op. cit. 40, p. 79, 100. 
424 Available at: https://duckduckgo.com/?t=hp [accessed 2019-06-27] and https://www.qwant.com/ [accessed 2019-06-
27]. 
425 See e.g. ABRAHAMSON, op. cit. 103, p. 880, who mentioned a spell-checking feature developed on the basis of 
search results. See also ARGENTON, PRÜFER, op. cit. 40, p. 96.  
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characteristics that could be only produced by the dominant undertaking and with respect to big 
data. 
 
7.2. Elimination of Effective Competition in the Downstream Market 
This subchapter focuses on the second criterion that must be fulfilled in order to find a refusal 
to supply contrary to Art. 102 TFEU. In practice, its analysis is close to the assessment of the 
previous criterion; on the other hand, it differs in one significant aspect and the main part of the 
discussion below is accordingly focused on the interpretation of this condition, which could 
potentially have significant impact on the feasibility of demanding access to big data in certain 
situations. 
The formulation of the second condition in the test for refusal to supply is essentially a 
compromise between two other thresholds for the elimination of competition on the downstream 
market. On one hand, parts of the Commercial Solvents case suggested that all competition on the 
downstream market needs to be eliminated in order to find an abuse of dominant position;426 on the 
other, in Oscar Bronner, this criterion was only applicable to the competition on part of the 
undertaking seeking access to a certain product or service.427 Eventually, the threshold of the 
elimination of all effective competition was settled on.428 In this respect, the criterion of 
indispensability is closely related to this requirement, as the level of competition is taken into 
account in both and the assessment of which is often made generally together.429 
A key issue with this criterion is that it is interpreted as meaning that the dominant undertaking 
must be already present on the downstream market; in refusing to supply its competitors on 
downstream market, it leverages its dominant position and effectively reserves such a market for 
itself.430 In this respect, the criterion provides a dividing line between the narrower view on refusals 
to supply in EU law and the broader approach towards the properly defined U.S. essential facilities 
doctrine.431 This would pose significant, if not insurmountable, obstacles to using the refusal to 
                                                 
426 Joined cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, para 25; see also the formulation in Case 
C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 38 and 52. 
427 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 25, 38. 
428 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 85; WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 748, GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 
220-221. 
429 Furthermore, as Graef points out, in practice these two factors may be assessed together. See GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 
274. 
430 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 959-960, GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 220; compare with EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
op. cit. 116, para 76, where Commission states that typically competition problems arise “where the competitors that the 
dominant undertaking forecloses are, as a result of the refusal, prevented from bringing innovative goods or services to 
market and/or where follow-on innovation is likely to be stifled.” 
431 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 960; There is only limited evidence of decisions taken according to the broader 
approach. In fact, even Commission’s decisions that actually use the formulation “essential facility” mostly dealt with 
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supply framework in order to access big data by undertakings competing on a market where the 
dominant undertaking is not yet present or even on an altogether new market, which the undertaking 
seeking access is planning to enter.  
On the other hand, there is support for broadening the application of refusal to supply beyond 
its current limits; at the very least, it is difficult to exclude completely the possibility of applying 
this criterion on markets without the dominant undertaking’s presence or on new, emerging 
markets.432 
Graef suggests that the act of reserving of a market to the dominant undertaking under the 
current understanding of the criterion discussed in this subchapter is not so different from an 
undertaking effectively preventing others from accessing a market such undertaking itself intends to 
enter in foreseeable future.433 To some extent, this opinion finds support in the Aéroports de Paris 
judgment, where the General Court held that “the concept of abuse is an objective concept and 
implies no intention to cause harm. [Furthermore,] the fact that [the dominant undertaking] has no 
interest in distorting competition on a market on which it is not present [...] is in any event 
irrelevant.”434 This judgment was also taken as an inspiration by the English High Court when 
deciding a case where the Luton airport did not compete on the market for coach services, but 
benefitted commercially from terms of a contract given to the exclusive operator of coach transport 
to the airport. Justice Rose wrote: “I reject the contention that the economic or commercial interest 
on the part of the dominant undertaking must derive from it being active itself on the downstream 
market. I can see no legal or economic justification for such a requirement. Indeed, this case shows 
how arbitrary such a requirement would be.”435  
Furthermore, the Commission itself points out that consumer harm might arise due to refusals 
which prevent innovative goods and services from being brought to the market.436 and abusive 
behaviour can also be found in cases of licensing intellectual property rights, where the refusal to 
supply prevents the emergence of a new product (discussed further below). There is, therefore, 
sufficient reasoning for broadening the current approach. The question of how far such an extension 
                                                                                                                                                                  
downstream market with the presence of the undertaking dominant on the upstream market, with the exception of an 
interim decision in the so-called Roscoff case. See Commission Decision COMP/IV/34.174 – Sealink/B&I Holyhead 
(interim measures), Commission Decision COMP/IV/34.689 – Sea Containers Ltd/Stena Sealink (interim measures) and 
for the Roscoff case, Commission Decision COMP/IV/35.388 – Irish Continental Group v. CCI Morlaix, para 59 
(original in French). 
432 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 960. 
433 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 221. 
434 Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris [2000] ECLI:EU:T:2000:290, paras 172-174. The undertaking in question, 
accused of abusing its dominant position through price discrimination on the downstream market, claimed that it 
endeavoured to maintain competition and had no interest in distorting competition on the markets on which it was not 
present. 
435 Arriva The Shires v London Luton Airport Operation [2014] EWHC 64 (Ch), paras 99-100. 
436 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 87. 
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can go can perhaps fittingly be answered by another Opinion of AG Jacobs who claimed in Syfait 
the existence of a “narrow range of circumstances in which a dominant undertaking will be obliged 
to open up its facilities or license its intellectual property rights to a third party for the first time.  
For such to be the case, some exceptional harm to competition must be shown.”437 
The scope of cases where access to big data may be sought thus depends on the interpretation of 
the criterion outlined above and any possible changes to it. One possible source of inspiration for 
such a change in construction is the “new product” criterion, discussed below, which currently only 
applies in cases where a refusal concerns inputs protected by intellectual property rights. 
Nonetheless, some authors have proposed that the logic contained in that test may apply more 
generally.438 Even with such inspiration, however, any precise modification of this criterion appears 
unclear and will have to be settled in time. 
 
7.3. The “New Product” Criterion in Refusal to Supply 
As outlined above, the condition that the refusal in a concrete case must prevent the appearance 
of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand, is currently limited to cases 
concerning intellectual property rights. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to outline its meaning and 
its possible use if, as proposed by Graef, such criterion was applied to access to data (including big 
data; the discussion below nonetheless refers to data without further specification in line with the 
academic writing discussed). 
In Magill, the criterion was fulfilled because the refusal in that case prevented the production of 
a weekly guide with comprehensive television programme listings.439 In Microsoft, however, it was 
sufficient that the refusal prevented only the introduction of “technical developments”, which 
nonetheless impeded the introduction of products with innovative features.440 
Graef submits that both intellectual property law and competition law share an in-built respect 
to innovation and consumer welfare;441 she proposes that intellectual property law protection is not 
                                                 
437 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-53/03, Syfait [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2004:673, para 66. 
438 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p.960, see footnote 655. At the same time, it is admitted therein that in a way, in each 
of the cases where the “new product” criterion was applied, the dominant undertaking was at least to some extent 
present on the downstream market; e.g. in Magill, the broadcasters provided “highlights” of the week’s programmes, 
which were, however, only partially substitutable to the comprehensive weekly guides, which it was not possible to 
produce without the necessary input. See Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, para 52.  
439 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, para 54. 
440 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 632, 648-649; in particular, in para 632, the Court 
pointed out that “[t]he Commission thus took particular care to ascertain that Microsoft’s refusal was a ‘refusal to 
allow follow-on innovation’, that is to say, the development of new products, and not a mere refusal to allow copying.” 
441 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 201. 
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the only case where an input, the creation of which might have required significant expenses, 
deserves shielding from “free-riding” by other undertakings.442 Thus, she proposes to extend the 
“new product” requirement even to cases without an intellectual property element, including 
situations where access to data is sought.443 Her proposal with respect to data is to take into account 
the influence of network effects (or other market failures, though network effects seem to be the 
most likely manifestation of them); where the downstream market would be “locked-in” because of 
them and the undertaking dominant on the market for data would be in a stable leading position on 
such a downstream market, the criterion could be disposed of. On the other hand, in the absence of 
such a situation, the emergence of a “new product” would have to be demonstrated.444 
While the adoption of this test remains an issue for future decisions, the addition of this 
criterion would most likely make it difficult to seek access to big data for the replication of an 
already existing product, while the upcoming providers of innovative products would have an easier 
time fulfilling this condition. 
 
7.4. Absence of Objective Justification for Refusal to Supply 
Lastly, even if all of the criteria above are fulfilled, it is still possible for an undertaking to 
escape the finding of a prohibited refusal to supply in light of a potential objective justification, the 
outline of which is provided in this subchapter.  
The dominant undertaking is generally entitled to plead a relatively wide variety of defences to 
its abusive behaviour; it is up to competition authorities or courts to subsequently balance such 
justifications against the harm caused to customers and consumers.445  
While the dominant undertaking cannot simply claim that its abusive behaviour is in its 
commercial interests, it can successfully argue that it is justified in refusing to work with an 
undertaking who is a “bad debtor”, fails to uphold its contractual obligations or uses the input 
provided by the dominant undertaking to break the law.446 The application of these justifications 
will nonetheless be case-specific. Another often used justification – the lack of capacity or the 
temporary need to cease or reduce supply – will be unlikely to succeed with respect to big data. 
Even though data storage can be a significant expense,447 it will not be necessary to expand it due to 
                                                 
442 Ibid., p. 202. 
443 Ibid., p. 209. 
444 Ibid., p. 226. 
445 Ibid., p. 961. 
446 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 749. 
447 RUBINFELD, GAL, op. cit. 38, p. 363-364. 
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the necessity to provide access. On the other hand, it may become necessary to increase the capacity 
of an undertaking’s servers in order to accommodate higher traffic therein.448  
A further commonly used justification is based on the necessity to cover costs associated with 
the creation of an input, i.e. to guarantee sufficient return on investment. The potential of any such 
defence will depend on the conditions under which access to the necessary input is provided, and, as 
Graef points out, on the ability of access-seeking undertakings to pay for such supply.449 In cases of 
data, this justification will have to be especially nuanced in cases of highly specialised datasets or 
big data collected in such volume and variety that it requires a platform operating across multiple 
markets to provide, as the costs of these types of data will, in all likelihood, be the highest.  
One further possible justification has been raised by Graef; it is possible that the dominant 
undertaking will attempt to use its obligations under EU data protection law in order to dispose of 
the obligation to provide access to big data. Nonetheless, as will be explained in Chapter 8, this 
defence could only be raised if personal data is at stake and furthermore, as Graef herself states, the 
feasibility of such a justification will depend on the scope of discretion granted by data protection 
law in any concrete circumstances.450 
Probably the most important defence is the negative impact on the dominant undertaking’s 
incentive to innovate because of the access-seeking undertakings’ “free-riding” on the indispensable 
input; by the same token, such argument can also be made with respect to access seeking 
undertakings’ incentives.451 Such a defence was employed by Microsoft before the General Court; 
Jones and Suffrin, however, point to exactly this attempt in order to highlight the difficulty of 
succeeding with a justification once a preliminary finding of abuse is made.452  
In particular, it appears from Microsoft that in order to succeed, the dominant undertaking must 
provide a sufficiently detailed justification, most likely at least outlining the future innovations that 
the undertaking is going to make.453 Furthermore, even if a plausible claim regarding incentives to 
innovate is made, the Commission will consider such a defence, but will also in the process 
examine “the structural changes in the market conditions that imposing  [an obligation to provide 
access] will bring about, including the development of follow-on innovation by competitors.”454 
                                                 
448 See e.g. Joined cases 6 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, para 28. 
449 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 277-278. 
450 Ibid., p. 276. 
451 WHISH, BAILEY, op. cit. 29, p. 749, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 89. 
452 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 688-712; JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 531. 
453 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 698; Microsoft chiefly claimed that an obligation to 
supply interoperability information to other undertakings would eliminate its “future incentives to invest in the creation 
of more intellectual property” while the General Court wanted Microsoft to specify technologies and products Microsoft 
had in mind. See also JONES, SUFFRIN, op. cit. 4, p. 531. 
454 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 116, para 89. 
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Therefore, even if the dominant undertaking manages to outline its plans with the big data it holds, 
undertakings that seek to provide innovative products or at least products with innovative features 
may overcome this justification.  
In conclusion, the success of any defence will depend on the circumstances of the case. On one 
hand, undertakings do have a variety of arguments to choose from at their disposal, on the other, the 
successful use of a pleading such as the “innovation” defence appears rather complicated, especially 
if the undertaking seeking access is planning to launch a new or an innovative product. 
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8. Access to Big Data in Practice  
The previous chapters have dealt with the necessary analytical steps that need to be made 
before a finding of a refusal to supply can be arrived at, from the definition of relevant markets to 
the application of the criteria defining a refusal to supply in EU law. The aim of this chapter is to 
briefly outline the conditions of legal (subchapter 8.1.), financial (subchapter 8.2.) and technical 
(subchapter 8.3.) nature, under which access to big data is most likely to be granted if a successful 
case is made. These three types of conditions are thus discussed in turn below. 
 
8.1. Legal Conditions of Access to Big Data 
Firstly, as already suggested in the previous chapter, it is possible that big data (or its part) a 
successful access-seeking undertaking requires for competing on the downstream market will be 
classifiable as personal data under GDPR. According to Art. 4 (1) of GDPR, personal data means 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, a so-called data subject.455  
Furthermore, the wide definition given to personal data by the EU legislature has been 
developed in the same way by the Court of Justice, which held in Nowak that “[personal data] is 
not restricted to information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of 
information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and assessments, 
provided that it ‘relates’ to the data subject.”456 In the Nowak and Breyer rulings, the Court even 
included under the term of personal data written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional 
examination and any comments made by an examiner with respect to those answers,457 as well as a 
so-called dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider.458 Because of the 
development of technology and especially data processing and analytics tools, more and more 
                                                 
455 Furthermore, under Art. 4 (1) of GDPR, an identifiable natural person is “one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person.” As to the question of what exactly is understood by the “identifiability” of a person, 
GDPR itself gives an even more precise explanation in Recital 26, according to which in order to find  “whether a 
natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling 
out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain 
whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective 
factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available 
technology at the time of the processing and technological developments.” 
456 Case C-434/16, Nowak [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, para 34. 
457 Case C-434/16, Nowak [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, para 62. 
458 See Case C‑582/14, Breyer [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para 49, where the Court adds that a dynamic IP address 
may constitute personal data in relation to the provider when “a person accesses a website that the provider makes 
accessible to the public [and] where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with 
additional data which the internet service provider has about that person.” 
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information will come under the definition of personal data; this, in turn, means that GDPR will 
apply to increasingly more situations.459 
One way how to “escape” the obligations laid down by the GDPR is to anonymise the data 
provided to other undertakings; anonymous information or data is understood as  “information 
which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person [or] data rendered anonymous 
in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable [.]”460 In contrast, 
pseudonymised data, i.e. data processed in such a manner that it can no longer be attributed to a 
specific data subject without the use of additional information461 is still considered personal data 
and GDPR thus still applies to it.462 In order to distinguish anonymised data from pseudonymised 
data, it is vital that the data in question may no longer be used to identify a natural person by using 
all the means reasonably likely to be used by either the data controller or even a third party and that 
the processing is irreversible.463  
If data cannot be effectively anonymised, then GDPR will apply and the undertakings will have 
to comply with its provisions. Consequently, any sort of processing of personal data, defined 
principally as “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of 
personal data,” will have to be based on one of the reasons in Art. 6 GDPR in order to qualify as 
“lawful” as required by Art. 5 (1) (a) therein. In particular, this means that both the transfer of data 
between undertakings and the further processing by the undertaking which obtained access to such 
data will have to comply with at least one of the reasons in Art. 6 GDPR.  
In practice, the most relevant legal bases for such processing of personal data are to be found in 
Art. 6 (1) (a), (c) and (f). Firstly, under letter (a), the lawful processing may be founded by the 
consent of the data subject, often given through agreeing with the terms and conditions of a given 
service, which may include consent to the access and processing of personal data by third parties. 
Secondly, the transfer of data may be also justified by the need to comply with a legal obligation as 
suggested by letter (c) of the Article, in particular if providing access to data has been ordered by a 
court or a competition authority. Lastly, processing under letter (f) may be based on the “legitimate 
interests” of undertakings, which, however, need to be balanced against the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of data subjects (including the rights to privacy and data protection in Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU).  
                                                 
459 PURTOVA, Nadezhda. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law. Law, Innovation and 
Technology. 2018, 10(1), p. 78-79. As the Commission has recently also explained, an inventive solution to this problem 
would be to provide a possibility of an “opt-out” to data subjects. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 104. 
460 Recital 26 GDPR. 
461 Art. 4 (5) GDPR. 
462 VOIGT, Paul and Axel VON DEM BUSSCHE. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical 
Guide. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, p. 15. 
463 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY. Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques. 10. 4. 
2014. 0829/14/ENWP216, p.5 Also available at: https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88197.pdf [accessed 2019-06-27]. 
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In practice, the concrete basis will depend on the situation; for instance, if some of the data that 
is going to be provided to another undertaking fall within the category of “sensitive” personal data, 
consent will have to be given by data subjects;464 the same situation will most likely occur when the 
use of data by the undertaking with newly gained access involves processing for purposes other 
than those of the dominant undertakings.465  
 
8.2. Financial Conditions of Access to Big Data 
Secondly, as proposed at the beginning of this chapter, the financial conditions of granting 
access to big data are discussed. In academic writing, two views on the financial side of the 
mandatory granting of access to data are present. Firstly, a number of authors claim that 
administering a remedy for a refusal to supply will be difficult; in particular, courts and competition 
authorities will effectively have to take on the role of regulators in order to properly enforce their 
findings and identify themselves the proper price and other “terms of supply”.466  
On the other hand, there are claims that the cost of providing access to data is going to be much 
lower than in cases where access must be granted to physical infrastructure; according to this view, 
the costs are only going to cover the expenses on servers or bandwidth.467 
The situation under EU competition law could be placed in the middle of these claims. As Graef 
explains on the example of the Microsoft case, the Commission requested (without laying down a 
specific rate of remuneration) that Microsoft supplies interoperability information on the basis of 
reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.468 If Microsoft was able to discriminate between 
undertakings, it could actually introduce new distortions of competition.469 In particular, the 
Commission also ordered that any remuneration required by Microsoft for the supply must not 
reflect the so-called “strategic value”, i.e. value derived from its dominant position on a given 
market.470  
                                                 
464 See Art. 9 (1) and (2) (a) GDPR. 
465 In light of the principle of purpose limitation in Art. 5 (2) GDPR. See also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION 
WORKING PARTY. Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679. 10. 4. 2018. 
17/ENWP259 rev.01, p. 12. Also available at: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=623051[accessed 2019-06-27] where it is suggested that: “[i]f a controller processes data based on 
consent and wishes to process the data for another purpose, too, that controller needs to seek additional consent for this 
other purpose unless there is another lawful basis which better reflects the situation.” This interpretation of the 
requirement of consent, in light of the principle of purpose limitation, serves as a protection against the “function 
creep”, i.e. unanticipated use of personal data by data controllers. 
466 ABRAHAMSON, op. cit. 103, p. 877; see also KATHURIA, Vikas and Jure GLOBOCNIK. Exclusionary Conduct 
in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy [online]. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition Research Paper No. 19-04, 2019 [cit. 2019-06-25], p. 16-17. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337524.  
467 ABRAHAMSON, op. cit. 103, p. 878. 
468 GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 278; Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, para 1005. 
469 Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, para 1006. 
470 Commission Decision COMP/37.792 – Microsoft, para 1008 (ii). 
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The approach of the Commission was subsequently upheld by the General Court and thus, as 
Graef suggests, the standard for financial conditions of access is derived from this assessment; an 
undertaking may be required to supply other competitors on the basis of reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions, but without reflecting any strategic value of its asset in the process.471 
In practice, the FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) standard, otherwise used in 
the context of the so-called standard essential patents and their licensing, may be used as the 
relevant benchmark.472 Accordingly, the dominant undertaking’s interests would be compared to 
those of the undertakings using such data in order to strike a balance between them. This would 
suggest that the granting of access to big data would be under oversight with respect to this 
standard.473 
 
8.3. Technical Conditions of Access to Big Data 
Lastly, the technical aspects of access to big data are going to be relevant as well. It could be 
argued that in all likelihood, a dominant undertaking would only need to disclose the relevant data 
itself, not the sources or methods of collection; such a conclusion could be made by way of analogy 
from the Microsoft case, where the company was required to only disclose “interface specifications” 
necessary for enabling interoperability, but not to provide e.g. the source code of the Windows 
operating system.  
Furthermore, in cases where the relevance of data in time will be a significant characteristic of 
such an input, the “freshness” of big data will have to be ensured. A convenient way of managing 
this type of access is the development of “application programming interfaces” or “APIs”, which 
could be defined as functionalities that allow e.g. developers to access data stored in computer 
systems in a pre-specified and machine-readable format.474 In such a case, the API would serve as a 
“gateway” to the big data that the dominant undertaking must provide access to and accordingly, 
any manipulations with such an interface would be under the scrutiny of competition authorities. 
                                                 
471 Case T-201/04, Microsoft [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 95-100; GRAEF, op. cit. 12, p. 278. 
472 BAILEY, JOHN, op. cit. 119, p. 804-805. 
473 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, op. cit. 13, p. 97, 109. 




This thesis analysed the possibility of obtaining access to big data under the refusal to supply 
case-law developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. It can be concluded that in principle, the legal 
framework for the assessment of such cases could enable undertakings on downstream relevant 
markets to seek access to big data held by an undertaking dominant on the upstream relevant market 
for big data. At the same time, such an approach, if it were to be applied in practice, would require 
clarification of several points of law discussed in this thesis. 
The thesis first outlined the current understanding of the key notions subsequently discussed in 
further analysis. It explained that “big data” (although a concept that does not have a settled 
definition) plays a significant role in the rise of online platforms; this is also due to the successful 
use of so-called network effects and the so-called multi-sided nature of certain markets. Online 
platforms manage to take advantage of these phenomena, which help them to obtain access to vast 
amounts of data that are subsequently used by the same platforms to enhance their products and 
services and further exploit network effects and the multi-sidedness of a number of markets. 
The thesis aimed at placing this situation within the framework of the refusal to supply case-law 
of the Court of Justice; it identified a subset of these cases (involving the refusal to supply an input 
on an upstream market which subsequently affects the competition on the downstream market, as 
the input is vital for competing therein) as relevant for the issue. In order to do so, it was first 
necessary to examine the relevant market definition on the downstream level and subsequently on 
the upstream level.  
With respect to the determination of relevant markets, the thesis proposed that defining both 
downstream and upstream relevant markets for a scenario concerning such access is feasible, but 
not straightforward.  
With respect to defining downstream relevant markets, the thesis identified several key points 
that need to be dealt with in order to shed light on the definition of relevant markets in a 
hypothetical case of refusal to provide access to big data. Firstly, one of the most important methods 
of determining the issue of substitutability, the so-called SSNIP test, is not dependable when the 
relevant markets need to be defined within a so-called multi-sided environment. The notion of 
substitutability usually enables competition authorities and courts, as well as undertakings, to assess 
whether the products and services provided by one undertaking are interchangeable with products 
and services provided by another and whether they fall within the same relevant market. Because of 
the multi-sided nature of certain markets (and the benefits to users following from it), an 
undertaking may “compensate” for the otherwise detrimental effects of the increase in price 
105 
 
simulated in the SSNIP test. As a result, there is a danger of misinterpreting the results of the 
simulation and the incorrect definition of a relevant market.  
The thesis suggested several modifications to the SSNIP test. One of such changes uses the 
price structure set by an undertaking operating the platform, i.e. takes account of prices charged to 
all sided of a market. Such a method does correspond to the doctrinal understanding of online 
platforms as actors operating in multi-sided markets and has the potential to alleviate the problems 
with the inefficiency of the SSNIP test; at the same time, even the proponents of this method admit 
that it is difficult to adopt in practice.  
Another possible modification of the SSNIP test involves the introduction of the so-called non-
price factors of competition: these encompass criteria such as quality, privacy and/or data protection 
or innovation. While the thesis accepts that there is merit to the use of any of these factors (with 
quality having the strongest credentials, to the point where substitutability could be assessed on the 
basis of the reaction of consumers to a decrease in quality in a so-called SSNDQ test), they are not 
yet developed into a form that would enable their practical use. In particular, before turning to non-
price factors in assessing substitutability, two steps are proposed: firstly, narrowing down the 
otherwise too broad concepts of quality or innovation to more concrete terms and secondly, using 
normative benchmarks (possibly stemming from legislation such as GDPR) in order to create 
objective measuring system of consumers’ reactions.  
This difficulties with defining relevant markets on the downstream level further manifest 
themselves in the question of determining the number of relevant markets, as well as in the 
delineation of geographical relevant markets. With respect to the former, the thesis argues that two 
methodologies (which are connected, but not necessarily always lead to the same results) – the 
transaction/non-transaction methodology and the matching methodology – could be used to 
determine the number of relevant markets that need to be defined. 
With respect to the definition of an upstream market, the thesis first examined past decisions of 
the Commission where data was provided on an upstream market: in the cases of navigational data, 
financial data as well as broadcast data (with the last one actually placed in this category due to the 
fact that the downstream market was centred around the provision of corresponding data analysis 
services), an upstream market for data as an input could have been defined; in none of these cases, 
however, did the data in question arguably fulfil the definition of big data. The thesis nonetheless 
proposed two takeaways for access to big data from these existing decisions: the need to describe 
and delineate the data in question at least in partially concrete terms but not too narrowly, and the 
necessity to examine the subsequent use of such data on a downstream market (where the analysis 
of such data rather than pure implementation into a product should lead, with more probability, to a 
finding of a relevant market for big data). 
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The thesis further turned to the issue of defining potential, hypothetical markets for big data, 
derived partially from the fact that no case of access to big data has reached the Commission to 
date. The thesis accepted that in light of a certain interpretation of the case-law of the Court, it could 
be possible to arrive at a definition of a potential upstream market for big data, provided that such 
an exercise leads to a sufficient description of the way big data is used within the operation of the 
platform (e.g. through the distinction between collection, storage and subsequent analysis of big 
data) and that the “production processes” as defined by the IMS case could thus be identified. 
Lastly, the thesis pointed out the need to accurately determine the substitutability of big data as 
an input sought on the upstream market. It argued that the special properties of big data – often 
described through the “Four Vs” of volume, variety, velocity and value – need to be taken account 
of in order to properly determine the inputs that fall within the same upstream relevant market. On 
the basis of the Commission’s decision in Microsoft/LinkedIn, it proposed that big data provided on 
an upstream market may take the form of data that relates at least broadly to some source or topic 
(e.g. customers and their actions), even if described less concretely than in cases of “standard” data 
discussed previously in the thesis, and that it ought to bear some relation to its intended use (e.g. use 
in machine-learning algorithms, which disqualifies smaller, less varied, datasets from being in the 
same relevant market). Provided that this data is of significant volume, variety, velocity etc., such a 
case can serve as an inspiration to future decisions where big data serves as an input. 
The thesis further turned to the issue of finding a dominant position on such a market. A similar 
issue as with the tools used to define relevant markets presents itself with respect to the analysis of 
market power. The arguably most practical tool used in order to ascertain market position and 
subsequently the market power of an undertaking, i.e. the analysis of market shares, needs 
substantial modifications in the approach of its application. This thesis proposed to combine the 
assessment of market shares through monetisation of data (basing market shares on the amount of 
money obtained from the monetisation of data) and the analysis of availability of such data; it 
nonetheless remains to be seen whether a similar approach will be adopted in the future. In 
particular, with respect to big data, the thesis pointed out that even the use of modified market share 
approach suggested therein relies on the possibility to compare the properties of big data (which 
nonetheless the author argues could be possible). 
Furthermore, the thesis analysed the barriers to entry and expansion and their impact on the 
determination of dominant position. Such an examination could have significant impact on the 
outcome of any case where access to big data is sought, as it can not only modify or disprove the 
conclusions taken from the “first step” presented by the use of market shares, but also, in the event 
that it would not be possible to use such a preliminary method, can effectively serve as the main test 
for the finding of a dominant position. In practice, it will be necessary to examine firstly, the costs 
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of and difficulties of obtaining data and secondly, the impact of network effects on the collection of 
data and the possibilities of developing such effects. Such an assessment, however, can currently be 
only conducted on a case-by-case basis with only limited clarity.  
The thesis nonetheless argues that it could be possible to find that an undertaking holds a 
dominant position in a market for big data; due to the dynamic nature of such a market (as data, in 
general, is relatively easy to obtain), such a finding will be most probable if one undertaking is in a 
position of a monopoly or a near-monopoly. 
The thesis subsequently turned to the test needed to establish an anticompetitive refusal to 
supply provided that relevant markets are ascertained and a dominant undertaking exists. With 
respect to the criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to find a violation of Art. 102 TFEU through 
a refusal to provide access to big data, two of these conditions can have significant impact on the 
success of any such case. Firstly, the criterion of indispensability can shed light on the essential 
nature of big data for competition on downstream relevant markets, although the analysis of 
indispensability is still largely dependent on case-by-case determination. In particular, the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn decision was again taken as a case that could shed light on the practical 
assessment of this step of the test; if data, usable for a certain goal (e.g. developing a machine-
learning functionality in a service), especially for data analysis of similar use, can be obtained 
(provided that the quality of data is comparable) from e.g. both internal and external sources, the 
criterion of indispensability will not be met. Secondly, the condition of elimination of effective 
competition on the downstream market will, in all likelihood, be crucial for the issue of access to 
data where data has not yet been provided to third parties. As the interpretation of this factor 
currently stands, it will not be possible to rely on the refusal to supply framework in such a 
scenario. Two other criteria, the absence of objective justification and the “new product” criterion 
were also discussed, although the former two seem to be the most determinative of the success of 
any request to access big data in the control of a dominant undertaking. 
Finally, the thesis proposed the basic questions that need to be dealt with once access to big data 
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Přístup k big data na základě „refusal to supply“ judikatury Soudního 
dvora EU 
Abstrakt  
Tato diplomová práce se věnuje tématu přístupu k tzv. big data z pohledu soutěžního 
práva EU. Práce se zabývá tím, zda a do jaké míry je možné využít tzv. „refusal to supply“ 
judikaturu vytvořenou Soudním dvorem EU k tomu, aby bylo možno získat přístup k big data, 
která jsou v dispozici dominantního podniku.  
Práce shledává, že za určitých podmínek je možné, aby byly naplněny všechny 
nezbytné kroky k tomu, aby mohl podnik od dominantního podniku žádat přístup k big data 
pod kontrolou tohoto podniku. 
Tato práce se proto nejprve zabývá tím, jaké faktory působí na tzv. online platformy, 
které se v postavení dominantních podniků z hlediska přístupu k big data mohou ocitnout 
velmi často. Práce analyzuje působení tzv. síťových efektů, vlivu analýzy dat na jejich 
efektivitu a problematiku tzv. vícestranných trhů v souvislosti s postavením online platforem. 
Následně je předmětem práce posouzení jednotlivých kroků, které v souhrnu vedou 
ke klasifikaci chování dominantního podniku jako zneužití jeho dominantního postavení skrze 
odepření přístupu k big data.  
Z hlediska definice relevantních trhů v soutěžním právu je zásadní rozdělení na tzv. 
downstream a upstream trhy, jelikož v případech „refusal to supply“ posuzovaných Soudním 
dvorem EU je typickou situací právě dominantní postavení jednoho podniku na upstream trhu 
a následné odmítnutí přístupu ke zdroji nezbytném pro soutěž na downstream trhu. Práce 
nicméně ukazuje, že definice obou typů trhů je v případech přístupu k big dat problematická; 
jednak s ohledem na vícestrannost trhů, které zahrnují online platformy a jednak kvůli 
nutnosti definovat upstream trh jako trh s big data. 
Práce dále zkoumá, jakým způsobem je možné dojít k zjištění dominantního postavení 
podniku na upstream trhu s daty. Zabývá se možností určit tržní podíly za takové situace a 
bariérami vstupu na relevantní trh v podobě nákladů na získání dat a vytvoření síťových 
efektů. 
Dále práce zkoumá jednotlivé kroky v rámci testu pro „refusal to supply“ dle 
judikatury Soudního dvora EU. Jako zásadní zejména shledává otázku nezbytnosti big data 
pro působení podniku na downstream trhu, stejně jako otázku vyloučení efektivní soutěže na 
relevantním trhu a její interpretaci v dosavadní judikatuře. 
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Nakonec práce stručně představuje podmínky, za kterých by měl být přístup k big data 
poskytnut. 
Klíčová slova: právo Evropské unie, soutěžní právo, zneužití dominantního 




Access to big data under the “refusal to supply” case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the EU 
Abstract 
This thesis deals with the topic of access to the so-called big data from the perspective 
of EU competition law. The thesis deals with the question whether and if so, to what extent it 
is possible to use the so-called “refusal to supply” case-law created by the Court of Justice of 
the EU to gain access to big data held by a dominant undertaking. 
The thesis finds that, under certain conditions, it is possible for all necessary steps to 
be fulfilled to allow one undertaking to request access from a dominant undertaking to big 
data under the control of that undertaking. 
This thesis therefore firstly discusses what factors affect the so-called online 
platforms, which can often find themselves in the position of dominant undertakings in terms 
of access to big data. The thesis analyses the effects of the so-called network effects, the 
impact of data analysis on their efficiency and the issue of the so-called multi-sided markets 
in connection with the position of online platforms. 
Subsequently, an assessment of the individual steps which, in summary, lead to the 
classification of the behavior of a dominant undertaking as an abuse of its dominant position 
by refusing access to big data is conducted. 
From the point of view of defining relevant markets in competition law, the division 
into downstream and upstream markets is essential; as the case-law of the Court of Justice 
shows, the typical situation of a refusal to supply involves the dominant position of one 
undertaking on the upstream market and the refusal to provide an input necessary to compete 
on the downstream market. However, the thesis shows that the definition of both types of 
markets is problematic in cases of access to big data, both with regard to the multi-sidedness 
of markets that include online platforms and with the need to define an upstream market as a 
market for big data. 
The thesis further examines how it is possible to determine the dominant position of an 
undertaking on the upstream market for big data. It addresses the possibility of determining 
market shares in such a situation and the barriers to entry into the relevant market in the form 
of costs of obtaining data and the creation of network effects. 
Furthermore, the thesis examines the steps in the refusal to supply test according to the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. In particular, it considers the issue of the 
indispensability of big data for the operation of an undertaking on the downstream market as 
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well as the elimination of effective competition therein and its interpretation in the existing 
case-law as the two crucial questions. 
Finally, the thesis briefly presents the conditions under which access to big data should 
be provided. 
Keywords in English: European Union law, competition law, abuse of 
dominant position, refusal to supply, big data 
 
 
